Breakdown of hegemony: Thailand's political crisis 2006- in Gramscian perspective by Kontio, Heli
 
 
University of Tampere 
School of Management 
International Politics 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
                          BREAKDOWN OF HEGEMONY IN THAILAND: 
       THAILAND’S POLITICAL CRISIS 2006- IN GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE 
                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heli Kontio   
Pro Gradu –Thesis 
May 2014 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE 
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 
KONTIO, HELI: Breakdown of hegemony: Thailand’s political crisis 2006- in Gramscian 
perspective 
Pro Gradu – Thesis, 121 pages 
International Relations 
May 2014 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The central theme of this thesis is the proposal that in Thai politics, a new historical 
transformational phase, a new paradigm, has emerged since the 1997-98 Southeast Asian 
economic crises. It is proposed, that this new phase indicates the breakdown of the hegemonic 
rule of the old elite networks – the army, the bureaucracy, the palace, and the old Thai 
business elites. These networks, it is argued, have held both material and ideological control 
over the masses since Thailand became a modern capitalist state in the late 19
th
 century during 
the historic hegemonic bloc of the Pax Britannica. The starting point for analysis in this study 
is to interpret Thailand’s current political crisis, which has been undergoing since the military 
ousted the Prime Minister elect, Taksin Shinawat, and his Thai Rak Thai government in 
September 2006, as a class conflict, the roots of which are embedded in the historical 
development processes of capitalism in Thailand. The new transformational phase, it is 
argued, indicates the emergence of the rural and the urban poor as a counter-hegemonic 
politically active social force in the realm of Thai politics. The rural and the urban poor as a 
politically active force demand more participation in the political decision-making, more 
social justice, and more social reforms.  
 
To illustrate the new transformational phase in Thai politics, the author has combined two 
approaches as interpretative tools in illustrating the function of hegemony in the Thai context 
against the backdrop of the function of hegemony on the international systemic level. The two 
approaches are the Gramscian method of the philosophy of praxis, which the author has 
reconstructed from Gramsci’s original texts, and the Neo-Gramscian Italian School’s theory 
of the historic hegemonic blocs in the world system. In Gramscian analysis, the two levels – 
the domestic and the international – are intertwined. To articulate Thailand’s current political 
crisis as a major shift in the class relations in Thai society, Gramsci’s concepts of organic 
crisis and his dual notion of the war of position/passive revolution are used. Thailand’s 
current political crisis is interpreted as a Gramscian organic crisis, a crisis of the state 
authority, which indicates a major historical rupture point from the passive revolution 
situation to a war of position situation between the various configurations of social forces. In 
the passive revolution situation, the hegemonic rulers keep the cohesion of their hegemonic 
social order by implementing social reforms brought about by the inbuilt change processes in 
the system. In the war of position situation, on the contrary, the organized counter-hegemonic 
forces, due to their empowered political consciousness, challenge the old hegemonic order 
and demand an alternative way of organizing a society.  
 
The focus of the analysis is on the historical forms of change and transformation of the 
totality of the power relations in Thai society in Thai historical context, where the hegemony 
of the elite networks emerges from the intertwined processes on the levels of the material base 
structure and the superstructure: the economic, the political, and the ideological. Hence, the 
function of hegemony in Thai context is illustrated through historical analysis: the hegemonic 
structures are positioned as having initially been created against the international systemic 
 
 
changes of the Pax Britannica era, when the interests of the elite networks were unified under 
the strong nation-state, upheld by the military and the bureaucracy. The consolidation of the 
hegemonic rule and the strengthening of the military, as well as reinstating Thai monarchy as 
a hegemonic tool, happened during the American neo-liberalist project of the Pax Americana 
era. The Southeast Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 and the ensued international neo-
liberalist offensive, it is argued, set in motion the breakdown of the hegemonic elite networks 
rule. In the Gramscian perspective, the polarization of society and the counterhegemonic 
resistance movement, embodied in the Red Shirt Movement, indicate a major change in the 
power configurations of the Thai society. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: WHY I AM DOING RESEARCH IN THAI POLITICS 
 
I have a long-time interest in Thai politics and its twists and turns, reaching back to the year 
1992 when I visited Thailand as a tourist for the first time, right after a few months after the 
streets of Bangkok had been stained with blood once again, in yet another military crackdown 
of people demanding political and social reforms. I moved to the country three years later, 
and lived and worked there for years. In the process, I became familiar with the Thai 
language. This process of crossing the language barrier not only had a profound impact on my 
own understanding of Thai society, Thai politics, and Thailand’s cultural practices, but it also 
opened a new perspective for me, as to what was happening behind the carefully polished 
international image of Thailand. 
 
Subsequently, the current historical political crisis that has engulfed Thailand since the 2006 
military coup – Thailand’s crisis of democracy - was a natural choice for my Master’s thesis 
project. As this thesis is a product of twenty years’ study on Thai politics, it naturally builds 
heavily on my own accumulated knowledge on the topic. With the help of this accumulated 
knowledge, the main goal of this project is to contribute to the knowledge on Thai politics, 
especially in Finland, by producing an alternative story to academic research on Thai politics, 
with the class perspective at the centre of analysis. 
 
Thailand’s current political crisis has lasted for eight years now, since the year 2006 when the 
Thai army deposed the democratically elected Prime Minister Taksin Shinawatra
1
. At the time 
of writing this, there is no end in sight to the crisis.  
 
 The bulk of the academic research on Thailand, “the hegemonic narrative” is often a 
monolithic, vertical “top-down” interpretation of the Thai elites’ internal struggle for power, 
as the driving factor of Thai politics. The hegemonic narrative of the mainstream academic 
                                                          
1
 I find the official transliteration of Thai language misleading and confusing, as this system does not always 
correspond to the way the Thai language is pronounced. Therefore, I have taken the liberty of transliterating 
the Thai language words as they are pronounced. To give a couple of examples of the official transliteration 
system here vs. how they are pronounced in Thai: King Bhumibol in Thai is  pronounced King Pumipon; Thaksin 
Shinawatra is Taksin Shinawat; Beer Singha is beer Sing; River Kwai is pronounced River Kwee, just to give a few 
examples.  Heli Kontio.  
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research on Thai politics tends to portray the political developments in Thailand as a linear 
continuum of military rule, with civilian governments strewn in between. To me, this 
hegemonic narrative emphasizes the elite stakeholders’ role in Thai politics, and to an extent, 
ignores the class conflict aspect of Thailand’s political crisis, as well as the grassroots’ 
perspective; or the perspective of the heterogenic, non-unified “masses,” the people, as active 
agents of social change in the realm of Thai politics.  
To understand the dynamics of the current historical Thai political crisis, I find it essential to 
focus on the totality of the power relations in Thai society in order to get a whole picture of 
the dynamics of the current crisis. In this perspective, the focus is on identifying and 
articulating social change and transformation of Thai society through historical analysis of 
situations, keeping the class nature of the conflict at the centre of the analysis. In my opinion, 
it is only through a holistic perspective that one can find answers to the questions, like, for 
example: why the crisis has lasted so long, and where the social movement of the Red Shirts 
emerges from. As the crisis is not only Thailand’s domestic crisis, the developments inside 
Thailand also have to be seen against the backdrop of the international system. 
 
Due to my own life experiences and my life as a social activist, the alternative story that 
emerged to me upon my learning the local language in Thailand, was more interesting to me 
than the aforementioned hegemonic narrative. At the forefront of this alternative story, is the 
hierarchical class nature of Thai society, its subtle and at the same time clear class 
distinctions, and the power struggles simmering underneath the smooth surface, between the 
various political stakeholders. These power struggles are ready to erupt into violence at the 
slightest provocation. Violence is always brewing under the smooth surface of Thai society, 
ready to erupt, like happened in the Red Shirt demonstrations in Bangkok in 2010, and in the 
recent “the People’s Democratic Reform Committee” street demonstrations in Bangkok that 
begun in November 2013.   
As contrast to the hegemonic narrative, in the alternative story, the bottom-to-top story, as I 
call it, the central question that emerges, is the asymmetrical power relationship and the 
power struggle between the hegemonic rulers and the ruled, which are in subordinate position 
in Thai society. This alternative story is a story of the struggles of the “people” (prachachon) 
against the elites (ammart), and their hegemonic rule, the roots of which point to the historical 
economic development processes of the Thai society, and their socio-political implications. 
Essential to this alternative story are the normative questions concerning social inequality, 
3 
 
social struggle, resistance, and the demands for participation of the ruled in political decision-
making. 
Seen from this perspective, a continuous domestic social conflict emerges, which in the 
current Thai political crisis, denotes an open confrontation between the rulers and the ruled, 
the ammart and the prachachon. On one side of the conflict, there are the economic elites, the 
army, the king, and the bureaucracy, who have ruled Thailand since the transformation of 
Thailand into a modern capitalist economy at the end of the 19
th
 century during the expansion 
of Western capitalism. Up until now, the different sections of the elites, the army, the 
bureaucracy, and the business elites have had the upper hand in Thai politics.   
On the other side of the conflict, there are the “ruled,” it is the “masses,” who demand social 
justice and more participation in the political decision-making process
2
. The masses consist of 
different sections of the urban and the rural poor and lower middle-classes
3
. The masses have 
challenged the hegemonic rule of the elites several times during the past decades; however, all 
the mass uprising efforts of organized resistance - in 2010, in 1992, in 1976 and in 1973 have 
ended in a military crackdown of the protests
4
. However, since the latest military coup in 
2006, when the Thai Army ousted the Prime Minister Taksin Shinawat, the masses’ 
continuous challenging the ruling elites’ power has become an on-going feature of Thai 
politics, manifested in the emergence of the Red Shirt Movement after the year 2008. 
To articulate and identify this alternative story of Thailand’s current political crisis, I have 
chosen to use Antonio Gramsci’s political theory of hegemony and Gramsci’s methodology of 
philosophy of praxis, as interpretative tools in my thesis. In Gramscian class perspective, the 
power relationships between social forces in any society are rooted in the economic material 
forces of production, from which various social classes emerge. This non-static class-based 
perspective in this study entails looking at the current Thai historic political crisis through 
paying attention to the historical developments of Thailand as a capitalist state, and the 
economic, political, and social implications of this developmental process, and how they 
relate to the current crisis. The focus of this type of analysis is not linear, nor is it vertical or 
                                                          
2
  As proposed by several scholars later on, see for instance Ferrara 2011. Ferrara calls Thailand a minimal 
democracy and does an excellent analysis on different stakeholders in Thai politics and the way the elite 
networks’ powers reach over official institutions of governance in Thailand.  As for the notions “the rulers” and 
“the ruled”, see Gramsci 2007, 144. Gramsci, in conceptualizing the elements of politics, created the concepts 
of the “rulers” and the “ruled” as the first element of politics; however specifying that “there do exist rulers 
and ruled, under the conditions of a class society”.  
3
 Ungpakorn 2010, 9. 
4
 Krittian 2010. 
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non-static. Instead, it focuses on transitions and forms of change, through a historical 
interpretation of the transformation of power relations between the various actors. What is 
essential in understanding Gramsci’s political theory of hegemony, is understanding a crisis 
(be it economic or political) as an infinite creative flux, an opportunity, through which the 
social forces imbued in their struggle against the hegemonic forces in society may create new 
forms of social and political practices and bring about a new organisation of society
5
.    
  
Thus, by using the Gramscian political theory and his philosophy of praxis, I hope to assess 
how the hegemonic rule of the elite networks was established in the international systemic 
context, how the hegemonic rule was consolidated, and how the counterhegemonic resistance 
movement, embodied in the Red Shirt Movement, emerges as a collective social movement.  
 
The central argument in my thesis is that the 1997-98 South East Asian economic crisis and 
the ensued Thai Rak Thai Party era of modernizing Thailand with new economic and socio-
political reforms, opened up a whole new phase - a whole new paradigm, if you like - in Thai 
politics. During this new phase, the rise of the political consciousness of the rural and the 
urban poor, and their emergence as active, heterogeneous, political stakeholders in the 
forefront of Thai politics. The other side of the coin is the reaction of the old hegemonic elite 
networks in holding on to their own interests and their efforts to preserve the old social order, 
and their reluctance in accepting the rural and the urban poor as stakeholders in Thai politics. 
This has manifested itself during the current political crisis in the elite networks’ harsh 
narrowing of the democratic space for counter-hegemonic social forces to operate in, be it 
then through the strengthening of the military’s position, suppressing political dissent, 
politicizing courts, and so on
6
. The elite networks are by no means a monolithic group – the 
intra-elite fighting for power resulted to Taksin Shinawat, a business tycoon and a part of the 
elite networks, being ousted in the military coup in 2006 by his rival elite groups
7
. Neither are 
the “masses” – the various configurations of civil society – a monolithic group, but their 
emergence includes various transfigurations of civil society since the beginning of the current 
political crisis in 2006. 
 
What the outcome of the current Thai political crisis will be is open at the time of writing this 
thesis. However, one thing is certain: the Thai elite networks that have held the economic, the 
                                                          
5
 Malo 2013 , 111. 
6
 Ungpakorn 2014. 
7
 Kharabi 2010, 24-25. 
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political, and the ideological power over people for decades in Thailand can no longer ignore 
the transformative power of the ordinary Thai people in producing their own social change. 
There is no going back to the old hegemonic order and to the “Thai-style democracy”, where 
democracy and political participation are notions defined by the elite networks, and handed 
down to the people from above. 
 
 
2. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
 
 
The objective of this thesis is fourfold. Firstly, this thesis is a humble attempt to add to the 
virtually non-existent academic research on Thai politics in the field of international relations 
in Finland. The second objective is to honour the applicability and flexibility of the 
Gramscian method in the field of the International Relations discipline, as an interpretative 
tool to analyse social transformation and change. The third objective of this thesis derives 
directly from the recent resuscitation of the Marxist – and the Gramscian perspective in the 
field of International Relations, as a tool to study the new anti-neoliberalist transnational 
social movements; and from the validity of this perspective in offering alternative insights to 
the possibilities of articulating, identifying - and eventually, possibly transforming the power 
relations in society, through generative collective action. The fourth aim derives from all the 
three aforementioned points: I hope that my thesis will in its own humble way, contribute to 
the Marxist and  Gramscian academic research on Thai politics, as the Marxist perspective, 
apart from a few exceptions, has largely been neglected among the international academics 
who do research on Thai politics, apart for a few exceptions.  
Thailand is the Finns’ number one holiday destination in Thailand. Many Finns spend part of 
the year in their holiday residences in Thailand. Thousands of seasonal migrant labourers 
come to Finland every year from the North Eastern part of Thailand to pick wild forest 
berries. There is plenty of cultural exchange between the two countries, in the form of 
intercultural marriages, for instance. Finland contributes to the development of the Mekong 
River financially within the EU framework. There is Finnish academic research in diverse 
academic fields available on all these topics.  
Despite all this, however, Finnish academic research that focuses on Thai politics in the 
academic field of International Relations is neigh to non-existent. Apart from Marja-Leena 
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Heikkilä-Horn’s8 research on the relationship of the Thai state and the Santi Asoke Buddhism 
sect from the perspective of comparative religion, Finnish academic research on Thai politics 
and only exists in the form of articles in pamphlets and newspaper analyses
9
.   
I hope that this thesis will in its own humble way, fill the existing knowledge gap in Finnish 
academic research. Moreover, if this thesis will arouse curiosity, questions, and willingness in 
Finland to know more about Thai politics, this thesis has filled its purpose. Let it also be 
mentioned here that my thesis offers one narrow insight to Thai politics only. The perspective 
I write from is just as fallible and subject to criticism as any other study on the topic. In fact, 
if the perspective of this thesis will inspire someone to do research on Thai politics from 
another scholarly perspective, my work has served its purpose. 
Marxist research has recently undergone somewhat of a Renaissance in the field of social 
sciences. , Marxist research remain fragmented and in the margins in the field of International 
Relations. In the field of International Relations, Marxism’s applicability as an interpretative 
and a methodological tool has been used in, for instance, the subfields of the International 
Relations, like in globalization studies and in the field of political geography. Marxist 
research in the field of International Political Economy has also been resuscitated, especially 
in the context of analysing new anti-globalization social movements, and in the context of 
studying transnational flows of capital. The Amsterdam school of global political economy 
draws heavily on Gramsci’s theory of hegemony; their contribution to the theory of 
International Relations concerns the formation of the transnational classes in the international 
system, thus focusing on the functional dimension of hegemony
10
. The Amsterdam School’s 
approach focuses on seeing hegemony primarily in the functional sense, as the legitimization 
of a rule of a particular class
11
.  
 
In my own research I will use the world system approach  of the Italian school in the field of 
International Relations, whose focus is on the power of hegemonic historic blocs in the 
international system, and whose perspective has Gramsci’s premises as its theoretical 
precepts. The difference between the Amsterdam and the Italian world system schools is that 
the former focuses more on the influence of the international systemic level processes and the 
influence of the transnational classes rather than on the influence of the domestic level in 
                                                          
8
 See for instance Heikkilä-Horn 2010. 
9
 See for instance Kuronen 2010. 
10
 Roccu 2012, 11. 
11
 ibid. 
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change and transformation of societies, whereas the latter gives a strong emphasis on the 
social and cultural implications of hegemonic historic blocs in the international system. Both 
schools owe their basis premises to the Frankfurt school critical theory, which was developed 
in the 1970s. Deeply embedded in the Neo-Gramscian perspective is the emancipatory 
knowledge interest and the power of knowledge as a tool to emancipate ourselves from all 
dominance, which figures strongly especially in the Italian school’s approach. This dimension 
also figures strongly in my own thesis. By choosing the Italian school’s theoretical 
perspective as the background for my thesis, I hope my thesis, again, in its humble way, will 
contribute to the resuscitating of the Marxist perspective in the field of International 
Relations.  
 
If Marx has been resuscitated in the academic research in the field of International Relations, 
this trend is yet awaiting to happen in the academic research on Thai politics. Marxist 
research on Thai politics is fragmented, and only few researchers have taken this approach. 
Here, I mention only Ungpakorn, Hewison, and Glassman, who have all contributed to the 
missing gap in the Marxist or Gramscian academic research on Thai politics. As I see it, due 
to the flexibility of the Marxist methodology, the perspectives of these researchers differ, 
however, what is common to them, is their class-based perspective as their starting point of 
analysis.      
 
This naturally raises a question of why the Marxist class analysis in academic research on 
Thai politics has not been popular. Firstly, historical materialism is a challenging approach in 
its complexity. Secondly, the Marxist approach requires that the researcher have to take into 
account all the political stakeholders, and study the whole picture of interactions between 
them in order to be able to make an analysis. This perspective poses a practical dilemma in 
any prospective critical Marxist/Gramscian research on Thai politics, due to the political 
sensitivities involved in the Thai context.  
In Thailand’s case, more often than not, academic research is subordinate to the “realities” of 
the current political crisis and its implications, and the precarious political situation in 
Thailand. As an example of the sensitive topics, is an analysis of monarchy as an active 
political actor and an economic and a political stakeholder, and the monarchy’s part of the 
hegemonic elite rule, which position I have included in my thesis. Here, the researcher is 
treading on a treacherous ground indeed, since Thailand has an extremely harsh lese majesty 
jurisdiction. Should his/her research be considered insulting or critical of monarchy in any 
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way, the researcher could easily find him/herself out of work, financial resources, and in the 
extreme case, charged with Lese Majeste, which bears extremely harsh jail sentences. This 
has led many a researcher to make adjustments in his/her research, to comply with the 
boundaries defined by the hegemonic politico-ideological regime, which, of course, is 
deplorable from the standpoint of academic freedom, integrity and academic knowledge 
production. As the academic, David Streckfuss says in Ivarsson-Isager’s book on monarchy 
and democracy in Thailand, “Saying the Unsayable”:  
“Reasoned discussion on monarchy in Thailand…has until recently become not only 
“unsayable” but virtually unimaginable”12. 
The second sensitive topic concerning doing Marxist research on Thai politics is the 
researcher’s running the risk of being labelled a dissident – because of the risk of the 
hegemonic regime’s notion of equalling Marxism with “communism”. “Communism” here 
refers to the negative connotation of being anti-Thai, being in opposition to as what 
“Thainess” is about13. For an international researcher, this involves the risk of being labelled a 
dissident –an opponent of the regime, or the risk of not being taken seriously in the academic 
research community on Thai politics context. This has a lot to do with Thailand’s problematic 
history with communism after the WWII
14
. Thus, if the researcher says he/she is doing 
Marxist research, including monarchy in the analysis, this automatically posits him/her 
against the prevailing hegemonic order and accepted social practices, and his/her research 
becomes dubious, to say the least, in the current Thai political context. The sensitivity of the 
topic also shows in many of the sources used in this thesis: even though the sources are well 
acknowledged within the academic community, their publication and distribution is done via 
free access online websites, not via academic publications. 
Despite the challenges presented above, I have chosen the Gramscian approach in my thesis. 
When one looks at the current crisis from the Gramscian perspective, firstly, the class nature 
of the current conflict becomes much clearer. Secondly, the factors that distort the form of the 
current conflict
15
, fade to the background, and appear as part of the dialectic movement of 
attempts of the masses to break the hegemonic rule of the elite networks, and the elite 
networks’ attempt to preserve the status quo, respectively. Thirdly, and what is most 
important, from this perspective, the organic crisis of the hegemonic elite network regime 
                                                          
12
 Streckfuss 2010, 131. 
13
 Chachavalpongpun 2005, 6. 
14
 ibid. 46-48. 
15
 Phrase by Ungpakorn 2010. 
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itself, emerges, by which I mean the crisis of the strong, monolithic Thai state, under which 
the Thai elites’ interests are unified and through which they are reproduced in society in 
social practices. The masses, the civil society, are contesting these practices in the realm of 
politics – they have no unified ideology, as in the realm of the struggle for power, the form of 
conflict configures the strategy the regime transforms itself to use to retain the power
16
.  
This organic crisis of the state, i.e. the crisis of state authority is the central theme of my 
thesis. The leitmotif of this thesis is my proposal of the emergence of a new phase in Thai 
politics since the 1997-98 South East Asian crises, a new paradigm, where the old order is 
crumbling, and the masses emerge as a collective force, a motor for social change. In this 
transformation process, social change emerges from change in the economic base of society – 
in the international system of societies. The domestic level and the international level are 
always intertwined, as the economic changes in the international system reflect the changes in 
a particular local system and vice versa
17
.  
 
3. THE THEME OF THE THESIS; THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
The purpose of my thesis is to look into and outline the dynamics of the current historical 
Thai political crisis, the crisis of Thai democracy, which began when the military ousted the 
hugely popular, democratically elected Prime Minister Taksin Shinawat in 2006
18
. Since 
2006, Thailand has been a deeply divided society, characterized by a class conflict between 
the rural and the urban poor and the old royalist conservative elites who form the dominant 
social strata of Thai society
19
. The crisis has led to the polarization of Thai society into two 
main opposite groups, whose shirt colours and other insignia designate their loyalties: the 
“Yellow Shirts” and the “Red Shirts,” the former representing the supporters of the 
conservative elites and the latter representing the movement of the urban and the rural poor
20
.  
                                                          
16
 Rodan – Jayasuriya 2006. 
17
 See for example Gramsci 2007, 116. 
18
 “Thai PM deposed in Military Coup”, BBC News 20/09/2006.  
19
 Ungpakorn 2010, 9.  
20
 See for instance Chambers 2010. 
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The class conflict has brought the old social and political divisions of Thai society on the 
surface in the terrain of political struggle for power between various social forces
21
. These old 
social and political divisions – the antagonistic tension between the conservative elites and the 
urban and the rural poor - have their roots in Thailand’s development processes under the 
economic system of capitalism, and they reach back all the way to the late 19
th
 century when 
Thailand was transformed into a modern capitalist state under the Western expansion of 
colonialism
22
. 
Besides being an open, confrontational class conflict, the current historical Thai political 
crisis can be characterized as a crisis of Thai democracy. Thailand has suffered from 
continuous social and political unrest since 2006, the unrest culminating in the military 
crackdown of political street protests in April-May 2010 when over 90 people died and 
thousands were injured in the aftermath of the protests
23
. Thailand has undergone another 
wave of street protests since November 2013, due to the controversial amnesty bill proposed 
by the ruling Pheua Thai Party, which would have given blank amnesty to the politicians and 
generals who gave the orders to use violence in the 2010 crackdown
24
. Moreover, the blanket 
amnesty bill would have given the ex-Premier Taksin Shinawatra an amnesty for his alleged 
misuse of his political position for economic gain, and a chance to return to Thailand from 
exile
25
. When I am writing this, Thailand’s political crisis continues. 
The crisis, as I see it, has led to the disintegration of both the political and the judicial system 
of Thailand. Moreover, another by-product of the crisis is the partial liquidation of the Red 
Shirt social movement in the 2011 parliamentary elections when part of the Red Shirt 
Movement supporters joined the Phuea Thai Party. Despite presenting themselves as the voice 
of the Red Shirts, the reigning Phuea Party is a curious mix of old Thai opportunist politicians 
and Red Shirt representatives
26
. The Phuea Thai Party won the elections in 2011, and Taksin 
Shinawat’s politically inexperienced sister Yingluck Shinawat became the Prime Minister27.  
A lot of criticism has been voiced on the Phuea Thai government’s inactivity in pressing any 
significant economic and political reforms during their reign. The strongest criticism has been 
directed to the fact that Yingluck’s Phuea Thai government has continued the policies of 
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increased repression of political dissent, which began after the military coup of 2006, and 
which has been extremely harsh during the Abhisit Vejjajiva government
28
. Abhisit 
government’s human right record is abysmal, from the use of the Lese Majeste legislation and 
Computer Crimes Act as a tool to silent opposition, to the military crackdown of the protest in 
April-May 2010, and to the harsh sentences given to those who took part in the protests three 
years ago
29
. 
Thus, the way I see it, the current historical Thai political crisis is both a class conflict and a 
crisis of Thai democracy. The class conflict is rooted in the base structure of society and 
inequalities derived from the production relations during the development processes of 
Thailand’s capitalist system in the context of the global society; however, the current crisis of 
democracy is happening on the level of the superstructure, the ideological level of society. 
That includes the political institutions, cultural, social and political practices, where the 
vertical institutionalized hegemonic power structures of society, ultimately the Thai state 
itself, is contested by different segments of anti-hegemonic configurations of civil society. 
The locus of the form of the current class conflict between the Thai conservative elites and the 
people happens on the superstructure level of the society, on the ideological level. The current 
situation where there is a deep divide between Thai elites and the masses, is what Gramsci 
describes as a historical situation of a “the war of position” between different social forces. 
All these social forces involved in the conflict are willing to throw all political and moral 
resources they can come up with, into the political struggle for power, in order to achieve a 
genuine dialectical win over their opponent
30
. This type of situation arises when there is what 
Gramsci calls a crisis of authority in a society; Gramsci calls it a crisis of hegemony, the 
general crisis of the State
31
.   
Superficially, the history of modern Thailand presents itself as a continuum of cycles of 
military rule and sporadic episodes of democratic rule
32
. Since the abolition of the absolute 
monarchy in 1932, Thailand has experienced 18 military coups
33
. This recurrent cycle of the 
military rule and the civilian rule has created the widely used notion in the Thai context of the 
so-called “Thai-style democracy,” which more or less means a rule by a government, whose 
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authority is not derived from the mandate from the people, won in free elections
34
. The 
concept of “Thai style democracy” is the favourite term of the dominant strata of Thai society 
to justify the regulation of participation of the people in the political decision-making 
processes – and justify the removal of a government whenever deemed necessary by the 
ruling elites; all in the name of “introducing, restoring, or saving democracy,” as Ferrara35 
sums it up. The curious position of Thai monarchy as an essential part of this “Thai-style 
democracy” is another interesting feature of the Thai-style democracy, which will be handled 
later in this thesis. 
The “Thai-style democracy” is a stark contrast as to  the notion of democracy brought forward 
by the rural and the urban poor, the ruled, whose idea of democracy involves the notion of the 
participation of the masses in the political decision-making. The attempts to achieve this aim 
and the demands of social justice have invariably ended in the Thai military’s violent 
crackdown of mass protests, as happened in 1973, in 1976, in 1992, in 2009 and in 2010
36
. 
In my thesis, I will try to interpret and outline the dynamics of the current historical Thai 
political crisis from the Gramscian perspective of social transformation and change. The 
central analytical tool in my work is Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis, the essence of which is 
the notion of the function of hegemony; his theory of historic blocs and their hegemonic 
position in society, which I will apply in the Thai context firstly, to denote the long-term class 
struggle in Thai society between the hegemonic rule of the elites and the subaltern masses. 
Secondly, the other side of the conflict is the intra-elite struggle, where the old elites and 
those fractions of elites, who want to modernize Thailand - as represented by Taksin 
Shinawatra – fight in between themselves for the hegemonic power position in Thai society. 
The central theme of my thesis project is my proposal that, in Thai politics, a completely new 
paradigm - or a completely new generative phase - has emerged, the implications of which 
remain to be seen. This new phase began in the aftermath of the 1997-98 Southeast Asian 
economic crises when the business tycoon Taksin Shinawat emerged in Thai political scene. 
Taksin became the Prime Minister elect in 2001, as the result of his populist Thai Rak Thai 
Party political platform, which included reallocating resources to rural areas in from of cheap 
loans. Taksin also introduced Thailand’s first national health care scheme. Taksin stayed in 
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power until the Thai army ousted him in a military coup in 2006. Since 2006, Thailand has 
been undergoing a political crisis.  
During this new phase, the old hegemonic order of the ruling elite networks is beginning to 
dissolve, and the masses have begun to emerge in the realm of Thai politics as a strong, class-
conscious counterhegemonic force. Their demands of social justice, democracy, and 
participation in decision-making are challenging the old ruling elite networks regime, which 
has ruled Thailand since Siam was transformed into a modern capitalist state in the late 19
th
 
century. The current historical political crisis in this perspective, as I see it, is a continuation 
of this counterhegemonic process, and just one manifestation of the breaking down of the old 
hegemonic power structures. 
 
Essential to Gramsci’s theory of hegemony are the concepts of “passive revolution” and the 
“war of position.” In this analysis, the focus of the study is in the totality of forces imbued in 
the struggle for power of the various social formations of the society. The analysis happens on 
two levels simultaneously, as the transformation of the Thai society has to be seen against the 
backdrop of the hegemonic processes in the international system over time.  
The reason why I have opted to apply the Gramscian perspective as the theoretical framework 
in my thesis is partly due to my own ontological and epistemological choices, partly due to 
complicated nature of the Thai class conflict – and partly due to the flexibility of the 
Gramscian analysis of historical situations in studying political phenomena. In order to get a 
syncretic picture of the crisis and the class conflict imbued within it, I find it essential to study 
the whole dynamics of the interactions between the conflicting actors, not just fragments of it. 
The Gramscian perspective in my opinion offers a fruitful perspective for this type of a 
syncretic analysis. 
Instead of relying on secondary sources and various interpretations of Gramsci’s fragmented 
texts in my own research, I have mostly formed my theoretical perspective from Gramsci’s 
original writings, written between the years 1929 and 1935 in prison. Gramsci himself 
emphasized the use of a thinker’s original texts in analysis of situations, in order for the 
researcher to identify those elements in a thinker’s intellectual work that form the core of 
his/her thinking
37
. The same philosophy applies to the theoretical framework of the world 
system approach in my work: I have opted the elements from their work that I find relevant to 
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my thesis. By combining by both Gramsci’s original texts and the Italian School’s theory of 
hegemonic historic blocs in the world system, I hope to convey a syncretic picture of the 
dynamics of the current Thai political crisis. Moreover, I hope that this perspective will shed 
light to the central theme of this thesis: this crisis is a manifestation of a new phase in Thai 
politics, which began after the 1997-98 South East Asian economic crises. 
Now one might ask what relevance a European political theorist’s analyses on the late 19th 
century Italy have to do with modern Thailand’s political processes. Gramsci38 is of the 
opinion that the function of hegemony is applicable in culturally different contexts, as in 
every country, the logic of the creation process of hegemony, its consolidation and its crisis - 
the development of the ruled masses as a counterhegemonic unified force to challenge the 
ruling classes’ hegemony, is the same.   
Hence, when formulating the scope and the theme of my thesis, the questions I was looking 
answers for in my study were for, instance:  
o What are the relations of force in Thai society like? What are the historical, 
evolutionary processes behind the deep social and political crisis between the 
haves and the have-nots that has engulfed Thailand since the military coup of 
2006? How do the power relations manifest themselves in the level of 
superstructure (cultural, political and ideological practices) in different 
historical situations in Thai society and how has the afore proposed situation of 
the “crisis of authority” and the “war of position,” respectively, emerged?  
o How and why did the elites develop their hegemony in all spheres of society in 
Thailand, and how is the elite networks’ hegemony connected to changes in 
the international economic structures? 
o Why does the military play a strong role in Thai politics? The current Thai 
political crisis has brought the military to the forefront in Thai politics again, a 
strong contrast to the military’s role in the economic boom of the 1990s, when 
the military was rendered in the background in Thai politics.  
o When thinking about Thailand’s social change and my proposal that a new 
phase in Thai politics has begun since the 1997-98 economic crisis, how are 
the positions of the social forces different now from the mass uprisings of 1973 
and 1976? How did the Red Shirts social movement emerge as a counter-
hegemonic oppositional force to challenge the hegemony of the elites: how can 
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their position be defined, when situated into the context of the relations of 
force in Thai society?  
  
 
4. THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
Following my research question, my thesis is divided in the following main chapters: the 
introduction, the ontological and he epistemological basics of my research (which includes 
methodology used), the theoretical framework, the analysis, and the conclusions arrived at in 
the end of my thesis process. 
The introductory part consists of the introduction, the objective of the study and the 
knowledge gap recognized in research, the research question, and the prior research findings.  
The ontological and the epistemological basics of my research are discussed in chapters six 
and seven, respectively. Chapter 6 handles the ontological aspects of Gramscian approach, 
which derive directly from classical Marxism. In this chapter, I have included also a short 
discussion on two points, which to some extent have been criticized as being the problematic 
points of Marxist analysis in the academic research: determinacy and class.  
In chapter seven, I clarify the epistemological premises inherent in the Marxist perspective, 
and present the basic underlying presuppositions of Gramscian approach in relation to 
knowledge and consciousness. After that, I will introduce the method that I have used in my 
thesis, which is Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis. 
Chapter eight deals with the theoretical framework of my thesis. In my thesis, I have 
formulated my theoretical framework by combining the original Gramscian theory of 
hegemony and the world system approach of the Neo-Gramscian school. Hence, chapter eight 
is divided into two sub-chapters, in which both the theoretical framework and the concepts 
used are presented. In the first sub-chapter, the central concept of the Gramscian philosophy 
of praxis, the theory of hegemony, is presented. In the second sub-chapter, the deepening of 
the Gramscian theory of hegemony of the Neo-Gramscian Italian School is discussed, with 
the focus on the hegemonic historic blocs on the systemic level of the international society. 
16 
 
Chapters 9, ten, and eleven comprise the actual analysis part of my thesis. The analysis 
happens through a historical analysis of the function of hegemony in Thai society, and 
consists of three parts: the creating of, the consolidating of, and the breaking down of the elite 
networks’ hegemony in Thai society. As these local processes happen against the backdrop of 
the hegemonic processes in the international system, the creation of, the consolidation of, and 
the breakdown of hegemony in Thai society, is analysed against the structural changes in the 
international system. In the analysis, this is done by mirroring the processes on the local level 
against the Italian School’s framework of historic hegemonic blocs in the world system. 
These historic blocs are Pax Britannica, Pax Americana and oligopolistic neoliberalism. 
Hence, chapter nine focuses on how the elite networks’ hegemony was created inside the old 
Siam when Siam was transformed into a modern capitalist state against the backdrop of the 
expansion of the then-time hegemonic historic bloc of the Pax Britannica. This happened 
through building the alliance of the elite networks, the military and the bureaucracy, whose 
interests were unified under a strong state modelled after the Western nation-state. Chapter 
ten focuses on the consolidating the hegemony of the local elite networks and their rule after 
the second World War under the US economic aid, masked under the notion of development, 
to promote the American neoliberalist systematic program of Pax Americana. Herein, the 
strengthening of the position of the Thai military is of special focus, as well as the reinstating 
of the Thai monarchy as an ideological tool to serve the interests of the local elite networks 
and the military to keep the ruled in control. In chapter eleven, the beginning of the 
breakdown of the Thai elite networks’ rule is discussed against the backdrop of the historic 
bloc of oligopolistic neoliberalism. This includes an analysis to Thailand’s economic crisis in 
1997-98, its social and political implications, and the emergence of the masses as an active 
political agent in the realm of Thai politics. 
In chapter twelve, the conclusions of the research, as well as future possibilities for research 
are presented.  
 
 5. PRIOR RESEARCH 
The bulk of the mainstream academic research on Thai politics, as Ungpakorn
39
 classifies it, 
consists of the so-called “top-to-bottom” approaches, in which Thai politics is presented as a 
realm consisting of the interplay of structural-functional elite networks –the bureaucrats, the 
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technocrats, and the military. As the academic research on Thai politics has its roots in the 
Pax Americana era when the American influence on higher education was at its highest point, 
this research approach naturally has its roots in the American tradition of political science 
research, in which the focus of the research is on the structural-functional framework of 
society and its political institutions.  
In Thai particular context, the modernization of that framework in Thailand to comply with 
Western norms of stability, development, and the Western ideals of “democratization 
dominated the research until the 1990s
40
. The ultimate classic in this research tradition is Fred 
Riggs’ Thailand. The Modernisation of a Bureaucratic Polity (1966)41.This type of research 
ultimately does not include the perspective of the masses or the civil society as active unit and 
an agent in the interplay of political actors in the equation of analysis. Mass participation in 
politics, people’s demands on social justice, social equality, equal participation in decision-
making, and people’s demands on democracy as focal starting points for analysis are not of 
primary importance in this type of an analysis.  
Of the current researcher of Thai politics, Michael Kelly Connors follows the Riggsian top-
down tradition in his extensive research on Thai politics. His shift from the Riggsian tradition 
is mainly in his combining the social constructivist approach with the structural-functionalist 
one, and applying Gramscian concepts taken out of the Gramscian framework into his 
perspective. His emphasis is on the discursive struggle of the hegemonic state networks to 
retain their regime over the years. In his extensive book, Democracy and National Identity in 
Thailand (2007), Connors discusses the notions of democracy in Thai context from a 
constructivist perspective, and proposes the term ‘democrasubjection’, which refers to his 
critical notion that both liberal and static moments of democracy in Thailand are projects 
aimed at the subjection of people to imaginary forms of self and collective rule
42
. This in 
practice means that under the notion of democracy, people can be subject to ideological 
practices of power and power interests through imagined myths like nation state and national 
myths, for instance. 
 Despite Connors’ critical approach and his articulating the ideological dimension of various 
regime policies, his research still falls under the top-down approach and within the Riggsian 
tradition, as the masses, who are the targets of the democrasubjection, are not presented as 
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truly active agents. Connors consequently for instance, sees the military coup of 2006 and the 
ensuing political crisis as a failure of royal liberalism in his article “Article of Faith: the 
Failure of Royal Liberalism in Thailand”43. In this article he analyses the post-2006 political 
crisis as being a shift between two notions of democracy, whose contents were driven by two 
different types of interests, Taksin’s on one hand - and on the other hand, the notion of 
democracy of the royalist social forces, who is joining together against Taksin in 2005-2006 
ultimately caused the military coup in 2006
44
.  
Duncan McCargo has written extensively on Thai politics, and the problem of the six Malay 
Southern provinces in Thailand and their relationship to the central government institutions. 
His research, despite following the top-down research tradition, is significant in identifying 
and articulating the elite networks, network of patronage, in governing Thai politics, as he 
sees it. Mc Cargo, in his article “Network Monarchy and the Legitimacy Crises in Thailand”, 
replaces the notion of the Riggsian bureaucratic polity with the term “network monarchy”, by 
which McCargo means the network of elites close to the palace that actually ruled Thailand 
between the years 1973-2001, without them however gaining dominance in politics
45
. This 
rearticulation and modernization of the Riggsian analytical framework, with new concepts, as 
an interpretative tool of how the realm of Thai politics functioned in that era, has created a 
new concept in the international academic research on Thai politics, and is widely used now. 
 Two other current international researchers of the top-down perspective into Thai politics are 
worth mentioning here, as they relate to my own analysis in the respect that they have 
analysed the position of monarchy with merit. Paul Handley’s book The King Never Smiles is 
well-researched book, which offers an insight to the sensitive topic of monarchy’s prominent 
role in Thai politics, from the days the current King Pumipon was made the King, after the 
heir to the throne, Pumipon’s brother, King Ananda, accidentally lost his life in 1946, until 
the military coup of 2006
46. The book’s importance lies in how it is set against and how it 
mirrors the economic, social, and political context of the long period of Pumipon’s reign as a 
monarch, and how the palace networks have influenced Thai politics throughout Pumipon’s 
reign.  
Scottish journalist Andrew MacGregor Marshall has also written extensively on Thai 
monarchy since 2011, when he published his first study on Thai monarchy and the 
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monarchy’s interaction with the Thai authoritarian regimes since the late 1940s online, called 
“#thaistory. Thailand’s Moment of Truth: A Secret History of 21st Century Siam”47. 
MacGregor Marshall sees the succession to the throne at the heart of the current Thai political 
crisis.     
Gramscian –or Marxist class-based analysis on Thai politics is very fragmented in the field of 
international relations. This might be due to the fact (which can be disputed) that the 
Gramscian perspective is a challenging one for the researcher, as it requires a comprehensive 
analysis of the whole picture of the totality of the power relations in society, and it sees social 
change as an organic process. There is gap in Marxist research when it comes to research in 
Thai politics exactly for this reason: one has to include all political stakeholders in creating an 
analysis of the totality of power relations, including all the social configurations of power in 
the process. In authoritarian societies as Thailand is, this fact causes problems to the 
researcher, because the researcher cannot touch certain sensitive topics, whose boundaries are 
defined by the authoritarian regime. In Thailand, as mentioned earlier, the topic of monarchy, 
which is considered a sensitive topic of national security, cannot be included in an analysis of 
the power structures because of the Lèse Majesté legislation. This is one of the reasons, why 
conclusive Marxist research on Thai politics is very fragmented and difficult to find.  
Despite the problematic position of doing academic Marxist research on Thai politics in the 
field of international relations, and despite the neglect of similar research to my own thesis, 
there are a few researchers, who have used the Marxist/Gramscian perspective in their 
research on Thai politics, and from whose work I have drawn upon in my thesis.  
Giles Ji Ungpakorn has written extensively on the totality of power relations in Thai society 
from the Marxist perspective during the past twenty years, including analyses of the 
monarchy. In many respects, his research is closest to my own perspective in many respects. 
His perspective is understandably more extensive than the limited scope and theme of my 
own thesis; however, his basic premises are similar to mine, and I have used his research 
extensively in my own research.  
In his books “Thailand’s Crisis & the Fight for Democracy” (2010) and “Coup for the Rich” 
(2007), Ungpakorn sees the post-2006 coup crisis in Thailand as a class conflict between the 
urban and the rural poor and the various sections of the royalist conservative elites, whose 
network the King is part of, as a political and an economic stakeholder. This class conflict 
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derives from the inequalities, which are imminent in the development processes of capitalism 
in Thailand. Ungpakorn sees that the real power in Thai society lies with the military, whose 
task is to guarantee the elites’ hegemonic rule in the class struggle against the people. 
Ungpakorn sees that the King and the military operate in dual reciprocity: the military has the 
power to manipulate the politics with the help of the conservative ideology the King 
represents and this conservative ideology gives the military the legitimacy for their actions. 
Thus, the King is a useful tool for the elites and the military to preserve their hegemonic rule. 
Kevin Hewison is another academic researcher who has written extensively on the current 
Thai political crisis from the Neo-Gramscian perspective and whose work is relevant in the 
context of my thesis. Hewison’s detailed contributions to the structural analysis on Thailand’s 
economic development in the Thai Rak Thai Party era between 2001-2006 and its social 
implications, has been extremely helpful in formulating the underlying central argument of 
my thesis
. 
For example, in his article, “Thaksin Shinawatra and the reshaping of Thai 
politics,
48
 Hewison tackles similar questions as I do in my thesis. Hewison writes about the 
transformative power of the Taksin era, which he sees began during the Southeast Asian 
economic crisis in 1997-98. Hewison aptly points out the “revolution” of the Thai Rak Thai 
policies on the economic and politico-ideological restructuring of Thai society
49
.  
Hewison’s also analyses about Taksin’s rift with the palace, his ousting through the royally 
approved military coup 2006 - and on the other hand, his huge popularity with the masses and 
his ability to politically mobilize the masses, brought the politicization of monarchy in public 
discourse, despite the elites’ liturgy of the monarchy being above politics. Hewison also refers 
to the intangible effects of Taksin’s transformative influence: it revealed old power structures 
and changed the nature of political debate in Thailand forever – due to the repressive 
regulations and censorship, a considerable part of the political debate is being waged on 
various forums on the internet, for instance in social media.
50
 
Hewison also mirrors the interplay between the domestic and the international levels and 
reflects upon the interplay of domestic economic, social, and political processes against the 
respective processes on the international level in his research in a way that is very close to my 
own research. 
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Another pair of researchers, Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, focus on the interplay of 
the domestic and the international level of analysis in their research. Their work focuses on 
the economic analyses of Thailand in various historical contexts, against the backdrop of 
systemic international change. Their research cannot be characterized as based directly on 
Marxist approach; however, the focus of the bulk of their extensive research is in the 
structural economic organisation of Thai society and its social implications. In their book, 
“Thailand’s Crisis” (1997), Phongpaichit and Baker give a detailed account on Thailand’s 
economic crisis of 1997-98, and  the huge change the IMF-induced measures implemented 
caused in Thailand’s political system.  
Phongpaichit and Baker bring another detailed perspective on the effects of the 1997-98 
economic crises in “Thai Capital after the 1997-98 Crisis,” a compilation of various 
academics’ perspectives on the effects of the economic crisis on various Thai domestic 
industries. The focus of the book is on the relationship between the domestic capital and the 
pressure of the multinational industries during and after the crisis. 
Regarding the interplay of domestic and international levels, Robert Cox and Stephen Gill’s 
research on the hegemonic historic blocs initially prompted me to create my theoretical 
framework. Revisiting Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks deepened the understanding of 
Gramscian perspective. However, Roberto Roccu’s PhD thesis “Gramsci in Cairo: 
Neoliberal Authoritarianism, Passive Revolution and Failed Hegemony in Egypt under 
Mubarak 1991-2010”51 was of decisive importance in helping to finally put my own research 
together. The aim of Roccu’s analysis is to revive the applicability of the Gramscian method 
in analysing, in his case, the relationship between the international economic neoliberalism, 
the realm of the Egyptian economy and its social and political effects in Egypt. In his study 
Roccu contrasts Cox and Gill throughout his analysis, by emphasizing the forms of change 
and transformation of the Egyptian hegemonic power structures that emerge on a local level, 
to break the hegemony of the local oligarchs, instead of stressing the priority of the structural 
changes on the international system level bringing about change and transformation on the 
domestic level. 
He interprets the Gramscian analysis so that the domestic level is more important than the 
international level in the process of the function of hegemony. The local particular context – 
the local hegemonic processes embodied in the Egyptian state and its institutions retain their 
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independence from the international level, in formatting the particular change that happened 
in Egypt and its hegemonic structures, a ‘failed hegemony’, as Roccu calls it. Hence, the 
change ultimately happens on a local level in a local particular context - rather than as a 
determined, direct result of international systemic level changes, which Roccu sees as a 
weakness of the Italian school approach. Even though Roccu’s analysis is about the 
breakdown of the hegemony of the elites in Egypt, and thus the context is different; however, 
there are certain similarities as to the forms of change and transformation has happened in the 
Thai context, on a domestic level. In Roccu’s study, as opposed to my own, the approach is a 
top-down approach, focusing on the change in the hegemonic local structures. He leaves the 
analysis of the emergence of the counter-hegemonic forces out of his study. 
 
6. ONTOLOGY: HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 
 
This chapter deals with the basic ontological tenets of classical Marxism, as the Gramscian 
approach is based on these premises. A brief discussion on allegedly problematic points in the 
ontology of classical Marxism follows the questions of determinacy and class. 
 
6.1. Historical materialism and politics as a possibility 
 
The basic ontological premises of my work are initially situated on Marx’s theory of society, 
social transformation, and social change. This approach entails its own ontology to the 
relationship between man and nature, which is historical dialectical materialism. The central 
concepts for this approach are production and class. Production creates consciousness of 
one’s position in society and understanding social relations through understanding the 
relationship between one’s class and the prevailing mode of production52. The Frankfurt 
school of International Relations developed Marx’s ideas further in their critical theory, 
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developing the concept of Marx’s original notion of critique as the method to develop social 
sciences further
53
.  
Patomäki’s view54 sums the Marxist ontology as follows: firstly, the world exists, independent 
of our knowledge of it. The world consists of layers and structures, which we have to identify 
and differentiate in order to understand the world around us. There are causal powers at work 
in the world around us. If there did not exist causal powers in the world, we would not be able 
to know anything about it. As the society is an open system - like the nature is, ultimately, the 
conception of causality means “structured powers capable of producing particular effects if 
actualized”55. 
Here, the conception of politics as possibility, and the premise of the emancipatory knowledge 
interest come into play. It is up to us to identify and realize the possibilities within the 
structures and layers of the outside world. However, we must keep in mind that the key word 
here is possibility: the possible outcomes may happen or they may not happen. 
Gramsci develops the significance of the notion of possibility further when he ponders over 
the question: what is man? He concludes that a human being has to be understood “as an 
historic bloc of both subjective elements and of objective material conditions with which the 
individual is in an active relationship.”56 In a certain historical context, the notion of the 
possibility of changing the objective material conditions emerges – the measuring unit being 
the extent to which man dominates nature and chance
57. Hence, as Gramsci says: “Possibility 
is not reality; but it is in itself a reality”58. The notion of possibility embodies the idea of 
freedom; nevertheless, in order to attain freedom and change the world, ethical improvement 
of oneself alone is an illusion for as long as a human being does not direct his/her activity 
outwards to change both the material conditions and the relationships with other human 
beings
59
 
Patomäki sums Gramsci’s notion of the significance of possibility as follows: both the 
structures of the world and the researchers studying the world possess causal powers. As 
different layers of reality (biological, human, social) are basic ontological units and causally 
                                                          
53
 Patomäki 2002, 6-8. 
54
 Patomäki 2002, 8. 
55
 Gramsci 2007, 369; 372. 
56
 ibid, 360. 
57
 ibid. 
58
 ibid. 
59
 Ibid. 
24 
 
intertwined, the notions of absence and emergence are just as real as the existence of things. 
This possibility of the notions of existence – and absence and emergence of things – suggests 
that the ideas of the process of change and transformation process are also possible.
60
 
 
6.2. Two dilemmas of classical Marxism: Determinacy and Class 
   
In Marxist historical materialism, social change is conditioned by the economic mode of 
production of the society. Here, we irrevocably stumble at the classical dilemma and the 
debate about the problematic of the relationship between social formation and class 
determinacy. By this, I refer to the position of the class at the heart of the historical analysis 
of a society, and how that particular class’s ideology corresponds to its class position. 
Stuart Hall specifically assesses these two dilemmas in his article “Signification, 
Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates” (1985)61.  
Marx has often been interpreted to propose that a class position in the economic relations in a 
direct, predetermined way, determines the class’s ideology62. The theoretical position here is 
that the class relations of the capitalist mode of production - a structure in dominance - are 
constantly reproduced through the hegemonic ideology in a predetermined way. This will 
continue until the exploited social underclass, in their developing a practice of struggle, 
develops a conscious unity in action; transforms itself into a social movement; and transforms 
the social formation into a different one in an undefined temporal conjuncture
63
.   
Accordingly, we could take a highly simplified and deterministic view of the Russian 
revolution in 1917 as being a predetermined revolution of the Russian proletariat united 
behind a single ideology, which corresponded directly to their social position in the Russian 
social structure
64
. On the other hand, we could look at the development of the Red Shirt 
movement in Thailand through a similar perspective, taking the position that the Red Shirts 
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movement is unified behind one ideology, which corresponds directly to the Red Shirts’ 
social position in the Thai social structure. This certainly is not the case. Social totality is 
more complex than that. 
What happened in Russia in 1917, for instance, was what Hall quotes in Lenin’s words, was 
that the 1917 revolution happened “as a result of a very unique historical situation, absolutely 
dissimilar currents, absolutely heterogeneous class interests, absolutely contrary political and 
social strivings merged in a strikingly harmonious manner”65. In Thailand, as well as 
anywhere else, as for that matter, the process is very different. The uprising may happen or it 
may not happen.  
The “revolution” – i.e. the breakdown of the hegemonic structures, may happen – but it may 
not happen just as well, and it certainly is not the predetermined product of an obscure 
determinacy of   the correspondence between the class position and ideology.  
Althusser proposes solving this classical dilemma of the Marxist theory in conceptualizing the 
significance of recognizing difference when we analyse social totality: there are different 
social contradictions, with different social results, in different temporal contexts, which all 
form the driving force of a historical process, the results and the effects of which are different 
in each process
66
. It is through acknowledging and articulating the difference, where 
determinacy emerges from
67
. Thus, when we look at the dilemma of class and its 
correspondence with an ideology, the determinacy can be found in that there is no necessary 
correspondence between the social position and ideology – but there is no non-
correspondence, either
68
.  
Even though Althusser conceptualized the significance of the notion of difference, it does not 
mean that we should fetishize the notion of “difference” in any way. Recognizing and 
articulating the “difference” simply changes the perspective of the classical dilemma of 
determinacy in Marxist research altogether. In research, Althusser’s notion of articulating this 
difference enables us to look at a societal process in a syncretic way, seeing the unity in 
difference
69
. It retains the value of Marx’s theory and honours its complexity, its flexibility, 
and its applicability – and it helps us to analyse the prismatic nature of the social totality and 
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its processes. I find this perspective and the flexibility in analysis that it opens up, extremely 
helpful in outlining the dynamics of the current Thai political crisis, and the crises – the 
uprisings or the struggle, if you like - that preceded it. Each political crisis is different. What 
is the unifying factor common to political crises is, are the processes of the economic 
organization of the mode of production, and the interacting processes between the mode of 
production and the cultural and social realm. 
There is another classical dilemma about the Marxist analysis: the class as the starting point 
of the analysis. Marxist analysis is firmly rooted in European experience, so we might ask 
ourselves if it is a valid conceptual category in social analysis of other types of social 
contexts, like the Thai society for instance. This problem, in my opinion, can be overcome 
through thinking about the concept of class as an analytical tool of a subject’s experience, 
how a subject identifies him/herself in relation to society
70
. Thus, in my work, the concept of 
“class” does not refer to a class as a homogenic whole. Instead, I see the concept of “class” in 
a “decentred” sense71. Gramsci, in his analysis, as I see it, always emphasized the complexity 
of social processes, including the experiencing of a “class,” emphasizing the decentred sense 
of a class experience
72
. 
 
7. EPISTEMOLOGICAL PREMISES 
 
In this chapter, I will present the epistemological premises of the Gramscian approach. The 
questions of knowledge and consciousness are also discussed. The first subchapters serve as 
an introduction and a clarification to the Gramscian method of the philosophy of praxis, 
which forms the methodological basis of my thesis. 
 
7.1. On the nature of knowledge 
Marxism’s epistemological stance is relativistic. Knowledge is socially produced, it is always 
contextual – and knowledge is fallible. The knowledge of the world, just like the world itself, 
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is layered and structured reaching from strong universal claims on to scientific theories and to 
reflective interpretations of social meanings. The knowledge of the world is based on the pre-
existing means of production, resources, and technologies plus the historically transient 
concepts, and intuition and imagination of the researcher; hence, the social science is more 
reflective and relies on models and analogies more than natural sciences do. All this implies a 
more extensive reflective interpretation dimension than the natural sciences; however, the 
epistemological relativism and the interpretative element also imply the idea of rationality and 
possibility of making rational, plausible judgments about their truth.
73
 
This, however, does not exclude the possibility of any judgments being proven wrong at some 
point – all judgments are fallible. 
These epistemological presuppositions are in line with Gramscian epistemological premises, 
respectively. Gramsci, in his defence of Marx’s thought, especially emphasized the historical 
context of the researcher and the researcher’s constant awareness of consciousness in 
interpreting certain conceptions of the world borne out of the aforementioned pre-existing 
means of production, resources, and technologies
74. Gramsci saw the key to Marx’s 
philosophy in Marx’s critique of capitalism75. The key word here is “critique,” critical 
rational thinking as a function of consciousness, which also Gramsci advocates for. It is the 
critical reflective and intuitive activities of consciousness that is the primus motor of creating 
knowledge, which ultimately is fallible and can be proven wrong – the very same premise that 
Patomäki speaks of. Gramsci similarly emphasizes rationality as opposed to “philosophical 
dilettantism,” and what he calls “speculative philosophy,” in another context in his work76.  
Patomäki also brings up the question of social science relying on models and analogies more 
than natural sciences do, as mentioned earlier. For Gramsci and Marx alike, these models and 
analogies are an expression of language, which is the major arena of social struggle, and a 
prerequisite of social consciousness
77
.  
Hence, to specify the epistemological premises of my work further, I find it necessary to 
outline some basic notions of language and the Marxist theory of consciousness in the next 
chapter. This I find especially relevant to the Thai context of my study. The structure of the 
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Thai language per se is extremely hierarchical and rigid. One’s social position is defined by 
his/her first utterance in Thai language. Thai language has been one of the tools of hegemonic 
rule by the elite networks since the introduction of the capitalist mode of production into 
Thailand at the end of the 19
th
 century
78
. Breaking up the taboos of the conventions of the 
hierarchical language has in my opinion been part of the new paradigm in Thai politics 
mentioned in the introductory chapter. 
 
7.2. The terrain of social struggle: language and ideology 
 
The departing methodological point, in my own thesis and its syncretic theoretical framework, 
which has Marx’s ontology at its heart, lies in this nexus point of understanding the 
significance of language and the speech act in research. The Marxist theory of consciousness 
emphasizes the connection between the language and social struggle: that ideas have their 
origin in the material existence, the material conditions are the basis of social interaction, and 
that language, the speech act process, is the nexus point for social change. Although Marx did 
not pay much theoretical attention to the theory of language, he constantly handles the topic in 
his works concerning ideology. Marx proposes that ideas are born in the head; however, he 
sees that material existence presupposes the existence of ideas
79
.  
There are several Marxist theorists, who have paid attention to language and its speech act 
aspect. What is common to these researchers is their attention to the connection between 
language as a process emanating from the material conditions of a society and the ideological 
aspect immanent in language process. Let it be mentioned here that it is questionable if all 
these researchers can be classified under the category of “Marxist thinkers” due to the 
historical context they operated in
80
. 
The Russian linguist Voroshilov saw consciousness as a socio-ideological entity; the word, 
the ideas, the human psyche and consciousness are void per se, but find their unity in 
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expression of the word, the speech act, the language
81
. Subsequently, consciousness can only 
become a fact through the embodiment of signs
82
. Signs and the word forms the semiotic 
chart of an individual person’s inner life, however, the signs are conditioned by the social 
environment, which the individual lives in, and the interaction between human beings. It is at 
this stage of the interactive socializing process emanating from the material existence that the 
forming of ideologies takes place in the unity of linguistic expression, and consequently, a 
human psyche becomes into existence
83
. Thus, the ideology is immanent at every stage of the 
socializing process through language. “Consciousness becomes consciousness only after it is 
filled with ideological value”, he proposes – but to avoid determinism, he stresses the idea of 
unity in diversity, saying that the world of signs ( filled with ideological content) is 
heterogeneous – for instance the artistic, the religious, the scientific formula all are connected 
with different orientations when it comes to reality
84
. Accordingly, they all have different 
functions in social reality; still, due to their semiotic matrix, these diverse ideological 
phenomena can be understood and classified under one definition
85
. Ultimately, Voroshilov 
sees that “communication simply cannot be separated from its material base, and that 
language is where the social struggle takes place”86. 
According to Cox
87
, institutionalized social practices come into being through ideas put into 
practices. When it comes to understanding ideas that are relevant to a historical material 
structure - ideas as collective images of certain social order, as imagined by different groups 
of people - there is a normative principle inherent in this understanding of ideas. The 
normative principle means the sense that there are conflicting views on the nature and 
legitimacy of power relations; the meaning of certain concepts like democracy, good 
governance, social justice, etc., between the different groups in society. Consequently, there 
are different views on the strategies and on the potential for the evolving of an alternative 
economic material structure as the mode of organizing the mode of production in a society
88
.  
The speech act is also at the heart of Gramsci’s notion of the language process89. However, 
Gramsci’s starting point regarding language is that language is the nexus point of the social 
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struggle and conflict. Consequently, Gramsci, like Cox, does not separate language into a 
separate entity to be analysed in his structural analysis of society, but places language at the 
heart of his political theory. Gramsci sees the significance of language as a dimension in the 
functioning of the hegemonic processes in a society: language by nature is an imminent, 
material process, which exists within the boundaries of intertwined structural societal 
processes. The notion of language per se is an empty notion in the sense that each human 
being in a society has an individual conception of the things around him/her. It is only 
through collective activity, i.e. social practices and interaction in a particular social and 
historical context that language produces meaning and a common understanding of the world 
can be reached. This common conception of can be reached through cultural-social unity, 
which reflects the structures of dominance of the power relations between the heterogeneous 
strata of a society borne out the material base of the relations of production, and the 
hegemonic ideologies inherent in the structures.
90
 
Gramsci strongly criticizes separating language from the material base of the societal 
processes further. He proposes that language works and transforms through metaphors: he 
does not go as far as to propose that all discourse is metaphorical in respect to the material 
objects – but he sees language as “metaphorical with respect to the meanings and the 
ideological content which the words used had in the preceding periods of civilization”91. This, 
in practice, includes societal processes both on the levels of the material base and the 
superstructure. Gramsci himself can be seen to use language as a metaphor for his political 
analysis. 
In the end, based on the above chapters, we could draw the following conclusions: 
consciousness is born out of the material base of society through language. Language is the 
nexus of the social struggle, and it reflects the power relations in society, and is thus 
inseparable of the hegemonic structures of dominance in society. Ideology and hegemonic 
rule are always intertwined.  
  
7.3. Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis as a method  
The central theme of my thesis – my proposal of the emergence of a new paradigm in Thai 
politic involves some ontological and epistemological choices regarding the method and the 
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theory. Throughout my thesis process, I found myself constantly struggling with the question 
of how to combine academic rigorousness and its demands with my own long-term active 
engagement with my research topic – and my own role as a social activist.  
Leander
92
 writes that doing research in social sciences involves a two-way relationship 
between the questions the researcher asks, and the method and the theoretical standpoint 
he/she chooses: the researcher’s questions relate to the methodological choices and the 
theoretical approach and vice versa. In my case, I decided to study my selected research topic 
– the dynamics of Thailand’s current political crisis- from the Marxist perspective of social 
transformation and change. The motivation behind this perspective is an urge to do research, 
which is strongly connected to the practical world outside academia, and which, limited as 
this particular study is, can for example raise new questions in someone’s mind who is 
reading this. I believe this type of engaged or activist research is just as valuable as any type 
of mainstream academic research provided, that the activist researcher obeys the standards of 
any research, systematically reflects upon his/her empirical experiences, and provides as an 
intellectually honest account of his/her research topic as possible. Gramsci’s philosophy of 
praxis is thus the obvious methodological choice for the purpose of my thesis, due my 
theoretical framework and its epistemological premises, which derive from historical 
materialism.   
My second motivation in selecting the Gramscian approach is also connected to the goals of 
my research in general: to bring forth to the reader the flexibility of the Gramscian method –
philosophy of praxis – in conducting research in the field of international relations. 
My decision to use Gramsci’s original texts as the source of my selected methodological 
framework is based on the leitmotif of Gramsci himself on the method of doing research in 
general. Gramsci proposes that if one is to study the intellectual work and the world view of a 
researcher whose texts in any way are open to interpretation, one has to reconstruct the 
essential, coherent, sometimes implicit, meanings of the researcher in question, and consider 
his/her whole intellectual work, not just fragments of it
93
. This analysis, as Gramsci says, has 
to be done “with utmost intellectual care, scientific honesty and without any a priori 
prejudice”94.  
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Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis is a method, which Gramsci outlines in the context of his 
critique of German philosophy and English classical economics, again in a fragmented form 
throughout his Prison Notebooks texts. He proposes that the prerequisite to the emergence of 
the philosophy of praxis is the whole conception of modern life, which includes Renaissance 
and Reformation, German philosophy and the French Revolution and English classical 
economics, secular liberalism – and his own historicism, the critique of the conception of 
world as presented and put into practice during diverse historical epochs
95
.  
Gramsci initially presents his basic premises of the philosophy of praxis as a method through 
the critique of Western philosophy, arguing that Western philosophy is an organic, 
ideological, and hegemonic construction, which is close to the conception of the world of the 
leading group
96
. He says further that this hegemonic construction will be reproduced 
endlessly by the hegemonic forces in a society through social practices, which ensures that the 
accepted form of thinking is through the function of hegemony accepted as a “natural world 
view,” which Gramsci calls ‘common sense’97. This common sense is the methodological 
starting point for the philosophy of praxis to emerge. It equals the researcher’s critique of the 
common sense and going beyond it, engaging in a polemic about the traditional philosophies 
means accepting a new perspective on the world
98
. Philosophy of praxis emerges through 
polemics, and as Gramsci proposes, in the form of a continuous struggle
99
. By this all, 
Gramsci refers to the process of intellectual revolution: one has to expose the hegemonic 
ideologies masked as ‘common sense’; however, one not only has to expose and confront 
these ideologies but also exposes, and confronts the social forces behind them
100
. The ultimate 
resolution of this ideological struggle, as Gramsci puts it, will happen on the realm of the 
‘revolutionizing praxis’, on a practical level of struggle between the hegemonic and the 
counter-hegemonic forces, which ultimately defines the social practices that will be adopted 
when the old hegemonic order breaks down
101
.  
Gramsci purports that it is essential that theory is not separate from practice: theory and 
practice must be combined
102
. For this purpose, the concept of hegemony and understanding 
the function of hegemony is essential, as it entails an understanding of the world that is 
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critical and beyond what common sense is
103
. This process involves firstly, gaining an 
intellectual unity in the form of a multifocal understanding of the world; secondly, making a 
detailed historical analysis of the dynamics of a particular situation and articulating the 
hegemonic power structures, and finally, transforming the hegemonic order through action
104
. 
It is only through understanding and awareness about the economic structures and the power 
relationships in a prevailing hegemonic order; through awareness of one’s position in these 
networks, plus through the will and passion to transform the existing hegemonic order that the 
notion of philosophy of praxis is completed
105
. If one has the understanding of the social 
order, but not the will to change it, Gramsci considers one a hypocrite in the service of the 
hegemonic order without a true understanding of the philosophy of praxis. 
Roccu
106
 calls Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis historical dialectical materialism. Of these 
concepts, Gramsci’s understanding of history deserves further clarification, as it is the key to 
understanding his dialectical materialism, and his method of the philosophy of praxis. 
Gramsci’s understanding of history is based on Hegelian concept of history in the sense that 
for Gramsci, like for Hegel, history is a progressive process
107
. This notion purports to in 
itself the immanent principle of development in the process of history
108
. The basic difference 
between Hegelian concept of history and the Gramscian concept of history, as Gramsci puts 
it, is that the Hegelian concept of history focuses on the teleological idea of the humankind  
attaining freedom through spiritual development
109. According to Gramsci, Hegel’s logic of 
how historical processes develop through the dialectical thesis-antithesis-synthesis (a shift 
between materialism and idealism) process, leads to an analogy of “man walking on his 
head”110. To surpass the pitfalls of the Hegelian dialectic, Gramsci requires us to strip history 
of all spiritual and materialist deterministic dimensions in favour of secularization and 
earthliness of thought
111
. This is possible through realistic historicism
112
, which is essential in 
understanding Gramsci’s notion of history. Realistic historicism refers to a “form of 
scientifically identifying an epistemological rupture with a previous ideological problematic”, 
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as Thomas interprets it
113
. Roccu
114
cites Gramsci that history consists of both contingency 
and necessity – every historical structure has according to Gramsci both organic and 
conjunctural points, and the methodological implication of the historicist approach is to 
identify and differentiate between the two types of points in history in order to articulate the 
ruptures. Conjunctural events do not have far-reaching historical significance, and they 
disappear when the elements affecting them dissolve
115
. Organic phenomena, on the contrary, 
have, in the Hegelian sense, the idea of necessity written upon them
116
. When we study them 
meticulously, we notice the dimension of crisis in them in the sense, that in an organic crisis, 
the structural contradictions of a certain historical structure have come to the surface so that 
the crisis itself is the manifestation of the incurability of these structures
117
. This is the nexus 
where the oppositional forces emerge to challenge the old historical structure. Herein is the 
nexus where the notion of opportunity as a possibility is to be positioned.  
To end this chapter, if I position myself as a researcher who uses Gramsci’s method of 
philosophy of praxis in my own engaged research, as brought forward in the beginning of this 
chapter, the following applies. My position as a researcher is that I cannot in the least be 
considered a neutral observer. My perspective stems from my own relating to the everyday 
experience of the “masses” and their passion in producing social change through action. My 
approach is normative in the sense that I am on the side of the people who ask for a greater 
part in political decision-making process, and who want to have their say in what “good 
governance” in society means. I see knowledge as doing118, politics as activity119, and I see 
language as a deed
120
 - and I believe in the emancipatory empowerment of attaining 
knowledge
121
. Despite -or due- to my own ontological and epistemological commitments my 
first and foremost aim is to provide as an honest and an intellectually clear account of my 
thesis topic as possible. 
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The reason for choosing this perspective is firstly, due to the epistemological premise inherent 
in the Marxist theory of consciousness in relation to knowledge, which is essential to my 
study: we study society in order to become aware and emancipate ourselves from all forms of 
dominance we have created ourselves throughout the history. Emancipation and resistance 
towards dominance derive from awareness of the social reality we live in; awareness and 
vigilance empower us with will to create alternative forms of social organization that respond 
better to the human demands for social justice and participation in decision-making. The 
second reason for using the chosen approach is my aim in my own research to bring forth the 
significance of the ordinary people, “the ruled,” in producing social change and their 
unification as a social force strong enough to challenge the prevailing hegemonic politico-
ideological order. As I have said earlier in this study, this bottom-to-top perspective has not 
attracted enough attention in the academic research on Thailand.  
In my opinion, even though in a sense, interpreting a social conflict through the perspective I 
have adopted, is a common perspective in for instance the post-colonial research in the field 
of international relations, I find it somewhat neglected in Thailand’s case. This omittance I 
would attribute firstly, the political sensitivities concerning the academic research in 
Thailand.  
In Thailand’s case, one of the critical issues in conducting research on Thai politics is that 
more often than not, the academic research is influenced by the so-called “realities” of the 
precarious political situation in Thailand. As an example of sensitive topics in academic 
research here would be, for instance, an analysis of monarchy not only as an active political 
actor, but also as an ideological tool of the hegemonic rule of the elites in Thai politics. 
Reinstating monarchy was an extremely important part of consolidating the cultural 
hegemony of the Bangkok-centred elites in the 1950s. Still, in order to get a whole picture of 
the current Thai political crisis by using the method of philosophy of praxis, those sensitive 
topics cannot be neglected. 
Here were are treading on a precarious ground indeed, since Thailand has an extremely harsh 
Lese Majeste jurisdiction, and should a study be considered inappropriate and critical of 
monarchy in any way, the researcher could easily find him/herself out of work, and in the 
extreme cases, charged with Lese Majeste, which bears extremely harsh jail sentences. 
In my opinion, the sensitivity of the topics of the Thai politics easily leads to either the 
researcher compromising his/her own academic integrity; or to the researcher adjusting 
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his/her research within the limits set by the hegemonic politico-ideological regime under the 
political situation at hand. I find this matter - i.e. what can be studied and what can be said in 
a precarious political situation – restrictive of academic freedom. I think academic freedom 
should not be subjugated to the pressures created by an oppressive political regime, and 
therefore in my own research want to provide the reader as an honest perspective of my thesis 
topic as possible, fully knowing the consequences. By doing this, I hope that my thesis will in 
its own limited way, contribute to the opening up of the academic research on Thai politics.  
  
8. THEORY: GRAMSCI’S THEORY OF HEGEMONY AND THE NEO-
GRAMSCIAN WORLD SYSTEM THEORY OF HISTORIC BLOCS 
 
This chapter deals with the theoretical perspective applied in my thesis. I have combined the 
original Gramscian theory of hegemony and the Neo-Gramscian perspective of the Italian 
school as my theoretical framework, therefore this chapter is divided into two sub-chapters. 
Chapter 8 first involves a short introduction to Antonio Gramsci and the context in which he 
wrote his Prison Notebooks, after which his theory of hegemony and its basic concepts, as 
applied in my thesis, will be presented. The second part of this chapter handles the Neo-
Gramscian world system approach of the Italian school, which is an updated version of 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony,   and how I intend to apply it in my thesis. 
 
8.1. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and its central concepts 
  
Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) was an Italian communist, a Member of the Italian Parliament, 
and the Chairman of the Italian Communist Party in 1924-26
122
. He was also an influential 
member of the Comintern, an international communist organization founded in Moscow 
1919, whose aim was to create an international Soviet republic ruled by workers, and 
ultimately abolish of the state altogether
123
. Gramsci wrote his “Prison Notebooks,” which my 
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thesis draws heavily upon, in prison in 1929-31. Gramsci was imprisoned in 1927, after the 
internal political developments in Italy had led to Mussolini fascist regime’s rise to power, 
and Mussolini’s crushing of the Italian Communist Party124.  
The central themes throughout Gramsci’s fragmented texts are the concepts of hegemony and 
passive revolution, which both in Gramsci’s analysis stem from the uneven development of 
capitalism. Through the concepts of hegemony and passive revolution, Gramsci analyses the 
uneven development of capitalism and the process of state formation at the periphery of the 
economic system, reflecting upon the various processes of diverse forms of state formation 
both on domestic and international levels
125
.  
Gramsci’s focus of analysis is on the unification of the Italy of the Risorgimento era, and the 
uneven economic development between the industrialized urban North and the rural 
undeveloped South, and the socio-political implications of this relationship between the two 
regions. In his analysis, the industrialized North holds both the economic, political, and 
cultural-ideological dominance over the underdeveloped rural South. This territorial urban-
rural relationship, as Gramsci characterizes it, is one of a dominance and hegemony of the 
economically developed urban North over the South, sealed in the strong state
126
.   
Although Gramsci’s focus of analysis happens in the domestic level (=Italy), as a Marxist, he 
follows the logic of the internal mechanisms and logic of capitalism as laid out by Karl Marx, 
which are international by nature and do not follow the boundaries of a single nation state
127
. 
As Gramsci proposes, the levels of the domestic and the international are inextricably linked; 
the phase of the economic state and the domestic relations of forces in the analysis have to be 
inserted into the context of the relation of forces on an international level in order to attain a 
clarity of analysis of a certain political situation
128
. Gramsci writes: 
 
“Any organic innovation in the social structure, through its technical-military expressions, 
modifies organically absolute and relative relations in the international field, too. Even the 
geographical position of a national State does not precede but follows (logically) structural 
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changes, although it also reacts back upon them to a certain extent (to the extent precisely to 
which superstructures react upon the structure, politics on economics, etc.).”129  
 
The Gramscian perspective ties my own research in the Marxist research tradition of 
historical materialism in the field of international relations, as the focus of my analysis will be 
on the power and the power relations in society emanating from the economic power relations 
in society. The basic premises of this approach are that economics and politics are 
inseparable, and that economic change conditions social change
130
. The basic underlying 
theoretical premise of the study is that there is the reciprocal relationship between power and 
production, which simplified in a very crude way here, means that those who own the means 
of production have the power in the politico-ideological and cultural levels in that particular 
society, respectively
131
.  
Class analysis is central tool in the Gramscian analysis, as the social class relations emerge 
from the way the material base, the mode of production, is organised
132
. As for the role of the 
state, in this perspective the state has a dual function: on one hand, as it embodies the interest 
of the ruling class, it is the terrain of class struggle
133
. On the other hand, the role of the state 
is to limit narrow class interests, as the state has tasks concerning the regulation of 
production
134
. 
The concept of hegemony initially comes from the Greek language, referring to an alliance of 
city-states under one dominant state called “hegemon”135. Antonio Gramsci developed and 
problematized the concept further, in the context of his engagement in the theoretical political 
debates of the proletarian revolution strategy with Lenin and Trotsky in Russia during and 
after the Russian revolution in 1917
136
.  
For Gramsci, like for Marx, the economic base structure of the society - production relations - 
is the basis of social classes
137
. However, Gramsci emphasized the significance of ideas as the 
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superstructure in society, too
138
. Through his definition of hegemony, Gramsci focuses on the 
power and the power relations in the society. According to him, those who rule, have the 
power over the ruled throughout society not only over the means of production but they also 
rule and have power through the function of hegemony, based on the dialectics of coercion 
and consensus respectively, of ideas in a certain historical period
139
. Thus, Gramsci brings the 
politico-ideological dimension into his conceptualizing of the function of hegemony. He 
states that the dominance of the ruling group involves both economic dominance, cultural-
ideological dominance and political dominance, respectively, both on a national and on an 
international level
140
.   
In a society, hegemony derives from how certain ways of doing and thinking are accepted by 
the dominant strata of society. The dominant strata of a society then use the social practices 
and ideologies to explain and legitimize them as “a natural order of things.” In a world 
system, a hegemonic order is created when also the dominant strata of other states accept the 
social practices and ideologies of the dominant strata of the dominant state, and use the 
ideologies to legitimize them as “a natural order of things.” This ideological “natural order of 
things” involves an ideological understanding of the “stability” of the order.141 Agnew 
provides a simplified version of Cox’s analysis: hegemony means exercising dominance and 
power over others by manipulating, convincing, and/or coercing them that “they want what 
you want”142. 
Through the function of hegemony, those who rule, have the power over the ruled throughout 
society not only over the means of production. They also rule and have power over the other 
spheres in society – the cultural, politico-ideological and social spheres - through the function 
of hegemony, based on the dialectics of coercion and consensus respectively, in society in a 
certain historical period
143
. Thus, the dominance of the ruling group involves both economic 
dominance, cultural-ideological dominance and political dominance, respectively
144
. 
Gramsci
145
 uses the notion of the function of hegemony in a particular society together with 
the notion of the “passive revolution”; by this he means reformation of society without 
revolution – the hegemonic forces in society transform the society through their hegemonic 
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ways, not through abrupt changes, which would change the balance of the existing order. 
Again, Gramsci emphasizes the use of the notion of the passive revolution as an analytical 
tool.  
The hegemonic relationship plants the seeds of social struggle and a struggle for hegemony 
between the different factions of the elites (the ruling classes) and the masses (the ruled)
146
. 
Historical unity of the ruling classes is united in the state, and their history is essentially the 
history of states and groups of states
147
. On the other hand, the history of the ruled (the 
subaltern) is fragmented and sporadic, as their struggle to change the system is constantly 
interrupted by the activity of the ruling groups
148
. Thus, the eventual social change for the 
subaltern classes, takes a long time and a unified approach, until they in turn achieve 
hegemony in all spheres of society, both in the base structure and in the superstructure. This 
hegemonic structure then prevails until the internal flaws of the system render the system 
obsolete and a new hegemonic system emerges, usually – but not necessarily, through a 
violent revolution
149
. However, the antagonistic tension of the classes is always latent in 
society. Gramsci uses the term “passive revolution” in analysing the process of the battle for 
hegemony, and as mentioned above, uses Machiavelli’s term “war of position” to analyse the 
latent tensions, and the political struggle between the different sections of society
150
. This 
process is different in every society but the content is the same
151
. 
The concept of hegemony refers thus to the duality of power: firstly, it involves the idea of 
power over but the reverse side of hegemony is the power to resist
152
. Counter-hegemony 
hence, refers to the possibility of challenging the prevailing hegemonic order; it is the struggle 
of social forces for alternative values against the hegemonic organizations and structures
153
. 
                                                          
146
 Gramsci 2007, 52. 
147
 ibid. The fact that Gramsci never laid out neither a detailed, comprehensive notion of the civil society nor a 
comprehensive theory of the state in my opinion, does not diminish the value of his political theory, as his use 
of both concepts has contingency throughout his work.    
148
 ibid, 55.  
149
 ibid, 10-12. For comparison, see Volkogonov 1997, 198-199, and Trotsky’s view on this: Trotsky saw the 
revolution in the same way as Marx: the revolution was a liquidation of a class system and a move to 
communism. However, whereas Marx saw the proletarian revolution as an end in itself, Trotsky went further: 
he coined the term of the “permanent revolution”; the revolution would permeate the socialist undertakings 
and lead to a total annihilation and liquidation of a class society throughout the world.   
150
 Gramsci 2007, 229-235. 
151
 ibid, 210. 
152
 ibid, 52-60. 
153
 Slater 2003, 83. 
41 
 
At the heart of the changing of the hegemonic order are the counter-hegemonic forces, 
consisting of different factions of civil society
154
.  
When the configuration of the counter-hegemonic forces in a particular society is strong 
enough for them to make a conscious, concerted effort to challenge the hegemonic bloc’s 
power, this conjecture is what Gramsci calls a war of position between the various social 
forces in that particular society
155
. The war of position situation according to Gramsci 
emerges in a particular historical situation, which Gramsci calls an organic crisis of 
authority
156
. The organic crisis of authority means that the hegemonic authority of the ruling 
classes and their politico-ideal rule is dissolving
157
. In the organic crisis the authority of a 
state and the structures, with which the cohesion of the old system have been held together, 
has been challenged by the counterhegemonic oppositional social forces (the ruled), whose 
class consciousness is rising and combined with conscious will, is developing into a unified 
resistance of the old system
158. Gramsci calls this type of a historical situation “the war of 
position”; where the rulers hold the economic, military, and politico-ideological power in 
society and the ruled challenge it openly
159
. The abstract concept “war of position,” the 
subaltern challenging the rulers, involves the idea of unlimited potential for development, and 
it is primarily a criterion of interpretation
160
.  
This type of a situation can last for decades, as this type of a historical situation is influenced 
both by the domestic economic and politico-ideological processes, and by the international 
economic, military, and politico-ideological processes, as Gramsci proposes
161
. He further 
adds an important note to this type of a historical situation: in every country and different 
cultural context, the process is different; however, the inner laws of motion of the process are 
the same
162
. 
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8.2. The Neo-Gramscian Italian School and the theory of historic blocs 
 
The Gramscian perspective, presented in the previous chapter, opens up a pathway to link 
another level of analysis in the study through the multidisciplinary world system theory of 
historic blocs as developed by Robert Cox
163
 and Stephen Gill
164
, whose world system 
approach relies heavily on the ideas of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Marx, respectively. The 
world system approach, as defined by Cox, purports the hegemonic nature of respective 
historic blocs in the world system, where the economically strongest power has not only 
hegemony over economic structures but also its hegemonic power reaches out to the politico-
ideological structures of the system
165
. The historical hegemonic unit in the international 
system keeps its economic, military, political and social power position by both cajoling and 
coercion: it is by exercising force and through ideology, respectively
166
.  
The hegemonic processes on a domestic level and on an international level are intertwined, as 
the interests of the dominant class in a particular society are the same as the interests of the 
dominant class on a systemic level, and interests of the working class are the same both on the 
local level and on an international level
167
. As Marx proposes, the logic of transnational 
economic capital is stronger than a power of a unitary singular state, and the inherent need for 
the spatial expansion of capital itself, reproduces the same antagonistic class struggles 
between the haves and the have-nots in any geophysical space in the world
168
.  
By extending the analysis to the level of world-system and the international economic 
structures, in my study I seek to relate the influence of the historical transformation and 
change processes in the world system to the historical economic, social, and political 
processes within Thai society, with the function of hegemony at the heart of the analysis.  
 
Cox’s definition of the concepts of hegemony and hegemonic order derives from Gramsci’s 
ideas. Cox analyses hegemony in the framework of historic blocs in a world system: a historic 
bloc is a dominant structure consisting of a base structure – production relations and the social 
relationships defined by the production relations – and the superstructure (ideology and 
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political organization). The essential prerequisite for a historic bloc is the existence of a 
dominant social class.
169
 In Gramsci’s words, historical bloc refers to the following: 
“…historical congruence between material forces, institutions and ideologies, or broadly, an 
alliance of different class forces politically organized around a set of hegemonic ideas that 
gave strategic direction and coherence to its constituent elements.”170 
It is through this concept of a “historical bloc” that the holistic world system theory built upon 
the premises of the Frankfurt School critical theory, and the concepts of Karl Marx and 
Antonio Gramsci respectively, tries to understand the transformation and change in the global 
society. The emphasis of the world system theory is on the historical economic structures, 
which embody the basic tenets for understanding historical change.
171
  
There is a duality of continuity and change inherent in the transformation of historic blocs; a 
new historic bloc emerges when counter-hegemonic forces are permeating all levels and 
structures of the old order and challenge it
172
. The world system is characterized by a 
hegemonic order, based on the power relationships created by the structure. Cox, like 
Gramsci, emphasizes the significance of the politico-ideological dimension of hegemony. To 
Cox, the prevalent historic world system is characterized by a hegemonic world order of 
states and non-state entities, where one state has economic or/and military dominance over the 
others. However, military/economic power is not enough. De facto, it is the 
consensual/coercive value structure (accepted social practices and ideologies) about the nature 
of a historic system, underpinned by a structure of power - where hegemony emerges.
173
 
John Agnew
174
 proposes that the main phase of the process of the current global politics is the 
result of the particular hegemony project, which the United States has developed in the world 
since the Second World War. This hegemonic project has been implemented both by the 
United States government and through a wide variety of American institutions, which have 
the same structures and values of a free-market society that have emerged in the United States 
since the 19
th
 century
175
. In the heart of this global hegemonic project is the vision of a new 
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world economic order, which Agnew calls transnational neoliberalism and the significance of 
the geopolitical role of the United States in promoting it
176
.  
Stephen Gill sees the current world system as a hegemonic order, a new economic world 
order; characterized by the American dominance through disciplinary neo-liberalism (Gill 
equates neo-liberalism with capitalism). He argues that disciplinary neoliberalism is a 
systematic program that has been created to create geopolitical and deep changes in structures 
of power, hegemony, and dominance that constitute the world order
177
. Gill sees that the 
capitalist new economic world order has been implemented since the Second World War by 
the United States; however, since the collapse of communism, it is the spread of the 
capitalism and the intensified globalisation, and their ingrained ideological implications – 
disciplinary neoliberalism – that have strengthened the US hegemony in the world system178.  
I will use the world system analysis and the notion of hegemonic historic blocs on a world 
system level as a backdrop for the study, to highlight relevant historical situations for my 
study, and their significance to the transformation and change processes in Thai society. 
Hence, as I propose, two historic blocs proposed by Cox, have had a considerable influence 
on the capitalist development of Thailand: firstly, the historic hegemonic bloc of the so-called 
Pax Britannica, in which the maritime power Britain was the hegemonic power in the world 
system in the 19
th
 century, and within which the pre-capitalist economic system of the old 
Siam was transformed into a modern capitalist nation-state. It was during this phase that the 
hegemonic rule of the different sections of the elites in Thailand began to evolve from the 
economic base through the formation of classes and through the formation of the division of 
labour
179
.   
The second significant historic bloc relevant to the consolidating of the hegemony of the elite 
networks in Thailand was the so-called Pax Americana after the WWII, when the United 
States emerged as the leading world power. Put into the Thai context, it was during the 
implementing of the neo-liberalist political program through the American economic and 
military expansion in South East Asia that the politico-ideological implications of the 
hegemony of the elites in Thailand were firmly consolidated, through the strengthening of the 
monarchy and the military.   
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The third historic bloc relevant to this study is what be what Cox initially called a post-
hegemonic phase in the world system
180
. Gill
181
 refers to it as oligopolistic neoliberalism, an 
era of the politics of supremacy, a prismatic transition period, a breaking of the structures of 
the hegemonic order of post-WWII disciplinary neoliberalism. Many international relations 
researchers have studied the era through the notion of globalization
182
; however, in my 
opinion this is fetishizing an old phenomenon and limiting it into one temporal context only. 
Gills
183
 suggests that the prismatic era and its challenges as a topic of research is best 
approached through critical reinvigorating of the whole field of international political 
economy, with its emancipatory possibilities in mind. However, what is central to my thesis 
when it comes to this transition period, is that due to new forms of communications and 
media and the complex globalized networks of social interaction, the capacity of national 
political leaders to sustain a singular national political culture is limited, and the notion of a 
singular political community within the boundaries of single nation-state has become 
impossible, indeed
184
. The effective power is now fragmented between diverse political 
organizations, forces, and entities on the regional, national, and international levels
185
.   
According to Gill
186
, one manifestation of this new intense integration in the world system is 
multilateralism, and the crises that happen on a regional level of the system. These crises can 
have deep economic, social, and political impact in that particular context. An example of 
these crises is the Southeast Asian economic crisis of 1997-98, which had particular impact 
on Thai society on all the mentioned levels. Here, going back to my own research, I see that 
the Southeast Asian economic crisis ultimately prompted a completely new phase in Thai 
politics: the breaking down process of the old hegemonic rule of the elites, and the emergence 
of the masses as a counter-hegemonic unified class-conscious political force.  
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9. CREATING HEGEMONY: PAX BRITANNICA AND THE INTRODUCTION OF 
CAPITALISM IN THAILAND  
9.1. The pre-capitalist mode of production in Siam: The Sakdina system 
 
Thailand was transformed into a capitalist nation-state in the late 19
th
 century
187
. Until then, 
the geographical area known as Thailand today, “the Siamese Empire,” was a loose, diverse 
cosmopolitan alliance, comprised of administrative and trade centres located along trade 
routes. The “Siamese Empire” had no clear borders. It was administered by local ruling 
families, even though Siam’s locus of power and the administrative centre was transferred to 
Bangkok from the old Siamese capital of Ayutthaya at the end of the 18
th
 century. The 
geographical area that the Siamese Empire covered at the end of the 18
th
 century was 
approximately the geographical area of current Thailand plus parts of the present Laos and 
Cambodia.
188
 
The dominant economic and social system in the pre-capitalist Siam was what in Thai is 
called the “Sakdina189” system, a system based on the power to mobilize labor190. The 
economy was based on rice production, the person who owned the land owned the people and 
their labour
191
. In the Sakdina system, the surplus production
192
 and its control beyond the 
labourers’ subsistence level lay on forced labour and the extraction of taxes193. This system 
was possible because of the population structure: Siam was relatively sparsely populated in 
those days
194
.  
In its essence, the Sakdina system means the dominance of the king, his family and the state 
over peasantry; the relationship was one of a control of labour, as Ungpakorn
195
 says “direct 
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control of humans,” i.e. the ruler’s ability to mobilize labour when necessary. Bowie196 
proposes that the majority of the population were slaves, and continues emphasizing the 
majority of the slaves having been “war slaves,” slaves captured in wars. The English term 
‘slave”, let it be mentioned here, is slightly inaccurate, as the Thai language terms for ‘slave’ 
are ‘tat’ and ‘prai’, which both first and foremost refer to the social position in the hierarchy 
of Thai society, and only secondly, to the bond relationship between the ruler and the 
subordinate and to the ruler’s ability to mobilize labour when necessary; hence, ‘tat’ = born to 
a labour class family; ‘prai’= commoner197. 
This relationship between the ‘tat’ and ‘prai’ bonded labour and the ruler involved a hierarchy 
of relationships under the umbrella term “patron-client” relationship between individuals of 
different status, which revolved around reciprocal exchange of production, protection, 
services, and security
198
. The economy was based on agriculture, thriving trade, and war; 
however, the importance of war lay more on gaining ‘tat’ and ‘prai’ than on the conquest of 
territory
199
. 
The class structure of the Sakdina system consisted of three classes: the ‘tat’ and the ‘prai’; 
the ruling class, and a diverse group of less well-structured classes, which consisted for 
instance of the Chinese intermediaries in charge of commodity sales
200
. The king was on top 
of the hierarchy, as he controlled the trade and the land
201
. The practical application of the 
Buddhist religion consolidated the hegemonic ideology of the King owning the land and the 
people into a hierarchical social system with limited social mobility
202
. 
The complex interdependent hierarchical, reciprocal relationship based on exchange of 
production, security, and protection between the rulers – the local kings, nobles and local 
rulers – and the ruled ‘tat’ and ‘prai’, was an all-inclusive system regulating social relations in 
the Sakdina system. Due to the intertwined logic of the system and the population structure, 
the economic and administrative power was not centralized under the ultimate power centre of 
Bangkok before the introduction of the modern capitalism to Siam.  
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9.2. Transition into modern capitalism: uneven development, the new division of labour 
and the centralized nation-state 
 
Thailand’s transformation into a modern capitalist state concurred with the aggressive 
expansion of the world market to the region by the European imperial powers. China, Siam’s 
old trade companion, lost the Opium War to the British in 1842, and Britain occupied Hong 
Kong, gaining a huge trade advantage in the region, after colonizing India. By the end of the 
19
th
 century, the British also ruled Malaya and Burma, and France had extended their 
Indochina Empire to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia
203. Gramsci explains European powers’ 
colonialist expansion in Marx’s terms: 
“Though Europe was rich in resources, it had arrived at the point at which the rate of profit 
was beginning to reveal its tendency to fall; Europe had a need to widen the area of expansion 
of its income-bearing investments.”204 
In the midst of the external pressures of expansionist colonialism and internal pressures of 
restructuring its own society, Siam’s transformation into a capitalist nation-state began. The 
Bowring treaty, the free trade agreement between the British and Siam, signed in 1855, was 
the final trajectory into capitalism for Siam
205
. In the following years, between 1855 and 
1870, Siam’s rulers signed several similar free trade treaties with major Western powers; 
however, the impact of the Bowring treaty and the British was the most far-fetching one
206
. 
The Bowring treaty guaranteed equal dues to both Chinese and Western shipping, it marked 
an end to the royal monopolies in trade, and it granted extraterritorial rights to British 
citizens
207
. What it meant in practice, was that even though Siam was not directly a British 
colony, its status was practically that of a colonized state. 
This new wave of capitalism as the dominant social institution involved profound socio-
economic transformations, including a new division of labour and the centralization of 
political power under a unified, monolithic nation-state with the absolute monarch as the head 
of state in Bangkok
208
.  
                                                          
203
 Heikkilä-Horn –Miettinen 2000, 198. Translation: Heli Kontio. See also Wyatt 1984, 202-204. 
204
 Gramsci 2007, 68. 
205
 Ungpakorn 2010, 121. 
206
 Dixon 1999, 30. 
207
 Baker-Phongpaichit 2005, 45. 
208
 ibid, 53-61. 
49 
 
The transformation to capitalism in Siam, unlike in England and France, was led “from 
above” by the Chakri dynasty ruler King Chulalongkorn (Rama V)209.  
First, Chulalongkorn centralized the political power in the hands of the ruling elites in 
Bangkok by reforming the administrative structure of the cosmopolitan kingdom of Siam, 
which he modelled after the British colonies. His aim was to create a monolithic unified 
nation-state adapted from the nationalistic Western ideals of the colonial powers. 
Chulalongkorn created the Siamese state partly to buffer off the threat of direct colonization 
of Siam; partly to realize his own ambitions: to control –and colonize- the peripheral regions 
of Siam under his own rule, in order to adjust Siam better to the demands of the new market 
economy.
210
 
Chulalongkorn did this by creating a civil servant bureaucracy to rule the peripheral regions 
of Siam. The creation of the bureaucracy meant abolition of the pre-capitalist Sakdina system; 
the bureaucratic rulers were directly under the Bangkok-based King’s rule, which rendered 
the local Sakdina rulers powerless. Chulalongkorn also abolished their power to control 
forced labour; he abolished slavery; and introduced the concept of private land property rights 
to Siam. Forced labour was replaced by wage labour. Chulalongkorn invested heavily in 
production of agriculture “to modernize” Siam to adjust his country to be competitive in the 
market economy. This all opened up possibilities for the peasant class for work and settling 
down to new regions. The stimulated growth of economy in due course caused a wage labour 
shortage, which was easy to deal with by transmigrating wage labour to Thailand from 
China.
211
 
It is in this transformation of Siam into a modern capitalist state, in which I see the 
fundamentals of the current political crisis stemming from initially. On one hand, there is the 
coercive element from outside colonialism. On the other hand,   there is the internal struggle 
between the peasants and the property owners, which was temporarily pacified by the forced 
social contract between the Bangkok-based absolute monarch and the masses against the local 
rulers, which masked the coercive hegemonic domestic element: the internal colonization 
through creating a centralized nation-state. These processes are intertwined and organic and 
they have changed and transformed themselves over time, naturally. However, it is in this 
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conjuncture point in Thailand’s historic development that I see the seeds of the current Thai 
political crisis and the underlying violence of the Thai political system were initially sown.   
Capitalism, according to Karl Marx is an historic organization of society ruled by the profit 
motive, it is, the production of goods and services for the sake of profit, not to satisfy people’s 
needs only
212
.
 
Capital is a highly abstract concept; money is only one aspect of capital; capital 
is also situated in the social relations
213
. 
What is important is that in capitalism, the insertion of capital into production process realizes 
more capital accumulation. Two prerequisites for this process are a sufficient amount of 
labourers available for a capitalist to extract a surplus value from their labour, and a sphere of 
the existence of market forces, which involves the expansion of capital through accumulation, 
and puts to motion the competition between different groups of capital.
214
  
The differentiation of degree between the various groups within the capitalist class – their 
titles, for example, are not important; what matters is that they control the material means of 
production, as well as accumulation
215
. In Siam, the development of the capitalist class was 
the different from Europe – during the decades that the capitalist mode of production and the 
structures emanating from it, the capitalist class consisted of the absolute monarch and his 
subordinates, i.e. the bureaucrats
216
. On the other hand, there were the indigenous Chinese 
merchants, and the foreign capitalists, who were mainly Westerners and Japanese
217
. 
The implementation of the process of the capitalist mode of production in Thailand was not 
much different from the other countries of the region. It certainly differed from the 
developments in Europe, where transition from feudalism to capitalism in England for 
instance happened through emancipation of the peasantry and citizen capitalism
218
. However 
different the cultural and historical context, Marx’ theory of capitalism is in my opinion fully 
applicable in the Thai context, as it is based on abstracting the concepts of labour and capital. 
By this, I refer specifically to the 19
th
 century transition phase to a capitalist mode of 
production in Thailand. 
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By the 1930s, the capitalist economic organization of society was fully integrated into Thai 
society. The change compared to the old Sakdina system, had been profound, and it 
permeated both the processes of the base structure and the superstructure of social relations. 
The base structure processes of society had been revolutionized by the royally induced 
revolution, and the Sakdina system had been abolished, through creating a unified Thai state 
with a geo-body with boundaries. 
Thinking of the current Thai political crisis, the basis of the antagonisms and struggle 
between the classes were laid out by the economic reforms of the Chulalongkorn era. 
However, it is also the hegemonic processes in the realm of the superstructure that need to be 
refocused onto, in order to be able to understand the long-term influence of this historical 
phase of Thailand to the current crisis. 
Again, the international level and the domestic level are intertwined, and cannot be separated 
from each other. I would propose that on the level of superstructure, the reforms of the 
Chulalongkorn era that still have effect today, are first, the modelling of the Thai state into a 
monolithic whole after the nationalistic state model adopted from the West. Masked under the 
concept of “Siwilai”219, which included building a geo-body of a unified entity coded under 
the administrative umbrella term of the nation-state of “Siam,” there was also a new 
cosmology introduced, hitherto unknown in the imagination of the Siamese
220
. 
In my opinion, the significance of the new cosmology lay in the fact that the new cosmology 
not only spatially arranged geographical state, as obtained from the West and adapted to the 
Thai historical situation. The ideological dimension of the new cosmology, in the 
superstructure of Thai society also remodelled power relations, both inside the capitalist class, 
and the relations between the ruling class and the peasantry in the domestic sphere. The 
creation of the strong Thai state served to mediate between the capitalist ruling elites and the 
masses. The strong administrative bureaucracy, whose ideologies were diverse, was strongly 
manipulated and influenced by the Bangkok ruling elites; it is the absolute monarch and his 
network. Both aspects lay the basis for the strong co-operation between the monarchy and 
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other sections of the ruling elites in Thailand as co-operating members of a networked 
capitalist class.  
The causal connection of this historical era to the later historical developments lies in the 
process of creating a strong bureaucracy and the emergence of the strong military to support 
the bureaucratic rule, as laid out by Bangkok. The strong bureaucratic practices as part of the 
hegemonic superstructure have been a fundamental coercive/consensual element of the Thai 
politics ever since Thailand was transformed into a capitalist state, and they have been 
reproduced over and over again to uphold the power of the Bangkok elites. This axis between 
the bureaucracy and military has been so strong in Thai politics, that it has become almost an 
essentialist model of Thai politics in the academic research
221
.    
 
9.3. The 1932 Revolution and the abolition of the absolute monarchy  
  
By the beginning of the 1930s, the Thai economy was fully integrated in the world market. 
The base of its economy was specialized agriculture, the most important export produce being 
rice. The growth of rice exports was the biggest economic change between the years 1850-
1950. During this period, 80-90 per cent of the population was involved in rice farming, and 
the rice exports comprised 60-70 per cent of total exports.
222
 
Most of the expansion of the rice cultivation was done by the indigenous Thai
223
. The 
modernizing of the economy, the market sector –building the infrastructure necessary for rice 
exports, i.e. the irrigation systems and logistical infrastructures- was done by importing wage 
labour en masse from rural South China. It is estimated that by 1910, the amount of Chinese 
immigrants had risen from 5% of the population to 10%
224
.  
The commercialization of the wage labour also reached the bulk of the indigenous population 
in the form of using hired hands in the highly specialized agricultural sector
225
. 
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The 1930s global economic depression hit Thailand hard. The 1920s had been tumultuous for 
the economy, and crises followed another. The world market rice price fluctuations were a 
challenge to the government. Spending on military and monarchical costs increased to 
swallow a disproportionate portion of the national budget. In the years 1930-32, the world 
market rice price fell by 75%, and the value of land fell down to a sixth of what it had been in 
the previous years.
226
  
High unemployment rate, salary cuts and tax raises plus the social and political unrest 
ultimately laid the basis for the 1932 revolution, and to the abolition of the Thai absolute 
monarchy
227
. The revolution and the abolition of the absolute monarchy in 1932 mark the 
beginning of the modern Thailand in the canonized meta-narrative of writing Thai history. 
The revolution of 1932 was carried out in the midst of societal unrest, which was due to the 
downturn of the economy affected by fluctuations in the world economy. A group of 
Western- educated young intellectuals together with military officers known collectively as 
“Promoters”, who had a wide distrust in monarchy between themselves, performed a coup, 
created a temporary constitution and abolished absolute monarchy
228
. The general 
recuperative economic plan for after the revolution was to be carried out under the new 
constitution by the Promoters’ “People’s Party”229, with Pridi Panomyong as main architect of 
the plan
230
.  
The canonized meta-narrative of Thai history and the bulk of both the Western and Thai 
research in the field of international relations both like to sum up the changes that occurred in 
Thai society after the 1932 revolution under the accumulative consolidation of democracy, 
emphasizing the functional-structural or institutional dimension of democracy
231
.  
I, on the other hand, prefer to follow Ungpakorn’s view on the significance of the 1932 
revolution when it comes to its effects on the current political crisis. Ungpakorn proposes that 
the real significance of the 1932 revolution lies in the changes in the superstructure of society: 
the revolution expanded the base of the ruling stratum of society, on the other hand, to include 
the military, and on the other hand, diminishing of the monarchy into just one fraction of the 
ruling class. Furthermore, he sees the relative weakness of both the domestic capitalist class 
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and the working class, respectively, as the main reason for the growing influence of the 
military in the public realm of politics.
232
 
Wyatt could be interpreted to have a similar conclusion on the significance of the military on 
the later developments in Thai society, as Ungpakorn, though from a different perspective 
altogether. Wyatt refers to the repetitive role of the military as a dominant force in Thai 
politics ever since 1932, both in the forefront and behind the scenes of politics. Wyatt 
proposes that the rise of the military was due to the sudden absence of monarchy in society. 
He suggests that the rise of the military happened because military had a high prestige as a 
social institution in Thai society as a social institution; it was a hierarchical organization, 
modelled and reproduced after the conservative and socially cohesive cosmology of the old 
Sakdina system.
233
 
I am trying to combine these two viewpoints through theory, in order to point out the reason 
why the nexus of hegemonic power in the superstructure of the process of social change at 
this historical conjectural point was shifted to military – and why the influence of the military 
is still very strong, whenever there is a political crisis in Thailand.   
Here we might go back to Gramsci again and look at his conceptualization of an organic crisis 
of authority in a society. What is noteworthy here when outlining an organic crisis of 
authority is the temporal dimension: the tenure of an organic crisis of authority in a society 
can extend over a long period
234
. This situation happens when structural contradictions that 
cannot be resolved in traditional ways evolve in a social formation; in this situation the 
dominant political forces do everything to conserve the old order through persistent efforts, 
even though the social formation in question has reached its maturity and its structure is 
incurable
235
.  
Gramsci, who never created a theory of the state per se, uses Italy during the time of the 
unification of Italy (the Risorgimento), which culminated in 1860-61, as an analytical tool and 
an example of an organic crisis of hegemonic authority. He outlines the role of a non-
productive entity, like the military or the bureaucracy, in a moment of crisis.  
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He analyses the Italy of the Risorgimento movement era as an example of an organic crisis of 
the State and the crisis of hegemony between the ruling classes and the masses
236
. Gramsci 
analyses the domestic development of the Italy of the Risorgimento, never forgetting the 
temporal and the spatial context against which the unification of Italy was carried out; i.e. the 
economic and political developments in other countries of Europe. He says: 
“These variations in the actual process whereby the same historical development manifests 
itself in different countries have to be related not only to the differing combinations of 
international relations (international relations are usually underestimated in this kind of 
research). The Jacobin
237
 spirit, audacious, dauntless, is certainly related to the hegemony 
exercised for so long by France in Europe, as well as to the existence of an urban centre like 
Paris and to the centralisation attained in France thanks to the absolute monarchy. The 
Napoleonic wars on the other hand, intellectually so fertile for the renovation of Europe, 
nonetheless through their enormous destruction of manpower- and these were men taken from 
among the boldest and most enterprising –weakened not only by the militant political energy 
of France but that of other nations as well.”238   
In the Italy of Risorgimento phase and during the later developments in Italy the military 
played a large role in establishing hegemony of the ruling classes
239
. Especially the unifying 
of Italy during the Risorgimento period 1870-1900 could be proposed to resemble the 
Siamese process of establishing and consolidating the hegemonic rule of Bangkok elites. 
What is noteworthy here when outlining an organic crisis of authority is the temporal 
dimension: the tenure of an organic crisis of authority in a society can extend over a long 
period, up to decades
240
.  
In Italy there was a deep divide between the industrialised North and the underdeveloped 
South – a territorial version of the urban-rural divide, as Gramsci points out, based on 
dominance and hegemony of the economically developed urban North, sealed in the strong 
state
241
. As in Italy, also in Siam, the urban and the rural areas were bound together only by 
the directive function exercised by the dominant economic centre
242
. This relationship 
between the rural and the urban areas was naturally a complex one with different combination 
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of relationships within and between the two entities. However, the relationship can be 
characterized as a relationship of direct dominance between the ruler and the subordinate, in 
which the real, the organic unification of the countryside and the urban areas is missing
243
.   
Gramsci’s conceptual analysis above is well applicable to the post-1932 era rise of the 
military in Thailand. The transnational crisis of the capitalist system processes, as they 
appeared in their historical conjuncture point in 1932, had affected Thai domestic economic 
and societal processes deeply. Regarding the base structure, the organizational form of 
production and the division of labour that the economy was restructured into after King 
Chulalongkorn’s revolution from above, had been solidified so that by the 1932 crisis 
Thailand was fully integrated into the world market, as already mentioned. Capitalism had 
been solidified as the dominant form of economic organization at this very point of historical 
development, up to the point where the historical unity of the ruling classes was realized in 
the monolithic Thai state in the group –or international society – of states244.  
As in Italy, the capitalist class in Thailand was weak and heterogeneous when the revolution 
of 1932 was carried out. The abolition of the absolute monarchy had led into monarchy being 
transformed from a prominent hegemonic societal institution into just another part of the 
governing elites of Bangkok. The economy was in chaos. The sphere of politics was open for 
violent solution, however, that did not happen in Thailand. Instead, the military rose in 
influence, as already mentioned earlier. 
According to Gramsci, in this type of organic crisis, “a crisis of authority”, “a general crisis of 
the state”; at this conjuncture the content of the crisis is the crisis of the ruling class’s 
hegemony. This type of a crisis occurs when the ruling class has failed in some of its 
undertakings to ensure its hegemony or/and at the same the masses have become politically 
active with their demands. In this situation, the ruling classes retort to trying to regain the 
control by coercion in order to safeguard its interests – and power - both in the spheres of the 
processes of production and in the sphere of the superstructure (the ideological level).
245
  
This situation occurs in historical saddle points, when the old system is breaking down and 
the new system is to come to existence
246
. The situation slides into a stagnant type of a status 
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quo, the war of position, as the masses have detached themselves from the old ideologies but 
do not yet have a political program and the organization needed to act upon their demands 
against the old order
247
. In this interregnum period, the content of the crisis is universal, 
though the process differs from country to country
248
. 
If in a country, there is a social stratum who has a monopoly or whose economic or political 
self-expression is strongly attached to military or bureaucratic career, depending on the 
particular nature of that society, this military or bureaucratic class, who in themselves do not 
have an economic function in society, may become a strong social force
249
. By nature, this 
class is reactionary in the sense that its social position depends directly on the ruling class
250
. 
Gramsci emphasizes, however, the directive nature of the military or the bureaucratic class – 
he sees that the power of this class is not necessarily absolute, as its power depends on the 
ruling class of the economic apparatus
251
. However, when it comes to power, the strong 
military reinforces the already existing division of power between the urban and the rural 
area, which in this type of a phase of the capitalist economic mode of production is an inbuilt 
law of motion; having the power in the urban area means having the power in the rural 
area.
252
 
In this type of a situation, the military influence in a society is not just influence in the 
technical sense of the word but also implies the influence of the social stratum where the 
military emerges from – and the psychological tendencies and the energy of this social 
stratum, which more often than not is conservative. This stratum more often than not 
expresses its aims in “political language” rather than in “economic” language. According to 
Gramsci, this happened in the Italy during the Risorgimento era. Gramsci also cites Spain as 
one example of this type of a process: the countryside is sparsely populated and the rural 
population is separated from the centre of power and politically not active; there is no rural 
bourgeoisie; hence, the military influence in the society is strong.
253
  
In the case of an organic crisis of authority then, the military influence in society is strong, 
and there is always a possibility of the crisis being resolved through the military taking 
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over
254
. However, as mentioned earlier: the military is never a united entity, supporting one 
uniform ideology, as they have none - except for preserving the interests of those their 
existence depends on, it is the ruling classes. Hence, if there is a tendency to political 
disagreement, it tends to happen vertically inside the ranks of the military through rival 
cliques and personal grievances rather than along any ideological frontiers
255
. In this type of a 
situation, the military is a permanent political force, ready to react and intervene in the public 
domain whenever there is a chance of an organic crisis of authority, and whenever there is a 
perceived threat to the perceived “legal order,” or in other words, a perceived threat to 
hegemony
256
.  
Gramsci mentions Spain and Greece as examples of this tendency
257
. He also cites India and 
China as examples of countries in which there is a large “parasitic” class (=military and 
bureaucracy) who has no position in production, but whose influence of as a political force is 
strong, leading to historical stagnation of these countries
258
. I would add Siam to the group. 
Consequently, herein is the key as to why the historical conjuncture of the Siamese 1932 
revolution intensified the influence of the military instead of reducing it.   
Inside Siam, the rise of the bureaucratic class had everything to do with building a Western 
type of a nationalist, monolithic, territorial state of Siam, centralized under the administrative 
centre of Bangkok. It was with the assistance of the bureaucracy that the hegemony of the 
ruling classes was established throughout the Siamese territory, in the first place
259
. The 
military’s role became to enhance the bureaucracy’s role, and legitimize enforcing the modern 
state of Siam with a geo-body during the reign of the King Vajiravudh, whom King 
Chulalongkorn appointed as the King in 1895
260
.  
In addition, the late dynastic modernisation and the late division of labour played a role in 
strengthening a role of the military
261
. Siam was heavily dependent solely on rice production 
in its economy for decades, and international fluctuations on the world market prices of rice 
reflected immediately on the national economy
262
. The late dynastic modernisation and 
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widespread social discontent led to the abolition of monarchy in the 1932 revolution, 
rendering monarchy to just one political force among others
263
.  
Before the 1932 revolution, the military’s role grew further during King Prajadhipok’s reign 
in the 1920s, as the international pressure on Siam was not only via the colonial Western 
powers. The rise of Japanese imperialism and the rise of the communism in China, plus the 
regional anti-colonial struggle had their effects on the Siamese soil and on the rise of the 
military in Siam. In late 1920s, Siam was a base for Lao, Vietnamese, Burmese and 
Cambodian nationalists to wage struggle against the colonial powers in their respective 
countries. In addition, Siam was a base for its Chinese population’s anti-Japanese struggle and 
the Communist vs. Kuomintang struggles amongst the Chinese.
264
 
 
9.4. Solidifying the hegemonic rule: bureaucracy, military and the local elites 
 
In this chapter, I return to the processes of the superstructure of the social change in Siam 
during the period when Siam was transformed into a modern capitalist state. The temporal 
context of this chapter covers loosely the same period as the previous chapter, the period 
between the years 1850-1932. The temporal dimension is only of secondary importance here, 
as the hegemonic rule of the trinity of the bureaucracy, the military, and the elites has 
continued until the South East Asian economic crisis in 1997-98 and the ensuing Thai Rak 
Thai Party-led era.  
In the previous chapter, I have tried to outline the changes in the base structure, i.e. the 
material base, and to some extent tried to identify the underlying fundamental dynamics of the 
societal change in Thailand, and the dynamics of the relationships between the different social 
forces during 1850-1932. I have done this with keeping in mind the current Thai political 
crisis, as well as the starting point of my research, i.e. that the underlying fundamentals of the 
current crisis are ultimately to be found in the historical development of the Thai society 
under the dominant economic mode of societal organization of capitalism. I have also tried to 
point out how the logics of the international dimension of the Thai societal change are 
inextricably intertwined with the logics of the domestic processes. 
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In order to complete the perspective of the process of historical change in a society, it is also 
essential to understand the process and the underlying dynamics of the change of ideas and 
ideologies that are intertwined with the material change during that particular phase in that 
particular society, in this case Thailand.  
Herein, it is apt to bring in the ideological-political dimension of hegemony by Gramsci. As I 
have proposed earlier, the hegemony of one class in society does not cover only the control of 
the economy but it also permeates cultural, political, and educational realms of society
265
. 
Gramsci saw economics, politics and ideas as an intertwined whole, bound in a historical 
bloc. According to Cox
266
, when it comes to understanding ideas that are relevant to a 
historical material structure = ideas as collective images of certain social order, as imagined 
by different groups of people, there is a normative principle inherent in this understanding of 
ideas. By this Cox means, that there are conflicting views on the nature and legitimacy of 
power relations, the meaning of certain concepts like democracy, good governance, social 
justice, etc., between the different groups in society. Consequently, there are different views 
on the strategies and on the potential for the evolving of an alternative economic material 
structure as the mode of organizing the mode of production in a society
267
.  
Gramsci
268
 saw the ideological dimension of these conflicting ideas embodied in the function 
of hegemony in a society in a given historical time. According to Gramsci, the social group 
who dominates the ownership of the means of production tries to preserve the power relations 
in all realms of the society through coercion and consensus, respectively:  in the realm of 
ideas and ideologies, to legitimize its rule and to stabilize and preserve a particular order
269
.   
The hegemonic control of the ruling classes over the masses is solidified – and their rule 
legitimized - directly through coercion in the public sphere via the government, legislation 
and other institutionalized forms of control. The consensual dimension of hegemony is more 
subtle, as it is not based on direct, but on an indirect control over the subordinate classes, 
instead. The consensual control over the masses is solidified in the private realm of a society, 
via the everyday social practices, where the masses give consensual control to the rulers. Here 
the central notion is that it is the historically caused position of ruling classes in the 
production that is seen as a natural, prestigious source of power as such. Both the coercive 
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and the consensual dimension of hegemony are understood as organisational and mutually 
intertwined.
270
  
The function of the social hegemony and domination creates a certain type of a division of 
labour in a society. Consequently, hegemony creates an open group of hierarchical 
qualifications to arrange a society upon, qualifications, which bear no direct relation to the 
mode of production. In practise, this means that there will be a differentiated group of jobs 
created through hegemony, whose function is “parasitic” – they exist only to serve and 
preserve the ruling classes’ inherited or/and dominant position in a society.271 
This in turn, reinforces the function of the hegemonic social order and reinforces the 
“legitimacy” of the power of the ruling classes in a society in the long term, until the 
dominant order is seen as “natural process of things”272. The process of the function of 
hegemonic control creates solidarity and psychological bonds between different hegemonic 
groups over time, and it reaches over all domains of economic and productive activity
273
. 
When looking at the implementing of the hegemonic rule in a society, if we try to pinpoint the 
locus where the power relations in society are most obvious, and the locus from where the 
antagonisms in a society and seeds of social struggle and discontent stem from, Scott
274
 
locates this nexus first and foremost in the public realm of hegemonic control, where the 
power of the rulers over the subordinate is displayed, and given an expression through 
institutionalized social practices and hegemonic discourses.  
In the early 20
th
 century Siam, the control of the economic base of the society by the Bangkok 
elites was already solidified through the imposing of the capitalist mode of production. The 
division of labour that followed shortly after in the process of adopting the capitalist mode of 
production in many European countries, evolved also in Siam, through a different process. 
However, the social differentiation process happened slowly in Siam. Hence, the development 
of the petty bourgeoisie was a much slower process in Siam, and there developed no middle 
class, neither was there a smallholding domestic capitalist class to speak of.
275
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If we place Gramsci’s theory on the function of hegemony in the Thai context at hand, we 
could conclude, first of all, that in this country-specific process of the elites’ gaining control 
of the Thai society, a space opened up for the two key subsections of the ruling elites to 
evolve: the bureaucracy and the military. These two subsections have played a key part in 
Thai political life since the early 20
th
 century, up until now. De facto, the position of these two 
subsections of the Bangkok elites depended entirely on the owners of the means of 
production, as they themselves did not have any function as such in the economic production. 
Their only function was to enforce the centralization practices of the administrative rule of 
Bangkok inside Siam after King Chulalongkorn’s capitalist revolution from above.276 
 
10. PAX AMERICANA, LEGITIMIZIG THE MILITARY RULE AND 
REINSTATING MONARCHY AS A HEGEMONIC TOOL 
10.1. The Pax Americana historic bloc: a global neo-liberalist project 
The post-WWII world system as a historic bloc, involves the breakup of the colonial empires 
of the 19th century, and the emergence of the US as the leading economic, military and a 
political force in the international society
277
. The main quotidian of the post-world war II 
historic restructuring of the world system involved a political strategy by the United States to 
restructure the world capitalism and it included both economic, social and political 
dimensions, all under the pretence of capitalist progress
278
. This was made possible by the fact 
that after the WWII, the economic, and the technological supremacy of the United States was 
par none globally: the sheer volume of the United States’ economic output right after the 
WWII alone accounted for more than 50 % of the global GNP
279
. Due to the dynamic nature 
of the American industrial capitalism, the scientific breakthroughs were swiftly applied into 
the creating of the military-industrial complex, which was the best in the post-WWII context. 
This together with the dominance the United States had in the field of information 
technologies crucial to economy helped to consolidate its position as the supreme powerhouse 
in the post-WWII world society. 
280
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The phase of the post-WWII era capitalist world order is more of an ideological project than 
the historic bloc of the Pax Britannica was. According to Cox
281
, the19th century territorial 
expansion of the imperial powers was connected to the rise of the manufacturing capitalism in 
the international economy, in which Britain ruled, and the social and ideological power of its 
bourgeoisie class, whose wealth was based on the manufacturing capitalism. Marx and Engels 
propose aptly how underlying the expansive British capitalism – and imperialism – there was 
also a geopolitical motive: to ensure the British rule of the global seas
282
. They also proposed 
that Britain eventually created its own demise as a leading world power by exporting capital 
to its economic rival the United States, and predicted that the US would become a dominant 
world power
283
.  
Trotsky
284
sees the rise of the US in the dynamism of its capitalism versus the international 
system of nation-states; he puts the inter-relationship and the contradictions between Europe 
and America in the centre of his analysis. Trotsky says that the American capitalism had 
increased the productivity of labour to an unprecedented level in the peaceful conditions 
capitalism developed inside the US after the civil war
285
. At this stage, Trotsky sees that 
capitalism has a progressive element to it, as it implies the possibility of increasing the 
welfare of all the classes in society
286
. However, as the accumulation of capital and the 
realization of surplus value is a social process, capitalism as a mode of production has an 
inbuilt tendency to expand and transform itself beyond a single individual or a single nation-
state
287
. He proposes that the huge dynamism of the US capitalism, as it emerged in the period 
between the WWI and WWII, simply could not be reproduced in the restricted system of the 
nation-states of Europe, neither could it be yet reproduced in what Trotsky calls the 
European-ruled Orient
288
.  
The essential cultural element of the American hegemonic project is the linking of the 
capitalist economic mode of production with the political form of government based on the 
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American experience, the social myth of the liberal democracy as a universal normative 
standard of political organization of a society
289
. 
This social myth on the link between liberal democracy and the capitalist mode of production 
derives from the intricate relationship between the state and the corporations in the US. 
Volpi
290
 sees America’s post-WWII expansionist imperialism as a logical continuation of a 
policy approach, which dates back to the creating of federal presidential republic of the 
United States in the 1780s. He proposes that the initial intention of creating the federal 
presidential republic was in essence to preserve the economic elite’s dominance through 
devising constitutional mechanisms, the purpose of which was ultimately to defend the elites’ 
property interests, all under the normative rhetoric of freedom, liberty, and justice
291
. 
A geographical expansionist dimension was immanent in this policy from the beginning, as 
America was a vast territory with huge resources in the dawn of the rise of industrial 
capitalism. Add to it the background of the Founding Fathers who were all part of the elite – 
all of them were rich landowners. The creation of the weak central government with only 
limited powers was a compromise between the Northern industrialists and the Southern 
merchants, to create a favourable environment for the rise of the corporation throughout the 
North American continent. Corporate economic interests de facto moulded the important 
regulatory agencies and government offices.
292
  
In the post-WWII context, the intention of the United States’ political project was simply to 
facilitate the movement of capital on a transnational level and to create favourable conditions 
for economic gain and the accumulation of highest possible profit
293
. This involved 
guaranteeing access to the expanding flow of industrial raw material inputs to enhance the 
United States economic business activity
294
. 
The historic bloc based on the “Pax Americana” was a structure in dominance in which the 
power configuration in the international society shifted from Europe to the US, and in which 
the central agencies of the US government had the dominant position
295
. However, it was not 
a hierarchical structure based on direct dominance by the United States, but a structure based 
                                                          
289
 Gill 2008, 40-41. 
290
 Volpi 2009. 
291
 Volpi 2009, xi-xiv. 
292
 ibid, 87-88. 
293
 Mittelman 1997, 41. 
294
 Caldwell 1978, 8. 
295
 Cox 1981, 145. 
65 
 
on bargaining and negotiating by internationalized fragments of states
296
. Moreover, the 
promise of progress and development immanent in Fordist accumulative capitalism - the 
growth in mass consumption was the legitimizing element of the system, adding to its 
consensual value
297
. The dynamic basis of the system lay on the structures of capitalist 
production and social reproduction of the system – the system was easy to transfer across 
national boundaries and easily reproduced in any society around the globe under a military-
political language: the slogans of development and modernity
298
. 
The ideological battle between the Soviet Union and the US offered the US a possibility to 
advance the expansion of the free-market capitalism under the thinly veiled justification of 
defending the vague universalistic claims to protect the “Western civilization and the 
liberalistic free-market structures against communism”299. According to Cox300, the power 
figuration of the “Pax Americana” involved the United States playing similar leading role to 
Britain in its pursuing its own interests in the global economy. When we look at the economic 
structures in the post-WWII context, the economic structuration of the world did not involve 
major changes per se, as the post-WWII phase ipse facto only deepened the existing capitalist 
structures created during the colonial empires
301
.  
However, what was different compared to the British hegemony of the world system of the 
late 19
th
 century, was the international geopolitical dimension of this organic alliance 
between the US, Europe and Japan, in the name of reconstructing the war-torn economies
302
. 
This de facto meant laying the economic basis of the post-WWII world order on the premises 
of the liberal Fordist
303
 capitalism and free trade, first in Europe, and then globally. In Europe, 
the economic base of the war-torn countries was restructured around the principles of Fordist 
industrial capitalism, especially around the technologically advanced car and electrical 
corporate industries, where the principles of the Keynesian macroeconomic management 
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mixed with the internationalization of the Rooseveltian New Deal with its principles of 
corporatism and state planning
304
.  
On a social level, these arrangements implied a social contract between the state, the 
corporations, and the subordinate classes. Gramsci
305
crystallizes this model by proposing that 
in this production model, the whole life is centred on the notions of production and 
consumption. The mass production model of industrial capitalism requires skilled labour, who 
are allowed higher wages and hence, a better standard of living. The corporations are 
guaranteed high capital accumulation. The state acts as a corporation itself, regulating its own 
investments through taxes, investments and state holdings – plus the state regulates the 
redistribution of wealth in the form of for instance subsidies or state bonds. This type of a 
social contract requires a certain type of a state to survive. Gramsci saw the United States 
liberal democracy as the model of a state in which this type of a social contract could 
survive.
306
 
Gramsci says that the function of hegemony is born in a factory
307
. As said earlier, hegemony 
not only has a coercive dimension but also a consensual element to it. Trotsky sees that 
capitalism basically has a progressive element to it, as it implies the possibility of increasing 
the welfare of all the classes in society
308
. Herein is the beginning of the success of the 
American hegemonic project after the WWII.  
The United States internationalized their hegemonic post-WWII project by establishing 
international institutions with its allies, the main aim of which was to ensure the rights of the 
US corporations to pursue their investments and profits globally
309
. The Bretton Woods 
conference created the system of institutions – the IMF, the World Bank, and the 
WTO/GATT all were negotiated into force by the US and its European allies to facilitate the 
free trade and the distribution of power between the negotiating members
310
. The Bretton 
Woods system also included the international monetary transactions tied to the American 
dollar as its basic unit, which meant tying the members’ monetary policies to the American 
dollar
311
. This was to stabilize the international monetary system and prevent the type of a 
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crisis of an international economy that happened in the 1930s; however, as Gilpin proposes, 
the real aim of creating the Bretton Woods system was to keep the value of the American 
dollar stable and enhance the United States’ dominant position in the world312. Consolidating 
liberal capitalism through international institutions hid the notion that thus, on a material 
level, the US leadership would guarantee a universal development and well-being
313
.   
Consolidating the new capitalist world order further happened through emphasizing the 
ideological dimension, the ideological competition between communism and capitalism. To 
contain the rival economic order, the state-led communism, and its spread, through 
militarizing and securitizing the interests of the industrial capitalism, the US created a military 
alliance along the geopolitical axis formed by the United States with its allies in Europe and 
Japan. This militarization in turn fed the growth of the military-industrial complex and the 
development of extensive arms trade in the region.
314
  
 
10.2. The American neo-liberalist project in South East Asia and Thailand 
 
To understand the complex dynamics of the relationship that developed between the United 
States and Thailand from the 1947 onwards, we have to look at Gramsci’s methodological 
considerations regarding the analysis of situations, and apply his analysis in the historical 
context that the relationship begun to take shape. According to Gramsci
315
, the key to 
understanding historical situations is the analysis of the relations of force on various levels of 
the situation. These levels comprise the relations of force firstly, on the international level, 
and secondly, the relations of force on a domestic level, it is the relations of force within a 
society, which not only consist of the economic relations between social forces but also of 
political hegemonic systems within a society, including the political parties and the military. 
The domestic level, the organic social relations within a society modifies the organic 
international relations of a state in an organic, changing international system. This 
relationship between the two levels is not unidirectional but   bidirectional, as both levels 
influence each other. It is the totality of the social relations of force, which we have to look at 
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in our analysis in order to get a clear picture of a historical situation, not just separate 
components of it. The relations of force at the economic base of a society are the starting 
point in the analysis to look into the structures of domination, and on the base of this analysis 
assess whether in a particular society the conditions for the true transformation of that 
particular society exist at that given moment. The question of organisation is essential; the 
significance of the military lies in the fact that they are an organised force, always prepared, 
unlike other social forces that lack the comparable international organization.
316
 
At the same time, we also have to keep in mind that societal processes in every society evolve 
in a way unique to that particular society, and that no society will dissolve or transform itself 
into something new until all the productive forces for which there is room in that particular 
society have evolved
317
.  
Only after taking these vectors into consideration, will we be able to see if the situation is a 
manifestation of a continuation of an organic process or if the situation is conjunctural, it is a 
manifestation of a real transformation of a system (= society).
318
 
When we look at the post-WWII situation, the emergence of the United States as a dominant 
country in the global system of states represents a manifestation of a change in the world 
system. The reconstruction of structures of the global system after the WWII is a 
manifestation of rearranging the global spheres of influence into a new historic bloc under the 
hegemonic position of the United States in the economic, and cultural, political, and military 
sense.  
If a state is in an economically weak position in the international system, according to 
Gramsci, the tendency is that within that particular state the hegemonic social forces try to 
exploit the situation and try to suppress the social forces in a subordinate position
319
. This to 
Gramsci is more of a reflection of the particular state’s international position than a 
representation of the total of the social forces within that state.
320
 
After the WWII, the Southeast Asian region was an underdeveloped periphery in the global 
system in Washington’s perspective. Still, Southeast Asia was vitally important to 
Washington both economically and militarily, as Southeast Asia had strategically important 
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raw materials, which the United States’ industry depended on321. Moreover, America’s closest 
ally in Asia, Japan, depended on Southeast Asian rice
322
. Japan had lost the war; however, 
after the war, due to Japan’s crucial strategic position and its advanced stage of capitalist 
development in the region, tied Japan’s development in the United States’ sphere of influence 
in the region
323
.  
This securitization of Washington’s economic interests in Southeast Asia emerged from the 
ideological rivalry between the communist and the capitalist economic systems: Southeast 
Asia was to serve as a key buffer zone to contain the perceived threat presented by the Soviet 
Union and China, where the communists took over in 1949
324
. This all happened in the 
context of the emergence of the national liberation movements in the region, which aimed for 
independence from colonialism
325
. 
In this grand scheme of the United States post-WWII project, integrating Thailand into the 
new economic world order was not of direct utmost importance in the region during the 
immediate years after the WWII. Initially, Americans’ involvement in Thailand was indirect, 
linked more to ensuring its post-WWII allies’ (Britain and France plus Japan) influence in the 
region and supporting their interests, which were first and foremost of economic nature. Both 
Britain and France needed American assistance in their efforts to keep their economic 
interests in the region intact. The British depended on the Thai rice for their troops in the 
Malayan peninsula. Thailand was also of crucial importance to the security of Malaya, as 
Malaya had tin and rubber, which the British needed. France needed Thailand as an ally to 
guarantee a peaceful buffer zone for its involvement in Indochina. As for the strategic alliance 
between Japan and the United States, Japan depended on the imports of the Thai rice. 
Thailand was also a crucial key to the security of the Malaccan Strait, a trade route crucial for 
Japan in its post-WWII economic recovery process.
326
 
Thus, Thailand’s role in the Pax Americana follows the logic of American capitalism’s 
interests in Japan. Subsequently, the US interests in Thailand were connected not only with 
containing the communism in the South East Asian region, but also with the role planned for 
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Thailand by the US, which was simply that Thailand’s economy was to assist keeping the 
Japanese economy healthy, as Japan was of strategic importance to the US in the region
327
.  
The consolidation of the American economic interests in South East Asia and in Thailand’s 
particular case were carried out with the aid of the American capital, under the notion of 
economic progress, which was in concurrence with the interests of the local hegemonic Thai 
business elites
328
. What is particular in Thailand’s case when compared to the other countries 
in the region regarding firstly, the relationship between Thailand and the US was the strong 
military nature of the consolidating of the American interests in the country
329
. The second 
particularity, regarding the US aid and its strong military aid to Thailand was the 
strengthening of the military as the consolidator of the hegemonic business elite networks’ 
interests within Thailand
330
. Subsequent to this was the reinstating of the monarchy as a 
subservient tool to uphold the elite interests inside the country, masked under strong 
nationalist ideology
331
.  
Under the notion of economic progress, huge infrastructure projects were carried out inside 
the country with the US development aid, whose main aim was to fortify the military 
infrastructure for the US aims, and utilize Thailand’s resources to the maximum in the service 
of the Cold War era US war operations in Southeast Asia. The domestic aim of the 
infrastructure projects was to consolidate the power of the Bangkok elite networks’ 
administrative rule over the provinces outside Bangkok. Junya Lek Yimprasert
332
 estimates 
the total figure of the direct American aid to the Thai military at approximately 2 billion USD 
between the years 1950-1987.
333
 
10.3. Consolidating domestic hegemony: the rise of the military 
 
When we look at the Pax Americana era (after WWII until the 1970s) from the Gramscian 
perspective, and its influence on the power structures in Thai society; and how the power 
structures formed during that era still have an effect during the current Thai political crisis; 
we could conclude that the Pax Americana era not only happened on the economical level but 
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the changes also happened on the ideological, on the super-structure level, as the changes 
ultimately consolidated the hegemony of the Thai elites, originally created during the Pax 
Britannica. What is unique to Thailand is the particular form of change in the structures of 
Thai society, which emerges from the historical analysis of that era, which has had a long-
standing impact in preserving the old hegemonic order of the elite rule in Thai society. The 
changes that happened in the structures of power inside Thailand in this era have had a long-
standing effect on Thai domestic political level up until now. Henceforth, as I see it, the 
change and transformation that the configuration of the network of the elites in Thai society 
underwent during the Pax Americana era on the domestic level, form the core of the elite 
regime rule that is breaking only now, during the current Thai political crisis. 
The era of the Pax Americana historic bloc on the Thai domestic level entails the emergence 
of the development of the monarchic-military axis as the most significant consolidator of the 
hegemonic elite interests and the hegemonic elite regime rule. If we analyse the phenomenon 
further, we could conclude from the Gramscian perspective that in this axis, the military is the 
one whose position as a political actor is stronger. The position and the function of the 
monarchy is subservient to the strong military, and in this equation, monarchy serves as a 
useful unifying tool to keep the elite network regime in power. The shift of which elite 
network actor has been in the forefront of the realm of Thai politics has depended on the 
historical situation of the international system, however, the position of the military has 
always been strong since the Pax Americana era, be it then direct influence or indirect 
influence.  
As mentioned earlier, the 1932 constitutional revolution lead to the abolition of absolute 
monarchy; however this was a nominal change only. In practice, the revolution did not bring 
about changes in the economic structures within the country, nor did it change the relation of 
forces within Thai society. Thailand’s economy was extremely weak due to the worldwide 
economic depression, and depended heavily on the global rice trade. The only societal process 
the 1932 revolution induced was the strengthening of the military as a political force and 
diminishing monarchy’s role into one fragment of the Thai ruling class334.  
Within Thailand, there had been no real change between the relations of force, or in the 
structures of dominance. The situation within the country, as I interpret it, resembled 
Gramsci’s Italy of the Risorgimento era, (as I already mentioned earlier in the context of the 
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1932 revolution in chapter 9.3.), where there was a huge discrepancy in the relatively 
industrialized administrative centre (Bangkok), and the countryside in terms of economic 
development. The relationship was that of uneven development and dominance between the 
centre and the periphery, created during the Pax Britannica historic bloc when the capitalist 
mode of production had been implemented in Thailand. As in Italy, to guarantee the interests 
of Thailand’s capitalist classes, the political and social dominance over the masses, 90% of 
whom got their living from agriculture, had been sealed under the umbrella concept of the 
strong nation state, to guarantee the Bangkok rule and the rule of the hegemonic elites.  
If Italy of the Risorgimento era had one-dimensional division between the centre and the 
periphery, Thailand had two geographical periphery regions over which to implement the 
centre’s hegemonic rule: the South and the North-eastern region, Isan, neither of which bore 
loyalty to the Bangkok centre. The four southernmost provinces are Muslim, their language 
and culture is Malay, and the provinces have up until today been the target of Thai internal 
colonization to assimilate them under the Bangkok rule, and any separatist tendencies have 
been handled heavy-handedly, often by the military
335
.  
The second periphery region, the Northeast countryside, Isan, as the region is known in 
Thailand, has been another problematic periphery region for Bangkok: there was no 
experienced loyalty to Bangkok – Bangkok was far, and the loyalties lay with the local elites, 
as they had been under the feudal sakdina system. Isan’s culture and language are again 
different from Bangkok and Isan’s geographical vicinity to the communist Indochina and its 
influence was beyond the control of Bangkok up until the 1980s
336
.  
Here we might go back to Gramsci’s concept of passive revolution, which Gramsci uses 
oscillating the concept between two dialectical poles: revolution and restoration. Revolution 
here refers to major changes in the structure of hegemony, restoration to reforms that happen 
without major changes in the hegemonic structures
337
. Firstly, the passive revolution refers to 
the outside pressures to innovate and reform existing structures. These changes and reforms 
can happen without mass participation. Secondly, by passive revolution Gramsci refers to 
small changes and transformations of society that happen against the intentions of a ruling 
regime. These two different processes can occur simultaneously, or independently of each 
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other; however, when they happen, they always strengthen each other
338
. Girling
339
 refers to 
Gramsci and his conclusion that the major of failure of the Italy of the Risorgimento era in 
unifying Italy was the fact that the passive revolution was realized via reformation without 
any major changes to the existing state framework. Girling then mirrors this situation with 
Thailand of the Pax Americana era, and proposes that Thailand underwent a similar process in 
the 1950s and 1960s, though the context was different: Thailand’s rapid industrialization with 
American development aid as channelled through the World Bank happened within the old 
hegemonic framework of the elites and the military
340
. 
I propose that the passive revolution in Thailand oscillated between the two poles of 
restoration/revolution in the time of entering Pax Americana at the end of the 1940s and 
during the 1950s when it came to the role of the state and adjusting to the economic and 
political reorganization of the Thai society in the aftermath of the WWII. On the other hand, 
there were the republican reformers who had the vision of the “good” state; a version of a 
state capitalism with economic planning and allocating resources to the common purposes, to 
guarantee the welfare of the citizens
341
. On the other hand, there were the royalist elites, new 
business elites and the military whose vision of a unified Thai state was that of promoting the 
US influenced vision of private capitalism - and advancing their own interests at the same, all 
under the unified nationalist state model, adopted from the West in the late 19
th
 century, and 
ultimately applied in Thai government’s policies both internationally and domestically with 
the elite generals and business elites
342
.  
If we keep in mind my initial proposal, that Thailand has been in the process of what 
Gramsci
343
 calls an organic crisis of authority, or the “crisis of the state”, since the 1932 
revolution; and then mirror the effects of the Pax Americana – the strengthening of the 
military in Thai politics - against this proposal;  and again reflect upon the current Thai 
political crisis and its dynamics and the strong role of the military in it, the we could conclude 
that it is in the era of the Pax Americana, where the strong position of the Thai military in the 
realm of Thai politics emerges from, ultimately. 
 If we add to this analysis the Pax Americana structural changes in the international society, in 
South East Asia, and inside Thailand, and take note of the pressure to innovate the existing 
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structures within Thai society via context- related reforms, we could conclude that the social 
forces inside Thailand were in a position of “passive revolution”, in which the necessary 
reforms were carried out under the strong autocratic rule of the military governments of 
generals Phibun and Sarit in the 1950s, without real mass participation on the political 
decisions. This is not to say, that there were no counter-hegemonic oppositional forces inside 
Thailand during the 1950s. On the contrary, besides the Communist who was operating 
underground, there were factions of a strong civil society, like the Labour Movement, who 
demanded more representation in political decision-making and opposition to the autocratic 
suppression of political dissent
344
.  
Elliott
345
attributes the rise of the military and the autocratic military rule of the 1950s in 
Thailand to the failure of the budding state capitalism to respond to the necessary structural 
changes required by the new international situation. The bourgeoisie class in the country was 
mainly Chinese, who rapidly took advantage by the economic boom the Pax Americana 
created in the beginning of the 1950s
346
. The local elite oligarchs and military generals 
benefited from joining the Chinese-owned businesses: it was symbiotic relationship, in which 
the Chinese merchant class controlled the capital and the exploitation of the labour resources, 
and the military and the bureaucrats grafted and protected the businesses, that the merchant 
class could not have created on their own, as the access route to the American capital was 
through the domestic ruling military and bureaucratic elites of Bangkok
347
. This, as many 
researchers have stated, was a new version of the old colonialism of the Pax Britannica, which 
involved the nation state as a straightjacket, within which the hegemonic local and the 
transnational elite networks operated, exploiting the resources of the country, and exploiting 
its people
348
. 
Thus, during the Pax Americana era, the economic reorganisations of Thai society structures 
were carried out de facto within the old framework of the elite rule. There were no democratic 
reforms carried out within the structures of society, either. Here, I find that only a brief, 
operational definition of the terms “democracy” is sufficient to clarify the notion of 
democracy. Two international relations scholars coming from different cultural contexts, 
Chase-Dunn
349
and Ungpakorn
350
 propose that democracy in the sense of “popular control 
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over collective decision-making” (definition by Chase-Dunn) was not invented in Greece, but 
it was a feature of all societies on all continents before the complex hierarchical systems of 
chiefdoms and states were created. In addition, Ferrara
351
 refers to the concept of democracy 
in a similar way as the two aforementioned scholars. Uhlin
352
 proposes the terms “societal 
democracy” and “societal democratization” respectively: the precondition to the societal 
democratization, is that in the society, the principles of common participation in the political 
activity, justice, pluralism, and tolerance are practiced. Henceforth, a minimal definition as 
this may be, this definition supports Gramsci’s notion that for example parliamentary 
democracy as a form of representative democracy may in fact be in service of an autocratic 
system and hence, a straightjacket state, instead of being in the service of the people
353
.  
In Thailand, the autocratic form of government was the rule throughout the Pax Americana 
era of the 1950s, and it was silently approved by the US hegemon in the world system, 
Thailand’s patron state. The weak efforts to reform the Thai state structure in the 1960s and 
1970s through semi-civilian governments were not successful, in the sense, that the military 
retained their option to interfere in governance. The military was also at the forefront of Thai 
politics against the people’s uprisings of the 1970s and people’s demands for more 
participation in decision-making and social justice, prompted by the civil right movement in 
the US in the 1960s
354
. In this sense, the Thai semi-civilian governments of the Pax 
Americana era of the 1960s and 1970s, as a form of representative democracy, were in 
Gramscian sense only tools of the hegemonic elite rule, instead of serving the people.  
In the above sense, the economic reforms in Thailand of the Pax Americana era, apart from 
serving the interests of the American capitalism and imperialism, served the interests of the 
elites within the country only. The reforms did not benefit the citizens of the country and the 
development of democratic reforms, even though the ordinary benefited nominally from the 
economic reforms and industrialisation
355
. More people worked in the industry sector now, 
and fewer in the agricultural sector; still, when we look at the minimum wage as one indicator 
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of “development”, for instance, the minimum wage had stayed the same between the early 
fifties and the year 1973, while the commodity prices had gone up by 50%
356
. 
 
10.4. Monarchy as a hegemonic tool 
 
During the current Thai political crisis, ignoring the question of the position of Thai 
monarchy in the power structure of Thai politics is neigh impossible. Especially after the 
military coup 2006, the ideological slogan of “protecting the monarchy” has become a staple 
in the rhetoric of the conservative royalists (Yellow Shirts)
357
. In the name of protecting the 
monarchy, simultaneously, the use of Thailand’s draconian Lèse Majesté law has increased; it 
is mainly used now to silence political opposition through the deterrence factor
358
. David 
Streckfuss
359
 says that until the late 1990s, there was practically no use of Lèse Majesté 
legislation in Thailand; however, since the late 1990s, and especially since the military coup 
in 2006, the Lèse Majestè cases have multiplied hundredfold. Streckfuss says that in the 
current Thai political crisis, the use of the Lèse Majesté can be compared to the old form of 
state suppression to silence criticism, not only of monarchy but also of the state institutions 
and of the army
360
. Those that the Lèse Majesté has been used against since the military coup 
2006, include a vast array of people from diverse backgrounds: academics, political activists, 
Red Shirt movement leaders, and also ordinary people
361
.  
Here, a question arises of what the role of the monarchy actually is in the whole picture of the 
dynamic power structure processes in Thai politics. According to the Thai constitution, 
Thailand is a constitutional monarchy, which has no stake in politics
362
. Previous research on 
Thai politics, however, has interpreted that Thai monarchy actually has had - and keeps on 
having an active role in Thai politics
363
. Many researchers have also previously pointed out 
the position of monarchy as initially being an ideological project of the military regime of 
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general Sarit in the late 1950s to unify the monolithic Thai state, and to legitimize the 
centralized Bangkok elite dominance over provinces
364
. McCargo
365
has coined the 
informative term of the “network monarchy” to shed light on the influence of the political 
networks of the King and his close associates, and their intervention in the Thai political 
events. Ungpakorn
366
 points to the symbiotic relationship between the military and the King 
as serving the interests of the hegemonic elite networks, where the King represents the 
conservative ideology, which legitimizes the repressive rule of the military and their allies. 
 My own view of the role of the Thai monarchy in Thai politics follows the above line of 
interpretation of the monarchy being a useful ideological tool for military and the oligarchs to 
preserve the old hegemonic order of the elite networks rule and legitimize that rule. This 
articulation of the monarchy as a hegemonic tool emerges when we again follow the 
Gramscian methods, look at the historical events, and compare them to the public image of 
monarchy, as promoted in the public realm. The controversies between the historical events 
and the public image of the monarchy emerge both on the realm of the politico-ideological 
level, as well as on the level of the base structure (economic organisation). 
 As discussing the topic from this perspective is a banned topic in Thailand and hence only a 
few researchers have brought forward their views of the monarchy’s influence, I will have to 
suffice with the few sources available. Ungpakorn
367
 proposes outright that the King as such 
is weak and has no power, and that he is a puppet of the military and the oligarchs, and bases 
his claims on mirroring the historical events when the King could have taken a stand in favour 
of democratic reforms on the political realm, like supporting progress-minded reforms. On the 
contrary, as Ungpakorn proposes, during the major political crises, for instance in the 1973 
and the 1976 public uprisings against harsh military rule and the military and the paramilitary 
violence that ensued, the King has always sided with the military and the conservative forces 
in the society against the reformist factions of society
368
.  
In addition, other researchers have pointed this perspective out when it comes to analysing the 
military coup in 2006: many researchers have proposed that the military coup and the ousting 
of the Prime Minister Taksin were directly backed by the palace
369
. Another example of the 
King siding with the conservative elites is the Red Shirt Movement street protests in 2010, 
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which demanded for social reforms and social justice and which ended in the Thai military 
dispersing the protests with violence
370
. The palace was quiet regarding the 92 deaths and the 
thousands injured in the protests.   
These arguments are in stark contrast as to how the position of monarchy is presented in the 
Thai academic context, and also to some extent in the mainstream international academic 
research on Thailand. In this narrative, the King is above politics; he is portrayed as a semi-
divine being; he is the unifier of the Thai nation and the omnipotent benefactor his people. On 
a practical everyday level, this myth is reproduced everywhere on an everyday basis in 
Thailand: the King’s pictures are everywhere, the Thai state media shows the daily activities 
of the Royals every evening, in the cinemas the King’s hymn is played before the movie; the 
King is the head of the Buddhist religion, just to cite a few examples. Any criticism of the 
monarchy is forbidden. Peter Jackson
371
 has proposed the excellent term “the regime of 
images” to analyse how the myth of the King is being reproduced in people’s minds via 
media; the mythical perspective lives on by itself now, because the contents of the myth are in 
the images themselves, as a result of efficient and society-permeating reproduction. 
Now, if we go back to the time of the Pax Americana era, in the late 1950s when the 
reinstating of the monarchy begun, we can trace the roots of the usefulness of the monarchy in 
the hands of the hegemonic elite networks, and how it serves their interests – and how the 
monarchy de facto is a tool of control inside the power structures of Thai society.  
Since the abolition of absolute monarchy in 1932, monarchy had been one faction of elites 
only and declined in significance; however, the royalist factions of the elites held considerable 
influence behind the scenes
372
. However, the active reinstating the monarchy only began in 
the late 1950s during the military dictator Sarit’s regime373. At this time, the economic boom 
brought forth by the American involvement in Southeast Asia and in Thailand –the Pax 
Americana phase – and its ideological dimension of containing communism in the region 
required a stable political system inside Thailand. A stable political system was the 
prerequisite for continuous access to American capital. 
As already mentioned earlier, from the centre-periphery system perspective, Bangkok rulers 
did not have a full administrative control over the periphery provinces at that time. For 
instance, the life in the rural Northeast at that time had basically no connection to the 
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Bangkok centre: farmers’ life was based on local patron-client networks, where the local 
elites controlled the inflow and the outflow of goods and capital
374
. Neither did the 
government have control over the new merchant elites, for whom the mantra of development 
had less appeal than their possible increased influence on the decision and the policy-making 
processes
375
. To appease the new elites, the Americans, and to gain control over the 
provinces, Sarit included nationalism to his government’s policies376.  
Sarit’s notion of strong state involved a monolithic conception of a unified Thai nation state, 
with one religion – Buddhism, one language and one King as the head of state, and as the 
head of the organized Buddhist religion
377
. If we interpret the contents of this ideological 
project further, it involves the all-encompassing construct of the notion of “khwaampenthai” – 
Thainess; what it means to be Thai
378
. What this means in practice is that the notion involves 
the subjection of a Thai citizen to the Thai state; it subjects the Thai citizen to be loyal to 
Buddhist religion, and loyal ultimately to the King, who is the head of the religion inside the 
country. This construct is, as Hewison and Kitirianglarp
379
 propose, a unity based on moral 
principles, which also ultimately entails a hierarchical conception of society. Subsequently, 
the King’s position in this equation is an idealized one: a mythical humdrum of animistic 
religion and Buddhist beliefs – the King is the virtuous Buddhist King who as the result of his 
gathered merit in previous lifetimes is demi-god, and who is the epitome of virtue amongst 
the people
380
.  
The reinstating of monarchy involved also the resuscitation of the “ratchasap,” the 
complicated Royal vocabulary, and prostrating in front of the Royals, to indicate the social 
difference between the ordinary people and the royalty. During the Sarit era, King Phumipon 
became a visible figure to the public with his public appearances both in Bangkok and in the 
provinces
381
. 
 
Now we might ask whose interests this ideological project of reinstating of the monarchy 
ultimately served. During the Pax Americana, it served both the local elites’ interests and the 
American interests. Here again, one has to keep in mind the dynamics of the relationship 
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between the economic system, the state and the civil society, and the power configurations 
embedded within Thai society during the Pax Americana era. Hence, reinstating the monarchy 
via nationalist ideology helped the Bangkok rulers gain control over the provinces, and it 
assisted them in stabilizing the political situation in the country, not only under Sarit’s 
government but also under the governments who succeeded Sarit in the 1960s
382
. The 
ideological project of reinstating the monarchy, it could be concluded, also served the 
American interests in the country and assisted the Americans in their hegemonic effort of 
gaining a stronger foothold in both in Thailand and in Southeast Asia. Thus, reinstating 
monarchy served the economic and the political interests of the neoliberalist local elites and 
the military, as well as the neoliberalist transnational economic, military, and political 
interests of the hegemonic patron state of the United Sates during the era of the Pax 
Americana. This applies both to the function of the hegemonic processes inside Thailand, as 
well as in the Southeast Asian region.  
An important part of the hegemonic ideological function of the monarchy inside Thailand in 
the 21
st
 century has been promoting King Phumipon’s economic philosophy of “Sufficiency 
economy” (setakit phopiang), which the King developed during the 1990s and which was 
published in the aftermath of the 1997-98 Southeast Asian economic crisis (see below). Its 
central idea, as I see it, is to promote self-sufficiency, localization and basically, a hierarchical 
society based on moral leadership. Here, let it be mentioned, that the idea of the Sufficiency 
economy was the King’s and his close associates reaction to the economic crisis and the 
measures that the Thai government took in 1998 to save the Thai economy: Prime Minister 
Chuan’s government accepted World Bank loans with tough conditions383. Handley384 
proposes that the King and his close advisors saw the economic crisis as a result of 
capitalism’s greed and ignorance of the King’s ideal of his humble, virtue-guided kingdom.  
 
 
“Sufficiency Economy is a philosophy that guides the livelihood and behaviour of people at 
all levels, from the family to the community to the country, on matters concerning national 
development and administration. It calls for a ‘middle way’ to be observed, especially in 
pursuing economic development in keeping with the world of globalization. Sufficiency 
means moderation and reasonableness, including the need to build a reasonable immune 
system against shocks from the outside or from the inside. Intelligence, attentiveness, and 
extreme care should be used to ensure that all plans and every step of their implementation are 
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based on knowledge. At the same time we must build up the spiritual foundation of all people 
in the nation, especially state officials, scholars, and business people at all levels, so they are 
conscious of moral integrity and honesty and they strive for the appropriate wisdom to live 
life with forbearance, diligence, self-awareness, intelligence, and attentiveness. In this way we 
can hope to maintain balance and be ready to cope with rapid physical, social, environmental, 
and cultural changes from the outside world.”385 
 
Herein another huge contrast emerges between the public image of the King and reality. The 
King preaches and promotes sufficiency economy among his subaltern. However, the 
economic interests of Thai monarchy in the Thai economy are considerable. The King is the 
world’s richest monarch, with estimated total assets of 30 billion USD386. The King’s assets 
are organized under the Crown Property Bureau, a tax-exempt anomaly of an institution, 
which is only accountable to the King directly
387
. The Crown Property Bureau owns, among 
other things, large areas of land in central Bangkok; it is active in the banking sector, and it 
has joint ventures together with multinational corporations
388
. Based on the above figures, the 
King himself is a major – and a modern - business investor in Thai –and in the international 
economy. His interests are in concurrence with the conservative elites’ interests. 
Thus, as Ungpakorn
389
 concludes, the importance of the monarchy to the modern elites of 
Thailand lies in the ideological value of the construct of monarchy, which was created during 
the Pax Americana era. The value of monarchy as an ideological tool of the conservative 
elites has held its validity up until the current crisis. In 2000s, it has become more difficult for 
the Thai military to legitimize military coups outright. However, the symbiotic relationship 
between the military and the palace – the former, as Gramsci390 says, a parasitic class with no 
function in the economic production, and the latter, an ideological tool in the service of the 
oligarchs guarantees the usefulness of the monarchy for the hegemonic regime. The military 
relies on the instigated mythical power of the King to legitimize their strong position in Thai 
society
391
. This symbiotic relationship also prevents any demands of the civil society for 
justice that is more social and reform, and any true political reforms, as for that matter, from 
being put into practice.  
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11.   BREAKDOWN OF HEGEMONY: THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN ECONOMIC 
CRISIS, TAKSIN, AND THE WAR OF POSITION 
 
 
11.1. Oligopolistic neoliberalism and the neoliberalist offensive in Thailand’s economic 
crisis 1997-98 
 
 
The mainstream interpretations of the Southeast Asian economic crisis of 1997-987 often 
involve the moral prerogative of American capitalism’s superiority to the Asian capitalism392. 
These notions interpret the Southeast Asian economic crisis to have been the result of weak 
finance sectors, poorly regulated economies, lack of transparency, and political systems, in 
which corruption and cronyism rule
393
. American analysts, in particular, have blamed the 
close relationship networks between local businesspersons and politicians, the existence of the 
family businesses where the management and the ownership are intertwined processes, and 
the borrowing from banks instead of investing in the stock markets
394
.  
Seen from the Gramscian historical perspective and the historical analysis of situations, this 
interpretation lacks weight, as it does not take into account the local specific context, and it is 
devoid of any historical context altogether. From the Gramscian perspective, the Southeast 
Asian 1997-98 economic crisis is connected to the systemic processes on the international 
level. Handling it as an isolated crisis from the Western self-righteous moral perspective, as 
the mainstream analysis does, by implying that the Southeast Asian economic crisis happened 
because of the implicated inferiority of the economic and political structures in the Southeast 
Asian societies, is a questionable interpretation altogether. A more comprehensive analysis 
and an insight into the changes and implications on the international systemic level is needed, 
as the 1997-98 Southeast Asian economic crisis, as well as Thailand’s economic crisis at that 
time correlates to the changes in the international systemic level after the Pax Americana era.  
Since the demise of the Bretton Woods organizational structure of the world capitalist system 
in the 1970s, which included the political demise of the Cold War era, a new form of the US-
led capitalism has emerged, which as I mentioned earlier, Gill calls disciplinary 
neoliberalism. By this, he means the spread of the capitalism and the intensified globalisation, 
and their ingrained ideological implications. This disciplinary neoliberalism is similar in 
nature to the colonialist expansion of the Pax Britannica and the ensuing US neoliberalist 
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hegemonic project of the Pax Americana era: promoting free trade, free capital flows, and 
capitalism as the preferable economic mode of organisation. What are different to the 
previous hegemonic historic bloc eras in the world system in the modern neoliberalist 
capitalist project are the speed and the scale of the integration of the global trade and the 
transnational capital flows and their effects on individual states in the world system – and 
their effects on the socio-political organization structures within the individual states
395
.  
Gill
396
 specifies his definition of disciplinary neoliberalism in this context into the concept of 
oligopolistic neoliberalism, as he proposes that the current economic global system ultimately 
serves the strong only – the huge transnational corporations and major institutional investors 
of a global scale, in which he includes, for instance, the international financial institutions like 
the IMF and the World Bank. In this universal global economy, for the first time in history, 
the integrated global economy transcends the boundaries of the nation-state. The integrated 
economic system also transcends the particular national ideologies that have been relevant 
within the boundaries of individual nation-states, as this type of an economic system requires 
a restructuring of a state, civil society, culture, and political economy
397
. Consequently, the 
logic of this integrated economic system favours a political system that is conducive to the 
pressures from outside – a government that prioritizes free trade and free flow of transnational 
capital
398
. 
Hence, Marxist researchers interpret the Southeast Asian and Thailand’s economic crisis from 
this perspective. They tie Thailand’s national economic crisis to the boom-and-bust cycle of 
international capitalism itself. Thus, for instance, Ungpakorn
399
 sees Thailand’s economic 
crisis as being the result of  the uncontrolled competition for profit and falling rates of profit 
first and foremost, on a global scale, which mirrors itself on a local scale in Thai economy; 
the increased investment in fixed capital, instead of the of hiring of labour, is the reason for 
the falling profits
400
. Over-production of export products on a global scale, followed by the 
overproduction of exports on a national scale, and overproduction and falling profit rates 
especially on a real estate sector, are the reasons why the economy bubble burst in 
Thailand
401
.  
                                                          
395
 Agnew 2004, 2. 
396
 Gill 1995, 405.  
397
 ibid. 
398
 Beeson 2003, 10-11. 
399
 Ungpakorn 2010, 160-161. 
400
 ibid. 
401
 Hewison 2005: 314; Ungpakorn 2010: 160-161. 
84 
 
Let it also be mentioned here that the crash of 1997 was in stark contrast to Thailand’s 
economic development in the previous decades: before the economic crisis of the 1997-98, 
Thailand had experienced an average annual GDP growth of 8% between the years 1959-
1996, and it never fell below 4.8%
402
. Still, the economic, social and political structures 
established under the Pax Americana era, had undergone only little changes during this 
constant economic growth period
403
. 
The IMF bailout package required strong measures to restructure financial institutions, tight 
fiscal and monetary policy, a reform programme, which included keeping the wages low, 
privatization of state enterprises, reform of the civil servant sector, lowering obstacles for 
foreign investment, etc.
404
. Phongpaichit and Baker
405
 say that regarding the economic 
organisation of Thai society, the main consequence of the IMF bailout package was 
surrendering the Thai sovereignty of its economic policy to tight austerity measures, 
privatization, and financial restructuring. What this meant in practice was that the 17.5 bn 
USD bailout package enabled the IMF and the US patrons of global capitalism “to open the 
Thai economy up for greater foreign penetration, including Japan’s involvement in 1999.”  
Seen from Gramscian perspective of how the power relations in Thai society were organized 
during the growth years between 1959-1996, as I proposed earlier, this was the era of “the 
passive revolution.” The power relations had their roots in the Pax Americana period of the 
“development” paradigm - the government would support financial capital, domestic financial 
capital would provide the growth, and the military would support the hegemonic order and 
control of the ruling elite networks
406
.  
Thailand’s 1997 economic crisis and the ensuing neoliberalist offensive, as Hewison407 calls 
the IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank-assisted concerted effort to 
“rescue” Thailand’s economy, without the slightest concern on the social consequences 
embedded in it, was to prove a revolution on many levels. De facto, I propose, in concert with 
my initial research question that the economic crisis prompted a series of developments, 
which ultimately led to the beginning of the breakdown of the hegemonic rule of the Thai 
elite networks. This happened first on the level of the base structure of Thai society in the 
form of restructuring the domestic economic base, and later on, on the level of the 
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superstructure, by which I mean the politico-ideological level. Henceforth, I propose that the 
consequences of the neoliberalist offensive reach all the way to Thailand’s current political 
crisis. The reasons for the neoliberalist offensive and the form of social change it ultimately 
motored, on the other hand, can be traced to the long-term capitalist development in Thailand.  
The social change that the economic crisis and the IMF bailout package caused – the 
complete restructuring of the domestic capitalist class and the dissatisfaction at the austerity 
measures of the working classes - enabled the multimillionaire Taksin Shinawatra’s rise to 
power and his Thai Rak Thai party policies. It also enabled the rise in the political 
consciousness of the urban and the rural poor. Thai Rak Thai’s pro-poor policies gave the 
poor an impression that they matter, and that they can participate in the decision-making in 
the matters concerning them. This ultimately was the prerequisite for the factions of the civil 
society to challenge the hegemonic elite networks’ rule. Herein lies the reason why the current 
Thai political crisis has lasted so long, since the military coup in 2006: expressed in 
Gramscian terminology: the masses have emerged as a unified counter-hegemonic force, and 
the political situation has shifted from the situation of passive revolution into a situation of the 
war of position. 
Herein is the power of the Gramscian perspective: historical analysis of structures and 
situations enable us to obtain the whole picture of the dynamics of a particular crisis and 
articulate change and transformation in a way that the mainstream political theories neglect. 
Hence, these consequences of Thailand’s economic crisis and their significance form the core 
argument of my thesis: that a new phase began in Thai politics after the economic crisis, 
which relates both to the consequences of the IMF “rescue operation” on the base structure 
level, and to the processes on the superstructure level.  
The new phase paradigm that forms the core of my thesis began during the restructuring of 
the Thai economy according to the rule set by the international fiscal institutions. Thailand’s 
economic crisis and the ensuing implementing of the IMF reorganisation of Thailand’s 
economy put an end to the unlimited growth ideal, the development paradigm, under which 
the economy had been steered since the Pax Americana era. It also put an end to the uneasy 
social contract borne in that era, where the hegemonic alliance between the ruling elite 
networks and the army had dominance over the masses in both economy and politics. The 
economic crisis had caused a rift in the ruling elite networks, and those within the elites who 
did not benefit from the IMF-bailout package, were not happy with the new arrangement. 
However, it was the rural and the urban poor, who bore the brunt of the austerity measures 
86 
 
and the IMF economic reform
408
. Still their response to the crisis only came in 2001 when the 
multimillionaire businessperson Taksin Shinawatra entered the political arena with his 
populist policies, which included the rural and the urban poor in the political decision-making 
through the Thai Rak Thai Party political platform
409
.    
 
11.2. Post-1997-98 social contract  
 
If we look at Thailand’s economic crisis of 1997-98, and the social transformation it set in 
motion from the Gramscian perspective, this is the crucial temporal conjuncture point, where 
the central theme of my thesis sets in. Thailand’s economic crisis, as I see it, is the beginning 
of the new phase in Thai politics when the hegemony of the elite networks’ rule begins to 
crumble, and when the counterhegemonic masses as an active political force emerge, 
challenging the hegemonic rule of the elite networks that have ruled Thailand since the Pax 
Britannica era. Gramsci calls this situation the war of position between two equal 
configurations of social forces, as mentioned earlier. In Gramscian sense, the polarization of 
Thai politics into two opposite camps in Thailand’s current historical political crisis is a 
manifestation of this war of position situation.  
In Gramscian perspective, Thailand’s 1997-98 economic crises, and the international 
neoliberal offensive that followed it – the IMF bailout package – and the socio-political 
consequences of the crisis are a manifestation of a new phase of an organic crisis, the crisis of 
authority. This phase happens often, though not always, as I have stated previously, in a 
historical situation when the economic structures of a particular society are organized in a 
new way so, that the position of various social configurations in the power structure of a 
society change accordingly.  
At the core of my interpretation of the post-economic crisis as a new phase in Thai politics, is 
the Gramscian notion of seeing an organic crisis as an opportunity. A historical crisis situation 
accordingly, is seen as an opportunity for various social forces to create alternative ways to 
organize society in a crisis situation. In this type of a situation, new solutions are needed. This 
type of a situation also indicates a crux where the masses have become alienated from the 
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mechanist ideologies that the hegemonic elites stick to and use coercively, in order to keep the 
cohesion and the power structures of the old system intact, because it serves their interests
410
.   
I propose that Thailand’s current political polarization into the Yellow and the Red camps, 
respectively, is a result of the processes on the levels of the base and the superstructures of 
Thai society that the economic crisis of the 1997-98 set in motion. I will clarify the base 
structure changes; it is, the contents of the policies implemented during Taksin’s era later on 
in this chapter. To support my argument of a new phase in Thai politics – the breakdown of 
the elite hegemony rule and the current war of position situation– one has to articulate and 
outline the underlying transformative social changes and processes on the politico-ideological 
superstructure level under the implementation of the Thai Rak Thai Party policies between the 
years 2001-2006 when Taksin and the Thai Rak Thai Party were in power. I see that these 
processes are that developed during those years, are at the core of Thailand’s current political 
crisis stalemate.  
These processes are firstly, the inclusion of the masses in the political decision-making and 
the consequent rise of the political  
consciousness of the rural and the urban poor, and their rise as an active political force. This I 
see as the most important effect of the Thai Rak Thai Party era of 2001-2006. Thai Rak Party 
ultimately democratized Thai politics, and their significance is in the fact that the urban and 
the rural poor experienced that their vote and their voice mattered. No other party in Thai 
politics had ever done this before
411
. As Ferrara
412
 says, before Thai Rak Thai Party’s political 
platform, especially the rural voters were always considered as too unsophisticated by the 
Bangkok elites - as not being capable of making rational enough judgments on how the 
country should be governed and what kinds of policies should be implemented
413. Taksin’s 
Thai Rak Thai Party brought end to that perspective. despite the Taksin government’s 
questionable policies in the Muslim Southern provinces of Thailand and his government’s 
War On Drugs in 2003, which initially targeted the kingpins of the drug trade; and in the 
name of which an estimate of 1500 extrajudicial killings were performed
414
.   
Secondly, and directly derived from this, is the further deepening of the class divisions in 
Thai society because of the ideological threat of the masses to the hegemonic elite rule, as 
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experienced by the elites, who wanted to keep their dominance over the masses
415
. Thirdly, 
Taksin’s favouritism of the businesses close to his own clique, which came from the “new” 
Sino-Thai business elites, as opposed to the old power families, caused a rift within the elites, 
and turned many of those who had initially backed him, against him
416
. The fourth process 
stems from the third process, and it concerns the position of the army and the bureaucrats 
whose position had never been questioned before.  
During the years 2001-2006, the military was pushed in the background in Thai politics, 
which the various factions of the military did not take to lightly
417
. Moreover, though this can 
be disputed, Taksin’s War on Drugs, which initially aimed at destroying the kingpins of the 
drug trade, was on a symbolic level, a warning to some high officers in the army who were 
involved in the poppy trade operations
418
. These factors together strengthened the alliance of 
the old conservative elites and the military. The dissatisfaction of this ultraconservative 
alliance that had not benefited from Thai Rak Thai Party’s governance ultimately led to the 
formation of the Yellow Shirts, the royalist People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) whose 
call for military intervention in politics prompted the palace-approved military coup in 
2006
419
. The military coup, however, was not winning only for the conservative sections of 
the Thai society. As Ungpakorn
420
 says, the reason why the military coup happened was also 
a result of various sections of the urban middle-class civil society joining the conservative 
forces, forming a cross-class alliance with the military and elites. This phenomenon, a middle-
class people’s movement joining the conservative forces marks also the recent protests that 
have been going on in Bangkok since November 2013 under the name of the People’s 
Democratic Reform Committee, who prioritize a political reform at the cost of the 
parliamentary election process
421
.  
At this point, it might be worthwhile to remind the reader of “the whole picture”: that the 
1997-98 economic crises were a result of a long-time capitalist development in Thailand, set 
against the development of the processes in the international system, as interpreted earlier. 
Why the historical situation of the new phase of an organic crisis in the post-1997-98 reality is 
completely different to the phases of the organic crisis that have imbued Thai superstructural 
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level since the 1932 revolution, can be interpreted, through looking at Gramsci’s notions of 
the passive revolution and the war of position, respectively. 
There are other researchers, too, who have referred to the post-economic crisis – as a 
revolution, like Hewison
422
, for instance. Ungpakorn
423
 also sees Thailand’s current political 
crisis as resulting from the processes set in motion by the 1997-98 crisis. Ferrara
424
 is another 
researcher who focuses more on a syncretic historical perspective to the transformation of 
Thai society through historical analysis, and focuses of the forms of change resulting from the 
economic crisis more than focusing on Taksin’s controversial persona, which tends to pester 
the bulk of analyses on Thai politics in the post-economic crisis era.  
The difference between my earlier referrals in this thesis to Thailand’s long-term organic 
crisis of authority, and the post-1997-98 economic crisis social reality, can be interpreted 
through Gramsci’s interpretative criteria of the passive revolution and the war of position. 
Gramsci’s use of the term passive revolution involves two dimensions: revolution/restoration. 
They are both connected to the function of hegemony, and Gramsci uses them to indicate how 
in a class system, the hegemonic rulers perform reforms required in a particular situation to 
firstly, keep the social cohesion of the system intact, and secondly, to keep their control over 
the subordinate
425
. The revolution phase indicates to a dynamic situation and the restoration 
phase refers to a situation where seemingly progressive reforms are performed; however, the 
hegemonic control still prevails, in these situations more than not, factions of progressive 
forces are transfused into the hegemonic order through the reforms taken
426
. In Thailand, as I 
interpret it from previously mentioned, the situation between 1932-1997 is characterized by 
this type of a process of a passive revolution, which alternates between the two poles of 
restoration/revolution, respectively. Ultimately it could be said that the hegemony of the elite 
networks rule was never challenged seriously until the post-economic 1997-98 crisis, as 
previously, the masses, or the subaltern were ultimately too weak to challenge the hegemonic 
power structures permanently. 
The war of position, on the other hand, refers to the situation, in which a new configuration of 
social forces emerges as the result of an organic crisis, as explained in the theory chapter of 
this thesis. In the war of position situation, the masses are alienated from their old belief 
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systems. The driving for the emergence of the masses as an organized, unified active political 
force is their risen political consciousness of their position, and their conscious will to 
challenge the hegemonic forces’ rule in favour of bringing forth-alternative ways to organize 
a society
427
. Let it mentioned here once again that the abstract concept “war of position”, the 
subaltern challenging the rulers, involves the idea of unlimited potential for development, and 
it is first and foremost a criterion of interpretation
428
. Consequently, at the back of my 
proposal of a new paradigm emerging from the 1997-98 economic crises is a transition in the 
positional sense from the passive revolution process of the hegemony of the elites, into a 
positional phase of the war of position of various social configurations in Thai society. In 
other words, this is an interregnum stage where the old order is dying, and the new is still 
waiting to be born, as Gramsci
429
sums it up.  
To back my proposal further, I also propose like Hewison and Ungpakorn earlier, that it is 
against this major revolution in the economic and the social structures that happened between 
the years 1997-2014 that the significance of Taksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai Party 
politics ultimately have to be evaluated. 
The rise of the Thai Rak Thai Party and its leader, Taksin Shinawatra to the forefront of Thai 
politics was initially motored by the anti-globalist sentiment and the dissatisfaction directed at 
Chuan Leekpai Democrat Party government’s implementing of the IMF bailout package in 
the national economy
430
. Again, when seen from the “post-1997-98 new phase” perspective, 
Thai Rak Thai’s detailed political party agenda entailed three important election promises to 
the urban and the rural poor: 1. Establishing the first ever universal health care system in 
Thailand; 2. simulating local small-scale economy (each village would get a one-million THB 
loan for the purpose) and 3. Introduction of a debt moratorium for poor farmers
431
. This 
inclusion of the poor in the agenda of a political party was revolutionary in Thai politics, and 
Thai Rak Thai Party won two consecutive elections by a landslide in 2001 and 2005, 
guaranteeing Taksin Shinawatra two periods as a Prime Minister
432
. 
When we look at the contents of the Thai Rak Thai economic policies during the post-
economic crisis years of 2001-2006, the economic policies implemented between 2001-2006 
were a combination of mild Keynesian economic policies and neomercantilism - state support 
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for entrepreneurialism and export competitiveness
433
. Called a “dual track” policy by many 
researchers, this Thai Rak Thai Party agenda initially was to stimulate the domestic economy 
to counterbalance the trends in world capitalism
434
.  
The implications of the Thai Rak Thai Party election wins within the power structures of Thai 
society were manifold. The first Thai Rak Thai government was the first Thai government of 
local tycoons; however, the inclusion of the poor into a new social contract was essential for 
the government to promote and stimulate domestic business
435
. Thus, a curious combination 
of social forces the Thai Rak Thai support base was: the social peace was sealed in the new 
social contract by a configuration of social forces reaching from various sections of the 
capitalist class to the urban and the rural poor
436
.  
The new social contract also indicated the need for political reform – the pre-economic crisis 
new Constitution of 1997 had been created and implemented in a political atmosphere of 
elation by the progressive factions of society, in which strengthening political participation 
and democracy were seen as essential components of political decision-making
437. Taksin’s 
government, also partly due to the Thai Rak Thai’s mandate being the result of a 
parliamentary election, saw the significance of the inclusion of the poor into the new social 
contract, promoting the democratization of politics, and reallocating resources to the poor as a 
new prerequisite for being able to promote their new economic policies
438
. In this sense, I see 
Taksin and his Thai Rak Thai Party’s significance lies in their democratizing Thai politics. I 
also propose based on the content of the Taksin era experience from the standpoint of the poor 
that their notion of democracy means parliamentary democracy and voting in the elections. 
 
11.3. War of position: Thailand’s current political crisis 2006-2014 and the emergence of 
the Red Shirts movement as a counter-hegemonic force 
 
Since the military coup in 2006, in Gramscian terminology, Thailand has been in a constant 
organic crisis of authority, which can also be called the crisis of the state –or the crisis of the 
old hegemonic order. In this crisis, the hegemonic elite networks have tried to use all the 
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opportunities at their perusal, which are inherent in the old system of governance, to reinstate 
the old cohesive order. Gramsci
439
concludes that in the situation of an organic crisis, in which 
the hegemony of the ruling classes is beginning to break, the open war of position situation of 
the polarized forces in society concurs. The situation is volatile and dangerous, since the 
various configurations of social classes are not capable of orienting themselves swiftly to the 
rhythm of the situation, which Gramsci characterizes as almost lightning-like, as compared to 
a situation of calm
440
. In this situation, one cannot emphasize enough the bureaucratic-
military element in a particular country where the military-bureaucratic social stratum is an 
important element in the political sphere
441
. This has become obvious in the case Thailand 
through the historical analysis of the function of hegemony in previous chapters in my thesis.  
According to Gramsci
442
, the bureaucratic-military axis in society where its position is strong, 
the power of this stratum to assist in the upkeep of the old hegemonic social order is within its 
social function – in protecting the hegemonic elite networks ‘interests- and in influencing the 
psychological tendencies, which their social function favours. This stratum has no economical 
function in the production as such
443
. As this non-homogeneous parasitic class formation has 
no basic role in the actual economic production, their only function is to oppose the subaltern 
from improving their position
444
. Due to this, their unified resistance to the oppositional 
force’s attempts to improve their situation involves strong multiplicity of even bizarre 
ideologies to keep control of the old hegemonic order
445
. The war of position thus happens, as 
said before, on the politico-ideological level. 
Against the above, the military coup of 2006, in the masses’ experience, the military coup of 
2006 represents a step back in the progressive democratic development of society. The 
military coup and the ensuing yellow shirt People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) street 
demonstrations in 2006 and the occupation of the Bangkok International airport by the PAD 
in 2008, in this perspective, were a manifestation of the attempt of the old hegemonic 
networks to narrow the democratic space of society and to show off their support to the old 
regime
446
. These royalist conservatives resort to old ideologies that have their roots in the 
past, and that bear no relevance to the present reality of Thai politics in the eyes of the 
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empowered civil society
447
. These anti-Taksin ultra-royalists who demanded for the military 
to step in 2006, and who demanded to return to the ultra-nationalist policies consisted of a 
cross-class alliance consisting of academics, politicians, middle-class sections, aristocrats, 
businessmen, media, Buddhist monks, military leaders, Privy Council members and NGOs
448
. 
The cross-class alliances who have been protesting in Bangkok since November 2013, is in 
this light only the new configuration of the old ultra-conservative alliance that brought about 
the military coup in 2006
449. The current protesters’ rhetoric is in essence similar to the 
rhetoric of the PAD, the main message being getting rid of the Shinawat family, first and 
foremost
450
.  
Moreover, if we go back to Gramsci here and his notion of the old establishment transforming 
itself into new cross-class formations to keep their hegemonic position, the social forces 
behind the conservative royalist movement of 2005 and the street protest movement in 
Bangkok in 2013 are partly the same forces in both movements. What is ironic, is that the 
recent anti-Taksin People’s Democratic Committee (PDRC) street protests in Bangkok who 
have demanded Taksin Shinawat’s sister Yingluck Shinawat to resign, for instance, were 
initially mobilized by the Democratic Party, whose leader, Abhisit Vejjajiva, was the Prime 
Minister in 2010, when the Democratic Party government gave the army the permission to use 
violence against the Red Shirt street protesters
451
. The protest leader, Suthep Tuegsuban, was 
in charge of the Bangkok security in 2010 and signed the ultimate order for the military 
crackdown of the protest in 2010
452
. 
In the subaltern’s experience, the step back to the military rule and to the old rhetoric was a 
reminder to the masses of the violent political massacres of the 1970s by the military. It also 
brought on the surface the old social divisions of the 1970s, a tumultuous time in Thai 
politics
453
. Winichakul
454
 describes the period between the years 1973-76 as the first true 
democratic period in Thai history. A student uprising in 1973 caused an overthrow of a 
military junta, and the ensuing three years were a period of true radical reforms; however, this 
period ended in another violent military coup in 1976 and in a massacre of students in the 
Thammasat University campus by the military.   
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The experienced injustice of the military coup of the 2006 and the return of the conservative 
royalist elites in the form of the yellow shirts, as opposed to the previous five years of the 
Thai Rak Thai Party rule, is the locus where the emergence of the Red Shirts as a social 
movement begins. The alienation of the masses from the old ideologies, which have 
ultimately upheld the cohesion of the old order, has reached a point where the measures that 
the old establishment are willing to take to preserve the old order, are not compatible with the 
alternative visions and possibilities that the empowered factions of the civil society demand to 
be taken. The empowered civil society want to create an alternative way to organize society, 
which is more democratic and just than the old hegemonic order of the elite networks.  
Hence, the measures taken by the alliance of the ultra-royalists and the military to preserve 
the order and the political reforms presented to the empowered civil society have not been 
accepted by the empowered civil society as relevant. These measures to revert to the old 
hegemonic regime rule include the new military Constitution of 2007, approved via 
referendum, and the military junta’s ignoring the pro-Taksin parties winning of the 
Parliamentary elections of 2007 and the Senate election in 2008 – the pro-junta Democratic 
Party under the leadership of Abhisit Vejjajiva formed a government in 2008 without an 
electoral mandate
455
.  
The Red Shirt movement, later organized under the umbrella organization called UDD 
(United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship), began to emerge after the 2007 
elections
456
. In my opinion, in the Gramscian sense, the emergence of this movement as an 
active, spontaneous grass-root movement signals the ultimate shift of various social 
configurations to the war of position phase of an organic crisis. The Red Shirt movement 
emerged as mass meetings of ordinary people around Bangkok and later on in the Northeast 
and in the North; however, the first mass demonstration the UDD organised was only in 
2009
457
. The first mass street protests of the UDD in Bangkok in April 2009 ended with the 
military shooting at the UDD protesters, adding to the insult of the experienced injustice by 
the empowered civil society, brought on by the military coup
458
.  
The street protest of the Red Shirts movement in Bangkok in April-May 2010, in which the 
Red Shirts occupied the central Bangkok for two months, were, as I see it, worrying from the 
old conservative networks point of view. I see the Red Shirt movement’s protest as a warning 
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sign to the old hegemonic elite networks of how powerful the Red Shirt movement had turned 
into. The Red Shirt movement had a political platform in these street demonstrations: they 
demanded the inclusion of the rural and the urban poor in the decision-making, the dissolution 
of Parliament and new elections; social and political reforms and social justice in the sense 
that they purported citizen’s equality before the law459. Fragmented as their political platform 
was, it showed the old hegemonic elite networks that the Red Shirt movement was not to be 
ignored any more. The hegemonic rulers retorted to their old strategy and moved from 
ideological struggle into a direct military involvement: the street protests ended in the military 
crackdown in May 2010
460
. No military personnel involved in the crackdown were indicted in 
courts for the violence
461
. 
What followed, is as I see it, and is another old establishment transformation to keep their 
control. Parliamentary elections were organised in July 2011
462
. A part of the Red Shirt 
movement grouped themselves behind a pro-Taksin new political party Pheu Thai, who won 
the elections, and Taksin Shinawat’s sister Yingluck Shinawat became the Prime Minister463. 
The Thai election of 2011, in the Gramscian sense, is one manifestation of the old 
establishment’s ability to give concessions without losing their hegemonic grip, as the Pheu 
Thai Party was an alliance of old maverick career politicians and Red Shirt Movement 
members. Moreover, in order to take part in the elections, a behind-the-scenes deal was 
allegedly made between the Pheu Thai Party and the old elite networks, including the army 
that arranging the election and letting the Pheu Thai Party win (which all sides knew would 
happen) would prevent further escalation of the political crisis and further bloodshed
464
. 
Moreover, the alleged deal involved the possibility of Taksin Shinawat returning to Thailand 
in the future
465
. The deal was of mutual benefit for all the political stakeholders in the crisis: 
the Red Shirts would be appeased, the army’s image would improve – and the hegemonic 
elite networks would still retain their power behind the scenes.  
As the events have unfolded since the 2011 elections, the alleged deal de facto has become a 
self-fulfilling prophesy, when we look at the political developments in Thailand between the 
years 2011-2014. Some researcher say that the Red Shirt movement has somewhat been 
disappointed at the non-existent political reforms that the Pheua Thai government has put into 
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practice, and the disappointment shows in the Red Shirts distancing themselves from the 
Pheua Thai Party government  and the UDD
466
. Pheu Thai amnesty bill of November 2013, in 
which an umbrella amnesty was granted to the political leaders who were involved in the 
military crackdown of the street protests in 2010, was the decisive factor in alienating the Red 
Shirts from the governing party. The royalist conservative elite networks did not accept the 
clause in the amnesty bill, in which the ex-Prime Minister Taksin Shinawat would be granted 
an amnesty for all his alleged corruption charges in Thai courts
467
. This “deal gone wrong” 
launched the latest political crisis with the PDRC organizing street demonstrations and 
demanding “getting rid of the Taksin Shinawat corruption regime before any elections are 
acceptable,” which is at the centre of the PDRC’s political program468.  
When we look at the war of position situation at the current phase of Thailand’s political 
crisis, we have to mirror it against the normative demands for the alternative organisation of 
society as proposed by the Red Shirt movement. On the other hand, at the same, we have to 
compare this proposed alternative organisation of Thai society against the efforts of the old 
hegemonic regime to sustain their control in the realm of the ideological-political sphere. This 
is in line with the Gramscian understanding of the organic crisis and the war of position 
situation, using again the philosophy of praxis as an analytical tool. Gramsci
469
 proposes that 
an organic crisis is an opportunity, which produces modes of thinking, posing and resolving 
questions, which comprise of the whole post-crisis development of a national life
470
. Any 
analysis of a rupture of hegemonic historic bloc needs to be put into a practical context to 
serve a practical activity
471
. The purpose of this is to prepare the counter-hegemonic social 
forces to gain more empowerment that will act as a unified, compact, self-aware force when a 
favourable situation is deemed right to ultimately challenge the prevailing hegemonic 
order
472
. The counter-hegemonic struggle is a long one, as in the war of the position situation 
the state authority is at the breaking point, and the state will use all illegal means at its 
disposal while it still appears to remain within legality
473
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Hence, Ungpakorn
474
 sums up these normative questions as follows: free and fair elections, 
basic equal standards of justice, integrity of public institutions, strength of pro-democratic 
social movements and citizen participation. In the light of how the organic crisis of the Thai 
state has led into the polarization of the two political opposites in the realm of Thai politics, 
the conclusion of Thailand’s current political crisis would be, that the democratic space for 
the empowered civil society has narrowed considerably during these years from the situation 
in the 1990s
475
.  The old hegemonic regime of elite networks has come up with new ways to 
keep their control in this war of position situation and transformed their modus operandi into 
a more authoritarian direction, with the ex-PM Taksin playing both sides of the conflict 
behind the scenes in the centre of the conflict - he is a part of the conservative elites and a 
royalist and him and the Pheu Thai government do not want to “rock the boat”; however, he 
and Yingluck Shinawat’s Pheu Thai government want to modernize Thailand and include the 
poor in the decision-making processes, too
476
 
As for the free and fair elections, in February, the parliamentary elections were organized; 
however, the politicized Constitutional Court of Thailand deemed them void
477
. The 
Constitutional Courts based their decision on the fact that the election could not be organized 
at every election site in the kingdom on the same day
478
. As for the basic standards of justice 
for all citizens, there are no equal standards of justice in Thailand. An example of this is the 
increased misuse of the Lèse Majesté legislation to suppress political opposition
479
. There are 
also double standards in the use of law when it comes to an ordinary citizen getting a just 
court case: an example of this are the thousands of jailed political prisoners, whose existence 
neither Thailand’s government nor the international human rights organisations like the 
Amnesty International acknowledge
480
. There is no integrity of the public institutions, an 
example of which is the politicized administrative courts, rearranged to serve the hegemonic 
regime in the Constitution created by the military junta in 2007
481
. The participation of the 
pro-democratic social movements and citizen participation are both extremely limited at the 
current phase of the crisis. This includes also the labour union movement and labour rights; in 
Thailand, the labour rights are very limited, and the state repression of the free labour union 
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movement has a long tradition
482
. One deterrence for the Red Shirt social movement to act 
freely, for instance, is the constant threat of state violence either through the indirect violence 
– the misuse of the public courts by the hegemonic regime or through direct violence483. The 
ever-present fear of the military coup and the army’s use of violence regulate the actions of 
the pro-democratic movement
484
. Another deterrent fear factor is the political extrajudicial 
assassinations of political activists
485
. 
As a conclusion, according to Gramsci
486
, the solution for the subaltern, the masses to win the 
class struggle of the war of position lies in constant awareness, analysis, preparation, and 
organisation. How the current historical Thai political crisis will unfold, depends firstly, on 
the strength of the inbuilt logic of the current hegemonic historic bloc. As the creating of the 
hegemony of the elite networks in Thai society has been a long temporal process, the system’s 
structures may uphold the system for a long time: the strong position of the military and the 
bureaucracy, and the upcoming succession to the throne question all refer to this direction. 
The counter-hegemonic resistance movement’s possibilities to challenge the hegemonic 
historic bloc’s rule, all things considered, on the other hand, depends firstly, a lot on the 
possibilities of the emergence of a favourable conjunctural process, which might emerge or 
might not emerge. Secondly, and which emphasizes the agency of the counter-hegemonic 
force, the counter-hegemonic movement may put their risen political awareness into action 
without waiting for a favourable conjunctural moment.    
 
12. CONCLUSIONS 
 
My initial research question was that since Thailand’s economic crisis in 1997-98, there is a 
total new phase, a new paradigm, emerging in Thai politics. I proposed that this new phase 
involves a major organic crisis. This crisis is the crisis of the monolithic Thai state, a crisis of 
authority, which involves firstly, the crumbling of the hegemonic regime of the old elite 
networks. Secondly, it involves the emergence of the masses as a unified counterhegemonic 
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force, which is challenging the old hegemonic order and demands alternative ways of 
organizing society with their demands on social justice, social reforms, and more democracy. 
This counterhegemonic force today is unified under the umbrella organisation of the UDD 
and in the Red Shirt Movement. The situation, expressed in Gramscian perspective, is a 
situation of the war of position between various social forces. 
I see the current Thai historical political crisis as a class conflict, the roots of which go back 
to the long-term development of Thailand as a modern capitalist state. Therefore, instead of 
studying the current crisis as an isolated political crisis, I saw it necessary to study the 
underlying dynamics between all the political stakeholders in the crisis, to get a whole picture 
of the factors affecting the power relationships between the political stakeholders in the 
current crisis. The reason for this proposal is to shift the focus from the superficial twists and 
turns of Thai politics, into the factors that shape and have shaped the conflict, when put into a 
historical context where they emerge from. To understand the depth of the current class 
conflict, one has to focus on the totality of the power relations in Thai society and their 
changes, against the changes in the structures of the international system.  
Hence, for example, going back to my research question regarding the new phase of Thai 
politics emerging after Thailand’s economic crisis, analysing just that particular crisis leaves 
the analysis incomplete, as the roots of the social conflict go further back further than just to 
this particular economic conflict. Subsequently, even though the 1997-98 economic crisis and 
its socio-political implications that ensued were fundamental when it comes to the 
restructuring of the economic base of society, and the emergence of the masses as a 
counterhegemonic, unified force, these changes still do not explain, for instance, the Thai 
military’s strong position in the current Thai political crisis. Neither do the 1997-98 economic 
crisis and its implications explain the deep social divisions in Thai society, nor the roots of 
these social divisions. The hegemonic structures of the current order were created much 
earlier, and those structures still affect the current crisis. Therefore, in Thailand’s case, an 
analysis on the current crisis only is complete when the researcher deconstructs the process of 
this long-term development. 
Therefore, in order to reconstruct the dynamics of the totality of the power relations of the 
political stakeholders in Thai society and the forms of change in these relations, I opted to use 
the Gramscian perspective and his philosophy of praxis as my tool of analysis in my thesis. 
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In my thesis, I have tried to show the possibilities of the Gramscian analysis in studying 
political crises, with Thailand’s current historical politics as my case example. I have done 
this by combining the Italian school’s international systemic approach and reconstructing 
Gramsci’s thought by reading Gramsci’s original texts, combined with my accumulated local 
contextual knowledge of the underlying dynamics of the current historical Thai political 
crisis. I chose the Gramscian approach of the philosophy of praxis because it has to some 
extent been neglected as an approach to identify and articulate social change and 
transformation. I propose this because the relative autonomy of the local level and the change 
on the local level is missing in political analyses relying on the Italian School approach. 
Roccu mentions the Middle East social change and transformation as an example of this under 
exploitation of the Gramscian approach in the field of International Relations, and the neglect 
of the autonomy of the local level in the analyses. This neglect is also evident in the bulk of 
academic research in Southeast Asian politics and in the context of my own research, which is 
Thai politics. Based on my research process, I propose that the Gramscian philosophy of 
praxis is a fruitful analytical tool in studying the effects of the structural changes on a regional 
and on a local level, too, and why the implications of these international- regional effects 
influence the domestic level of a particular society on a political level.   
There are three factors involved in my approach that led my research process: the Marxist 
understanding of the articulation of the relationship between the material base of society and 
the superstructure evolving from it- it is the relationship between the economic and the 
political. The second dimension is the relationship between the international level and the 
domestic level; and how these two levels interact with each other. The third dimension is the 
relationship between the material and the ideational in a particular society.    
These three dimensions form the core of my analysis, at the centre of which is the focus is on 
the totality of power relations in society and how these relations change.  
In Gramscian analysis, the economic organisation of society defines the form of these power 
relations embedded in society. Thus, the researcher’s first task in applying the Grasmcian 
method is to identify and articulate the relationship between the material base and the 
superstructure level, and how the form of organisation on the base structure level affects the 
organisation of the political and the ideological, it is: the superstructure level. Central to the 
Gramscian approach is the function of hegemony, which evolves from the way the economic 
relations in a particular society are organised. In Gramscian analysis, the social forces that 
have hegemony over the means of production will have hegemony over the superstructure 
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level in society in a class society. By this, Gramsci refers to the form of the ideological-
political rule, a hegemonic regime. 
Hegemony is a process based not only on coercion on the rulers’ part, but it is also a process, 
which is based on consent on the part of the ruled to accept a status quo in society. The 
hegemonic rule of the leading groups in a society is kept in place through passive revolution, 
which means that the rulers alter between the poles of restoration/revolution to implement the 
necessary reforms in the process of transformation in a society. A hegemonic structure is a 
historical structure, which emerges in a particular historical context and which will prevail 
until the conditions develop for a counterhegemonic social force to emerge as a collective 
force to challenge the prevailing hegemonic regime, and to present new ways of organising a 
society. The emergence of a counterhegemonic force as an active political agent assigns the 
emergence of what Gramsci call a war of position of social forces, which is a historical 
interregnum situation, in which the old hegemonic order is crumbling, and a new social order 
is awaiting to be born. 
Gramscian approach studies the function of hegemony through the method of the philosophy 
of praxis. Embedded in the philosophy of praxis method is the notion that theory and practice 
are inseparable from each other: first, a human being becomes aware of the hegemonic social 
relations and his position in the hegemonic structures. Once he/she has attained awareness of 
the inequalities of the current system, he/she will put his/her knowledge into practice and tries 
to change the hegemonic system, together with other people belong to his/her social class. 
Philosophy of praxis thus also entails the emancipatory notion of knowledge: we study 
society in order to break free of all forms of dominance. Essential to the method of the 
philosophy of praxis is a notion of history as dialectical process. History is understood both 
as a necessity and as a conjuncture. The notion Gramsci proposes can be identified through 
analysing crises: an organic crisis is a crisis that has long-term implications on the economic 
and historical structure of a particular society. It refers to the major structural changes on the 
base structure level, which are reflected on the level of superstructure of a particular society. 
A conjunctural crisis is a passing, a temporary one, which disappears when the problem at the 
centre of the crisis disappears. Using the method of the philosophy of praxis thus requires 
differentiating between the two, through the use of a strict historical analysis of the totality of 
the power relations in a society. Only then is the researcher able to identify and articulate the 
major ruptural changes in his/her analysis.  
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In Gramscian analysis, the analysis happens on two levels simultaneously: firstly on the 
domestic level, and secondly, on the international systemic level, as both levels affect each 
other reciprocally. The hegemonic processes on the domestic level reflect the structural 
changes on the international level, respectively. The researcher has to shift her/his focus 
between these two levels intermittently.  
As Thailand’s current political crisis has its roots in the long-term capitalist development in 
Thailand, not only in the economic structural changes brought on by adjusting Thai economy 
to the Neoliberalist offensive implemented with the assistance of the international 
Neoliberalist institutional structures after the crisis of 1997-98, I had to look further in the 
history of Thailand’s development processes as a modern capitalist society, and try to 
articulate where the roots of the unequal development within the country initially stem from.      
Throughout the thesis process, the three factors mentioned in the beginning of this chapter led 
my research: the relationship between the base economic organisation of society and its 
effects on the superstructure level, the economic base, and the political level; the relationship 
between the domestic level and the international level, and the relationship between the 
material and the ideational. 
Here, the application of the Italian School’s world system analysis proves helpful in 
articulating the backdrop against which the forms of change on the local level of Thai society 
could be reflected upon, as the changes on the local level reflected the forms of change on the 
international systemic level. Hence, through studying the function of hegemony through 
historical analysis, I ended up using the Neo-Gramscian Italian School’s approach to 
articulate the forms of change; to identify the framework against which the change processes 
took place in the particular context of Thai society. Hence, I used the Italian School’s 
grouping of the three major historical structures, historic blocs in the international system, as 
a backdrop, as a theoretical framework for my own analysis. Those three historic blocs I 
grouped as Pax Britannica, Pax Americana, and Oligopolistic Neoliberalism. All these 
historic blocs influenced the forms of change and transformation of society on the domestic 
level of Thai society. 
Consequently, if we unravel the function of hegemony in Thai society, the actual creating of 
the hegemonic elite network rule inside Siam happened in the Pax Britannica era. Thus, we 
can position in a particular historical context, for instance, the strong position of the army in 
Thai politics. The establishing of the military as an important class to protect the national 
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elites’ interests can hence be traced all the way to the era of the implementing of the modern 
capitalist system in Siam and the creation of the nation-state in the country at the end of the 
19
th
 century. The strong position of the bureaucracy class can be traced to the same era. The 
economic changes in Siam followed the economic changes in the international system and 
were submitted to the Western colonial expansion; however, the form that the changes took 
on the local level is a different process altogether, autonomous of the international level.  
The establishing of the military and the bureaucracy as a strong class to protect the national 
elites’ interests were due to the need of consolidating the Bangkok administration’s power 
within the provinces, in the periphery of Siam, which at time was not under the administrative 
control of Bangkok. Both classes have retained their power as parts of the ruling elite 
networks up until the current crisis, and no restructuring of the economic organisation of Thai 
society has weakened these two classes’ position in Thai society. The local revolution of 
1932, in which absolute monarchy was abolished, served mainly to strengthen the military’s 
position in society, as the coup-makers themselves were part of the elite networks. The 
military has retained their strong position up until now, the only change being that in the 
1980s and in the 1990s, the military withdrew in the background in Thai politics, to emerge in 
the forefront again in the 2000s. The establishment of the national capitalist class also has its 
root in this era, when the old elite families established their economic power. 
The Pax Americana era consolidated the hegemonic elite rule. The forms of change in the 
totality of the power structure in Thai society in the Pax Americana era involved the 
implementing of the industrial capitalism in Thailand, which brought forward the rise of the 
Chinese family businesses as a part of the elite network rule. During the Pax Americana era, 
the influence of the international dimension of hegemony was strong, as the US was 
practically a patron state of Thailand. Thailand’s function in the US policy in Southeast Asia 
was twofold: to serve the Japanese economy that was of strategic value to the American 
interests in the region, and to act as a base for the expansion of the American capitalism in the 
region, masked under the ideological pretence of containing communism. In this era, the 
industrialisation of Thailand was carried out under the developmental paradigm, which 
involved the military-technocrat governments creating the framework for major economic 
projects with American aid, and the local Chinese-Thai business families executing the 
projects.  
An important part of the consolidation of the hegemony of the elite network rule in Thailand 
during this era has to do with the material-ideational axis: this is the era when the reinstating 
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of Thai monarchy as an ideological construct emerges from. The usefulness of Thai monarchy 
as a tool of the hegemonic elite networks to unify Thailand began at the end of the 1950s, and 
this tool has preserved its value in the hands of the elite networks up until the current Thai 
political crisis. The position of the monarchy as a political tool of the elite networks has 
become even more obvious in the current crisis, during which the trump card of the use of the 
harsh Lèse Majesté jurisdiction is used increasingly to silence opposition. Since 2006, the 
Lèse Majesté cases have multiplied, and there is no end in sight to the misuse of this 
particular law.  
Seen in this perspective, Thailand’s economic crisis in 1997-98 against the backdrop of the 
historic bloc of oligopolistic neoliberalism and the ensuing international neo-liberalist 
offensive on Thailand’s economy and the socio-political implications of this offensive, which 
includes the emergence of the Thai Rak Thai Party and their leader Taksin Shinawat, marks 
firstly, the total restructuring of Thailand’s economic base, and the restructuring of the 
domestic capital. Secondly, and what is more important in the context of this study, it marks 
the emergence of the masses as active political force, whose participation in political 
decision-making in the matters that concern them was acknowledged for the first time in Thai 
history by a political party through implementing pro-poor policies. Herein lays the 
significance of the “Taksin” era: the Thai Rak Thai Party “democratized” Thai politics with 
their pro-poor policies. What is important from the perspective of the rural and the urban poor 
was my proposed notion that in their experience and in their political consciousness the notion 
of “democracy” means electoral democracy – their voice is heard, and they can influence 
political decision-making through voting. This notion is important in light of the emergence 
of the Red Shirt Movement after the 2006 military coup: one of the demands of the Red Shirt 
Movement has been “democracy” all along the era of their existence. At the back of this 
thought, I claim is their experience of the Thai Rak Thai Party era and the mandate the poor 
gave to it through voting for their representatives.  
The previously mentioned in its totality indicates to the answer to my initial research question 
of the emergence of the new paradigm or phase in Thai politics since Thailand’s economic 
crisis in 1997-98. The crisis and the ensued Taksin era in my opinion is the beginning of the 
breakdown of the Thai elite networks’ hegemonic rule on the superstructure level of Thai 
society. What began as an economic crisis, set in motion a process on the politico-ideological 
level, an organic crisis, which in the Gramscian sense indicates a shift in the totality of the 
power relations in a society, and the beginning of the breakdown of an old hegemonic regime 
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rule. The organic crisis causes the shift from the passive revolution of the old hegemonic 
regime into the war of position situation between the rulers and the ruled. In the passive 
revolution situation, the society’s adjustment to the new historical economic situation is 
carried out from above, by the hegemonic regime: the necessary socio-political reforms 
brought on by this economic crisis are performed by the hegemonic rulers. This is not 
possible in the new war of position situation any more, in which an equilibrium exists 
between the rulers, and the ruled, as neither force is stronger than the other. The poor have 
alienated themselves from the old ideologies, and their political consciousness has risen. Due 
to this, the masses do not want to give their consent to the old hegemonic regime any more. In 
this war of position situation the poor, the masses, are not a passive mass any more, but a 
politically aware, politically active counterhegemonic force, who through their demands of 
social justice and reform demand an alternative way to organize a society. This is exactly 
what Thailand’s current political crisis is all about, and embedded therein is the answer to my 
research question: the new phase or the new paradigm in Thai politics indicates the beginning 
of the breakdown of the hegemony of the Thai elite networks in Thai politics, in the 
superstructure level of Thai society. As the war of position situation in the Gramscian sense is 
an interregnum period, in which the Hence, I see that the Gramscian historical analysis and 
the use of the philosophy of praxis as a method answers my initial research question. 
At the time I am writing my thesis, there is no solution to Thailand’s political crisis in sight. 
The speculations include the Yellow Shirts Royalist PDCR’s demands for an appointed 
government, the possibility of the civil war, another military coup. In Gramscian perspective, 
an old historic bloc will not cede from being until the hegemonic forces that keep its cohesion 
together have used up all the transformation possibilities that the inbuilt logic of the old 
historic bloc entails to preserve the old order. As I see it, in Thailand, these transformation 
processes of the hegemonic elite networks rule are still not over. These possibilities to 
preserve the old hegemonic rule are many, as we have seen recently in the politicized use of 
the law by various judicial administrative institutions to interfere in the political processes. On 
the other hand, the political polarization of Thai society into two camps and the efforts of the 
hegemonic elite networks to suppress the Red Shirt Movement may cause the ever-underlying 
political violence to erupt once again. In the end, following Gramsci and his philosophy of 
praxis I claim that there is no going back, as the rural and the urban poor have awakened and 
what is more important, they have the will and passion to change the society and offer 
alternative options on how to organize Thai society so that their demands for social justice, 
social reforms and democracy will be answered. 
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As my thesis is a holistic, general study into the power relations in Thai society and a study 
into the forms of change these relations have taken over time, there are a few questions that 
come into my mind regarding possible further research on Thai politics from the Gramscian 
perspective. As the Gramscian perspective is extremely flexible as a method, one possible 
topic of further research could be my deepening of the Gramscian method in studying special 
dimensions of Thai politics. In my thesis, my analysis happens on rather a general level, the 
focus being on the functional dimension of the function of hegemony; it is the legitimation of 
the rule of the Thai hegemonic elites. In this respect, when it comes to Thai politics and the 
legitimation of the elite rule, one uncharted territory especially comes to my mind that 
presents more questions than there exist answers in the field of the academic research on Thai 
politics: the analysis on Thai monarchy as a part of the hegemonic elite networks rule. The 
analysis on Thai monarchy is sorely neglected for the reasons mentioned earlier in this thesis. 
When one thinks of deepening the Gramscian analysis and the philosophy of praxis as a 
method, as a tool of analysis, it might be a basis for a further study on Thai politics. This 
would involve moving away from the functional perspective of the function of hegemony and 
acquainting myself further in Roccu’s articulation approach, which Roccu has outlined in his 
PhD thesis on the unravelling of the hegemony of the local elites in Egyptian context against 
the backdrop of the neoliberalist economic framework. The articulation approach deepens the 
Gramscian analysis as a method by articulating the different dimensions of the function of 
hegemony in a more detailed way that what I have done in my analysis. The merit of Roccu’s 
analysis is in how through the detailed articulation of the function of hegemony he manages 
to avoid what he calls the weaknesses of both the Italian and the Amsterdam schools. 
According to him, the weakness of the Amsterdam school type of an analysis in the field of 
International Relations is in their use of the functional dimension of the function of hegemony 
(transnational class approach), which leaves the analysis incomplete in the sense, that the 
focus of this approach is mainly on the legitimation of the hegemonic rule by a certain class. 
The weakness of the Italian school, on the other hand, is their focus on the consensual aspect 
of the function of hegemony. This focus tends to shift the analysis from Gramsci’s initial 
balanced equation between the material and the ideational, more towards the idealistic 
interpretation, which lessens the value of the analysis. As my thesis partly uses the Italian 
School’s theoretical approach, my own research would benefit from Roccu’s more detailed 
articulation approach, as it avoids the pitfalls of both schools. Hence, the using of the 
articulation approach more in research as a research method, as I propose, would enrich the 
Neo-Gramscian research, as it respects the flexibility of the original Gramscian approach, and 
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its use as a method, as an analytical tool of research. In the case of Thai politics, in particular, 
this approach would open up new possibilities for research.  
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